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English-Speaking Justice: Evolving
Responses to Transnational Forcible
Abduction After Alvarez-Machain
Paul Michell*
I. Transnational Forcible Abduction and the Role of Domestic Courts
in the International Legal Order
A. Introduction
May a domestic court try an individual who has been abducted from
abroad and brought before it in violation of international law? The traditional Anglo-American rule is that it must, denying the court supervisory
jurisdiction over unlawful executive conduct. This controversial doctrine,
encapsulated in the maxim male captus bene detentus,l has recently been
revisited in both the United States and the United Kingdom, but with
starkly different results. In United States v. Alvarez-Machain, the U.S.
Supreme Court reaffirmed the traditional rule in holding that a Mexican
citizen, abducted from Mexico by U.S. agents to face trial in a federal court
in California, could not challenge the court's jurisdiction based on the illegality of the arrest.2
Only a year later, the United Kingdom's House of Lords emphatically
rejected the male captus bene detentus rule in Regina v. Horseferry Road
Magistrates' Court (Ex parte Bennett).3 The Law Lords held that a New
Zealand citizen, forcibly returned to England from South Africa, could
obtain a stay of the criminal proceedings against him in England. In a
subsequent decision, In re Schmidt,4 the House of Lords clarified the position it had taken in Bennett II by considering the neglected but important
question of whether an individual can challenge extradition proceedings
against him on the basis that he was brought illegally into the jurisdiction
seeking to extradite him. The divergence of opinion between the U.S.
Supreme Court and the House of Lords requires some explanation.
* Tory Tory DesLauriers & Binnington, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. B.A., McGill
University; LL.B., Toronto; B.C.L., Oxford. I am grateful to Sujit Choudhry and Elizabeth
C.Fisher for their advice and comments, and to the Editors of the Cornell International
Law Journalfor their patience and expert editing. Special thanks to Craig M.Scott. who
patiently read many earlier drafts and vas unfailingly helpful in offering suggestions for
improvement.

1. This maxim translates as "improperly caught, well detained."
2. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).

3. Regina v. Horseferry Rd. Magis. Ct. (Ex parte Bennett), [1994] 1 App. Cas. 42
(Eng. H.L. 1993) [hereinafter Bennett II].
4. In re Schmidt, [1995] 1 App. Cas. 339, 362 (Eng. H.L. 1994) [hereinafter Schmidt

II].
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The domestic legal effects of transnational forcible abduction have
engendered considerable academic activity.' The controversial AlvarezMachain decision has been the subject of extensive commentary, the majority of which has been hostile,6 although it has not been without its support5. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see F.A. Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME
oF PE"LExrry: ESSAYs INHONOUR OF SHABTAi RosENNE 407 (Yoram Dinstein & M. Tabory
eds., 1989); Paul O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure of Persons by States, in INTrRNATIONAL TERRORiSM AND PoLrr-cAL CmaMEs 336 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1975); Abraham Abramovsky, ExtraterritorialAbductions: America's "Catch and Snatch" Policy Run Amok, 31 VA.J.
INT'L L. 151 (1991); Abraham Abramovsky & StevenJ. Eagle, U.S. Policy in Apprehending
Alleged Offenders Abroad: Extradition,Abduction, or IrregularRendition?, 57 O. L. REv.
51 (1978); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and IrregularRendition Devices as
Alternatives to Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TPANSNAT'L L. 25 (1973); Michael H. Cardozo,
Comment, When Extradition Fails, Is Abduction the Solution?, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 127
(1961); Vincent Coussirat-Coustre & Pierre-Michel Eisemann, L'enlevement de Personnes Privies et le Droit International,76 REVUE GENERALE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
[R.G.D.I.P.] 346 (1972); Andre Decocq, La Livraison des Delinquants en Dehors du Droit
Commun de L'extradition,53 REVUE CrMQuE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PRIVu [R.C.D.I.P.]
411 (1964); Richard Downing, Recent Development: The Domestic and International
Legal Implications of the Abduction of Criminalsfrom ForeignSoil, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 573
(1990); Alona E. Evans, Acquisition of Custody Over the International Fugitive
Offender-Alternatives to Extradition: A Survey of United States Practice,40 BRIT.Y.B. INT'L
L. 77 (1964); Alona E. Evans, InternationalProceduresfor the Apprehension and Rendition
of Fugitive Offenders, 1980 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 274 (1980); Andrew K. Fletcher,
Pirates and Smugglers: An Analysis of the Use of Abductions to Bring Drug Traffickers to
Trial. 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 233 (1991); Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, CriminalJurisdictionof a
State Over Fugitives Brought from a Foreign Country by Force or Fraud: A Comparative
Study, 32 IND. L.J. 427 (1957); Theodore C. Jonas, International"Fugitive Snatching" in
U.S. Law: Two Views From Opposite Ends of the Eighties, 24 CORNELL INT'L UJ. 521
(1991); Clare E. Lewis, Unlawful Arrest: A Bar to the Jurisdictionof the Court, or Mala
Captus Bene Detentus? SidneyJaffe: A Case in Point, 28 CraiM. L.Q. 341 (1986); Daniel
Marchand, Abductions Effected Outside National Territory, 7 J. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 243
(1966); Felice Morgenstern, Jurisdiction in Seizures Effected in Violation of International
Law, 29 BaRn. Y.B. INT'L L. 265 (1952); Paul O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure and Irregular
Extradition, 36 Barr. Y.B. INT'L L.279 (1960); Bartholome de Schutter, Competence of the
National Judiciary Power in Case the Accused has been Unlawfully Brought Within the
National Frontiers, 1 REv. BELGE DE DR.INT'L [R.B.D.I.] 88 (1965); Austin W. Scott, Jr.,
CriminalJurisdictionof a State Over a Defendant Based Upon PresenceSecured by Force or
Fraud, 37 MINN. L.REv. 91 (1953); Thomas H. Sponsler, InternationalKidnapping, 5
INT'L LAw. 127 (1971); Sharon Williams, Comment, 53 CAN. BAR REV. 404 (1975);
Kathryn Selleck, Note, JurisdictionAfter InternationalKidnapping: A Comparative Study,
8 B.C. INTL & CoMP L.REv. 237 (1985). See also 2 DANIE. P. O'CoNEIe, INTERNATIONAL
LAw 832-37 (2d ed. 1970); EuAR F. BAUER, DIE VOLKE ECHTSWIDIUGE ENTFOHRUNG
(1968).
6. For critical responses to Alvarez-Machain, see Betsy Baker & Volker R6ben, To
Abduct or To Extradite: Does a Treaty Beg the Question?, 53 Z -TscHIFr FOR AUSLANDIS.
CHES Ore-'rNCHEs R cr uND VouamuEcrr 657 (1993); Jonathan A. Bush, How Did We
Get Here? Foreign Abduction After Alvarez-Machain, 45 STAN. L.REV. 939 (1993);
Michael J. Glennon, State-SponsoredAbduction: A Comment on United States v. AlvarezMachain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 746 (1992); Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Evolution of United
States Involvement in the InternationalRendition of Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 813 (1993); JordanJ. Paust, After Alvarez-Machain: Abduction, Standing, Denials of Justice, and UnaddressedHuman Rights Claims, 67 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 551 (1993);
Rosemary Rayfuse, Comment, InternationalAbduction and the United States Supreme
Court: The Law of the Jungle Reigns, 42 INT'L & COMP. LQ. 882 (1993); Jacques Semmelman, Due Process, International Law, and Jurisdiction over Criminal Defendants
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ers. 7 While Alvarez-Machain may be a deeply flawed decision, the onus is
upon those who disagree with its reasoning to offer realistic alternatives for
the regulation of transnational forcible abduction, rather than merely issuing blanket condemnations. In Bennett II and Schmidt lI-decisions which
have received little attention outside of the United Kingdom8 -the House of
Lords has progressed somewhat toward achieving this goal. This Article
builds in part upon that foundation and provides an alternative account of
the role and responsibility of domestic courts when an individual has been
brought before them by way of a transnational forcible abduction.
This section provides a brief introduction to the nature of the problem
of transnational forcible abduction. Section II considers the origin and
development of the male captus bene detentus rule in the United States up to
the leading case, Alvarez-Machain. It also examines the status of transnational forcible abduction in public international law. Section II then
explores the possibility of establishing a customary norm requiring the
return of an abducted individual upon the protest and request of the
injured state. 9 Furthermore, it suggests that domestic courts, and not the
executive, are best placed to ensure that the international legal obligations
of states with regard to transnational forcible abduction are fulfilled.
Section III contends that transnational forcible abduction is unlawful
under international human rights law and considers some domestic impliAbducted Extraterritorially: The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine Reexamined, 30 COLUM. J. T-A.sNAT'L L. 513 (1992); Jacques Semmelnan, Case Comment, 86 AM.J. INT'L L. 811 (1992);
Brigitte Stem, L'Extraterritorialitd Revisitee, 38 ANN. FRL DE DR. INT'L 239 (1992);
Jonathan A. Gluck, Note, The Customary InternationalLaw of State-Sponsored International Abduction and United States Courts, 44 DuKE LJ. 612 (1994).
7. For positive treatments of Alvarez-Machain, see jimmy Gurul, Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the ForcibleApprehension of InternationalCriminalsAbroad, 17 HAsTINGS INT'L & CoW. L. Rev. 457 (1994); Malvina Halberstam, Agora: International
Kidnapping, 86 AM.J. INT'L L. 736 (1992); MitchellJ. Matorin, Note, Unchaining the Law:
The Legality of ExtraterritorialAbduction in Lieu of Extradition, 41 DuKE LJ. 907 (1992);
MichaelJ. Weiner, Note, The Importanceof a Clear Rule forjudicialDeference to Executive
Interpretationsof Treaties: A Defense of United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 12 WIsc. INT'L
LJ. 125 (1993).
8. See David H. Herrold, Note, A New, Emerging World Order: Reflections of Tradition and Progression Through the Eyes of Two Courts, 2 TULSA J. CoWP. & IN''L L. 143
(1994). On Bennett 11, see Andrew L.-T. Choo, International Kidnapping, Disguised
Extradition and Abuse of Process, 57 Moo. L. REv. 626 (1994); Vaughan Lowe, Circumventing Extradition Procedures is an Abuse of Process, 52 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 371 (1993);
Susan Nash, Abduction and Extradition,144 NEw LJ. 1235 (1994); G. Ossman, The Doctrine of Abuse of Processof the Court: Its Impact on the Principlesof ExtraditionWithout a
Conventional Obligation and of Speciality, 16 LivROOL L. REv. 67 (1994); Christopher
Staker, Public International Law, 64 Birr. Y.B. INT'L L. 477 (1993); Ruth Wedgwood,
Comment, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 142 (1995); Steven Coren, Note, Disguised Extradition and
Abuse of Process, 110 LxAW Q. REv. 393 (1994). On Schmidt II, see John Hopkins, Extradition and the Jurisdictionof the High Court, 53 CAMBRMGE LJ. 423 (1994). The two cases
are also discussed in Andrew L.-T. Choo, Halting Criminal Prosecutions: The Abuse of
Process DoctrineRevisited, [1995] Cpim. L. REv. 864.
9. On the use of the term "injured state," see Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
[1985] 2 (pt. 2) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 24, 25 (Article 5 of the draft defines an injured
State as "any State a right of which is infringed by the [internationally wrongful] act of
another State.").
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cations of this international illegality. With this foundation, Section IV
contrasts the U.S. rule with the history and present status of the Commonwealth rule. Courts in New Zealand, Australia, South Africa,' 0 Canada,
and the United Kingdom have distanced themselves from the traditional
rule to which U.S. courts still cling. The emerging Commonwealth rule is
more faithful to public international law and international human rights
law, as well as more consonant with domestic law. Finally, Section V sets
out a framework that a domestic court should follow when an individual
has been brought before it through forcible abduction from another state.
In conclusion, the Article maintains that a domestic court is under a
duty to refuse to allow a trial to proceed where an individual has been
brought before it in violation of international law. In this manner, domestic courts must regard themselves as agents of the international legal order
and must not abdicate the responsibility for ensuring that domestic criminal law procedures comply with international legal norms."
The concept of domestic courts acting as agents of the international
legal system must not be misunderstood. This Article does not propose
that domestic courts, in adjudicating transnational forcible abduction
cases, should consider themselves beholden to some indeterminate, woolly
entity called "the international legal system." Domestic courts are constituted by, and responsible to, domestic law. In general, where international
legal norms and domestic legal norms differ, domestic courts are bound to
follow the latter.
Yet matters are rarely so simple. Only infrequently are international
norms and domestic norms obviously opposed. The boundary separating
domestic and international law is, in many cases, a porous one. International law, whether conventional or customary, may enter or influence
domestic law, whether statutory or common law, in various forms. Some
of these forms are familiar, such as international conventions directly
incorporated into domestic law by domestic legislation. Others are less
familiar, particularly the potential influence of customary international law
and unincorporated international human rights law upon domestic legal
norms. Indeed, the familiarity of many courts with incorporated treaties
fuels their contempt for the more nuanced ways in which international law
can affect domestic law. More attention to the mechanics of the proposed
model will be made below; it suffices here only to emphasize that the issue
is complex.
This Article advances the specific argument that courts adjudicating
transnational forcible abduction cases should consider customary interna10. Technically, South Africa is not a member of the Commonwealth. Yet it has close

ties with other Commonwealth nations, and its legal system remains highly influenced
by those of the United Kingdom and other English speaking states. DALE HUTcHISON Er
AL., WiLn's PRINciPLEs OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 36-37 (8th ed. 1991).
11. See generally BENE-DErro CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND mE ROLE OF DOMES.
TIC LEGAL SYsTms (1993); RicHARD A. FAL,,THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTER.
NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964); KENN= C. RANDALL, FEmAL COURTS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS PARADIGM (1990).
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tional law and international human rights law when structuring and interpreting domestic constitutional, statutory and common law doctrines, so
as to render decisions which vindicate both international and domestic
norms. In particular, international legal norms provide useful guidelines
by which the domestic abuse of process doctrine may be structured and
exercised in transnational forcible abduction cases. In this way, domestic
courts act as agents of the international legal system by ensuring that international legal norms are, so far as possible, used to inform domestic common law doctrine.
This Article also establishes a framework within which domestic
courts may determine jurisdictional issues concerning abducted individuals. In deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over an abducted individual, a domestic court must take into account three factors. First, it must
consider the public international law status of the abduction; specifically,
whether there has been a breach of the territorial sovereignty of another
state, of a treaty obligation, or of human rights obligations owed to another
state. Second, it must look to both international human rights law and the
domestic constitutional rights of the abducted individual. Finally, its decision must be guided by reference to international rule of law values and a
concern for the protection of the court's process. Domestic conceptions of
abuse of process, therefore, must be informed by international law.
When faced with a fugitive who has been abducted from abroad and
brought before it for trial, a domestic court must consider the rule of law.
The term "rule of law" has often been abused, so it must be carefully
defined. 12 The rule of law is not only formal in nature, but has important
substantive elements as well. It is used in this Article to describe three
related concepts. The first is a traditional concern with the prevention of
executive unlawfulness under domestic law. Simply put, the courts must
be prepared to exercise judicial review to ensure that the domestic executive acts according to the ordinary law of the land. The second strand of
the rule of law embodies a concern that the domestic authorities comply
with international legal norms. This element of the rule of law is the one
most directly connected with the proposal that domestic courts must take
more seriously their rule as agents of the international legal system. The
third component of the rule of law relates to the concern domestic courts
should display in ensuring that the domestic executive does not violate
individual human rights, derived as they are from both international and
domestic law.
These three elements of the rule of law, though conceptually distinct
(and often treated as such by the courts), are closely connected in practice.
A breach of international human rights norms may be a violation of domestic law, and vice versa. Where the domestic executive observes international legal norms, a healthy respect for both international human rights
and domestic law is the likely result. Justice Steyn of the Appellate Divi12. See generallyJoseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in THE AurnoRry OF
LAw: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MoRAiTm 210 (1979).
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sion of the Supreme Court of South Africa recognized the links between
these three ideas in State v. Ebrahim,when he referred to the fundamental
legal principles of the preservation and promotion of human rights,
13
friendly international relations and the sound administration of justice.
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Alvarez-Machain, adopted a similar
approach. 14 Respect for one of the three principles normally entails observance of the others.
B. Transnational Forcible Abduction: Why and How?
The process of returning a fugitive from one state to another is generically
described as "rendition." Rendition may be subdivided into three categories: extradition, deportation, and abduction. States resort to transnational forcible abduction because bringing fugitives to trial is a difficult
business. 15 The ease of international travel makes it relatively simple for
an individual to escape from a state's prosecuting authorities by fleeing
abroad. Once abroad, the obstacles to the return and prosecution of a fugitive are numerous. The usual method of securing the fugitive's presence
for trial is through extradition, either by treaty or through reciprocity. 16 A
state seeking to prosecute a fugitive who has fled to another state may
request that the asylum state either extradite him or prosecute him domestically.1 7 However, in the absence of an extradition treaty, the asylum state
13. State v. Ebrahim, [1991] 2 S.A. 553 (S. Afr. App. Div.).
14. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
15. "Fugitive" is a convenient, if at times misleading, shorthand. Its use is not
intended to imply either that the individual is necessarily guilty of an offense (although
he may be), or that he has actually fled from one state to another and is thus a "fugitive"
from the former (although this is common enough). For the purposes of this Article, a
"fugitive" is an individual sought by the abducting state for the purpose of charging him
with criminal offenses, or punishment for a conviction previously entered. See Extradition Act, R.S.C. ch. E-23, § 2 (1985) (Can.). Situations where states intervene to evacuate their own nationals from another state (e.g., the 1976 Entebbe rescue) are thus
excluded because there the intent is protection rather than prosecution. Generally, a
state is unlikely to abduct an individual from abroad unless it intends to try him for
criminal offenses under its own domestic law. However, an individual could be
abducted or induced to leave state X to state Y with the intention of extraditing him to
state Z. See Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 910 F.2d 1063
(2d Cir. 1990), stay denied, 111 S. Ct. 23 (1990) (irregular rendition from Venezuela to
United States for extradition to Israel); Schmidt II, [1995] 1 App. Cas. at 343-45 (Eng.
H.L 1994) (fugitive lured from Ireland to England to be extradited to Germany); Liangsiriprasert v. United States, [1991] 1 App. Cas. 225, 231 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Hong
Kong) (individuals lured from Thailand to Hong Kong to be extradited to the United
States); Bozano v. France, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 297 (1987) (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (rendition from
France to Switzerland for extradition to Italy).
16. On extradition generally, see 1 M. CHim BAssiouNI, INTERNATIONAL ExTRADTON:
UNrErD STATES LAW AND PRACnCE (2d rev. ed. 1987); MicHAE. FoRDE, THE LAW OF EXTRA.
DrrON
T Em
UNrn KiNGDOM (1995); ALUN JONES, JONES ON ExTRADION (1995); ANNE
WANm LA FOREST, LA FORESr'S ExTRADrnoN To AND FROM CANADA (3d ed. 1991).
17. Extradition is "the formal surrender of a person by a State to another State for
prosecution or punishment." Draft Convention on Extradition,Art. l(a), 29 Am.J. INT'L L.
21 (Supp. 1935); 1 RESTATEmENT (THIRD) oF FOREIGN RLATIONS LAw § 475 (1987); Sir
Arnold McNair, Extradition and ExterritorialAsylum, 28 Bmur. Y.B. INT'L L. 172, 172

(1952).
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is under no international legal obligation to either extradite or prosecute a
8
fugitive.'
Even the existence of an extradition treaty between the requesting
state and the asylum state is no guarantee of successful recovery of a fugitive. Several barriers may prevent the return of a fugitive from abroad
through the extradition process. First, the asylum state may decline to
extradite a fugitive if it views the offense with which he has been charged as
political in nature.' 9 Second, many states refuse to extradite their own
nationals for offenses committed abroad. 20 Third, there is a requirement
of double criminality.2 1 Most extradition treaties provide that extradition
is available only for certain specified offenses. Finally, the extradition process can be painfully slow. 2 2 Faced with a foreign state's reluctance to

extradite a fugitive, other options may appear more attractive to the
requesting state, including the forcible abduction of the fugitive from
abroad to face trial.
A transnational forcible abduction consists of four elements. This
Article focuses upon transnational forcible abductions with the understanding that each of these four elements is present, while recognizing that
cases may stray from this paradigm. By setting out guidelines for the
model case, a solution for less dear cases may be derived by analogy.
The first element of a transnational forcible abduction requires there
to be a fugitive, an individual suspected (or already convicted) of having
18. There is no duty under customary international law either to prosecute or extradite fugitives. United States v. Allard, I S.C.R. 861, 865 (Can. 1991); BASsIouNI, supra
note 16, at 10; Manuel Adolfo Viera, L'evolution Recente de L'extradition dans le Continent Amdricain, 185 REcuEIL DES CouRs 151, 301 (1984-I1). Such a duty arises only
under treaties. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. 7, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 282; Convention For the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Highjacking), Dec. 16, 1970, art. 7, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 1646,
10 I.L.M. 133 134-35; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), Sept. 23, 1971, art. 7, 24 U.S.T. 565, 571, 10 LL.M.
1151, 1154; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, art. 8, G.A. Res.
146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245, 246, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/46 (1979).
See generally M. CHEmF BASSIoUNi & EDw-A1D M. WISE, Aur DEDERE Air JuDicARE: THE
DUTY TO EXrRADrrE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1995). While under international law there is no duty to extradite in the absence of a treaty obligation, a state may
choose to extradite even though no treaty requires it to do so. Extradition in this manner, however, may be prohibited by the domestic law of some states.
19. For an in-depth analysis of this defense, see CHsrlI VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE
POLITICAL OFFENSE ExCEPTION TO EXTRADITION (1980).
20. IAN BROwNIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLC INTERNATIONAL LAW 317 (4th ed. 1990); IvAN
A. SHEARE , EXrRADmON IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 94-96 (1971). States which do not extradite their nationals usually prosecute on the basis of the nationality principle. Therefore, even though the fugitive is not extradited, he may be prosecuted under the laws of
the asylum state. A state's willingness to extradite its nationals tends to vary directly
with the scope of the adjudicative competence which it claims under the nationality
principle. Jose Francisco Rezek, Reciprocity as a Basis of Extradition,52 Brr. Y.B. INT'L
L. 171, 184-85 (1981).
21. It is a common treaty provision that the offense for which the fugitive is sought
must be a criminal offense in both states. United States v. Lpine, 1 S.C.R. 286, 297
(Can. 1994).
22. Cardozo, supra note 5, at 128-32.
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committed a criminal offense 23 in one state, who has fled to another state.
The nationality of the fugitive is unimportant. 2 4 The only requirement is
that the fugitive be physically present in one state and be sought by the
authorities of another state. The second substantive element is that the
fugitive must have been abducted by force. A state may also use the threat
of force or similar sanctions in order the secure the presence of a fugitive
within its jurisdiction. Third, there must be an aspect of extraterritorial
enforcement by the abducting state. The abducting state must have acted
outside its own territory. The fourth element requires that the abduction
has been carried out by state agents, either state employees or private individuals working under state direction.
Transnational forcible abduction must be distinguished from the prac23. Civil proceedings are a distinct matter. The general rule is that jurisdiction for
civil proceedings cannot be grounded by force or fraud, and service will be set aside. See
generally ROBERTJ. SHA"E, THE LAw or HABEns CoRus 181 (2d ed. 1989); 1 DIcEY AND
MORMs ON THE CoNFucr oF LAws 300 n.84 (Lawrence Collins ed., 12th ed. 1993). Case
law also supports this distinction. See In reJohnson, 162 U.S. 120, 126 (1897); Watkins
v. North American Land and Timber Co. Ltd., 20 T.L.R. 534, 535-36 (Eng. H.L. 1904);
Fitzgerald and Mallory Const. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U.S. 98, 105 (1890); Perrett v.
Robinson [1985] 1 Q.R. 83, 84-85 (Queensland (Austl.)); Colt Indus. Inc. v. Sarlie, 1
W.L.R. 440, 443-444 (Eng. Q.B. 1966); Stein v. Valkenhuysen, 120 Eng. Rep. 431, 432
(Q.B. 1858); Adam v. Crowe, 14 . 800 n.* (Scot. 1st Div. 1897); Lewis v. Wiley, 53
O.L.R. 608, 609 (Ont. (Can.) S. Ct. 1923). Even this rule is limited in its application.
Service will not be set aside where service of the writ upon the defendant was not the
sole reason for having lured him into the jurisdiction. Watkins, 20 T.L.R. at 536. A
defendant who has been brought into the jurisdiction by force of law may be served with
a writ. Baldry v.Jackson, [1976] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 19, 23 (New S. Wales (Austl.) S. Ct.); John
Sanderson & Co. (N.S.W.) Pty Ltd. v. Giddings, [1976] V.. 421, 424 (Victoria (Austl.)
S. Ct.). Several forcible abduction cases explicitly distinguish criminal cases from civil
cases. In re Harmett, 1 0.R. 2d 206, 209-10 (Ont. (Can.) High Ct. ofJustice 1973); In re
Johnson, 162 U.S. at 126; Sinclair v. H.M. Advocate, 17 P. 38, 43 (Scot. 1890).
24. In most situations, the fugitive will be a citizen of the state requesting extradition
for an alleged offense committed within that state. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 437-39
(1886); The King v. Walton, 10 C.C.C. 269, 272-73 (Ont. (Can.) C.A. 1905); Regina v.
Hartley, [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 199, 215 (N.Z. C.A.); State v. Ebrahim, [1991] 2 S.A. 553,
562-63(a) (S. Mr. App. Div.), translated in 31 I.L.M. 888, 890 (1992); Mackeson v. Minister of Info., Immigration, and Tourism, [1980] 1 S.A. 747, 749 (Zimbabwe/Rhodesia
Div.); Regina v. O./C. Depot Battalion, R.A.S.C., Colchester (Ex parte Elliot), [1949] 1 All
Eng. Rep. 373, 375 (K.B. Div'l Ct.); Ex parte Scott, 109 Eng. Rep. 166, 166 (K.B. 1829);
Sinclair v. H.M. Advocate, 17 R. 38, 41, 44. In some cases, the fugitive will not be a
citizen of the abducting state. Jaffe v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304,305 (1lth Cir. 1987); Regina
v. Plymouth Magis. Ct. (Ex parte Driver), [1986] 1 Q.B. 95, 103 (Eng.). In other cases,
the alleged offense may have occurred outside the territory of the abducting state.
Thomas L. Friedman, Israel Confirms It Is HoldingMissing Nuclear Technician, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 1986, at A1O (former technician at Israeli nuclear plant who revealed details of
Israeli nuclear capacity lured to Italy from London and abducted by Israeli agents);
Christopher Walker, Vanunu's Kidnap Story Confirmed by Israeli Report, THE TIMES
(London), Mar. 24, 1995, at 13 (same). The fugitive may also be a non-citizen accused
of a crime committed outside the abducting state's territory. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.
at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1510 (S.D.
Fla. 1990) (Commander-in-Chief of Panamanian Defense Forces seized by invading U.S.
forces and brought to face drug trafficking charges in United States); United States v.
Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 898 (D.D.C. 1988); Attorney-General v. Eichmann, 45 Resakim
Mehozim 3 (Isr. Dist. Ct. 1961), translated in 36 I.L.R. 18, 28-29 (1968), affd, 16 P.D.
2033 (Isr. 1962), translated in 36 I.L.R. 277 (1968).
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tice of "disguised extradition," with which it has some similarities. 25 Disguised extradition occurs when an individual is deported by state X to state
Y,state Y seeks his return for prosecution, and state X deports the individual in order to bypass the regular extradition process between the two
states. Extradition and deportation are conceptually distinct procedures
with different purposes. The purpose of deportation is to expel unwanted
immigrants. In theory, a state which deports an individual has no preference as to her destination-it simply wants her to leave. Extradition, by
contrast, is concerned with the transfer of an individual to a specific foreign state so that she may be prosecuted there for specified offenses. There
are a number of other important distinctions between extradition and
deportation. Only aliens may be deported, whereas a state may extradite
both aliens and nationals. Further, extradition arises from the request of a
foreign state, whereas deportation is in theory a unilateral act of the deporting state. Finally, disguised extradition by way of deportation necessarily
involves the consent and participation of the officials of the deporting
state, whereas a transnational forcible abduction may or may not.
Deportation to a specific foreign state may give rise to the suspicion
that "disguised extradition" is taking place, thus depriving the individual of
the procedural protections inherent to formal extradition proceedings.
Deportation decisions, which are themselves subject to controls in both
domestic and international law, 26 cannot be made in a vacuum. An individual who is to be deported must be deported to some other state, and in
many cases only one or two states may be willing to accept the deportee.
The receiving state may wish to press criminal charges against the
individual.
Although the problem is worthy of concern, the term "disguised extradition" should not be used too broadly. The mere fact that an individual
has been deported from state X to state Y,and Y seeks to prosecute him, is
27
It
neither inherently objectionable nor a violation of international law.

25. On disguised extradition, see Schlieske v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs, 84 A.L.R. 719, 724-29 (Austl. Fed. Ct. 1988); Moore v. Minister of Manpower
and Immigration, [1968] S.C.R. 839 (Can.); Halm v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1996] 1 F.C. 547, 560-65 (Can. Fed. Ct.); Hahn v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 2 F.C. 331, 365-67 (Can. Fed. Ct.); Mensinger
and Minister of Employment and Immigration v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1987] 1 F.C. 59, 6870 (Can. Fed. C.); Kindler v. MacDonald, [1985] 1 F.C. 675, 683-89 (Can. Fed. Ct.);
Bembenek v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 69 C.C.C. 3d 34, 48
(Ont. (Can.) Gen. Div. 1991) (recognizing phenomenon, but holding that it was not
made out on the evidence); In re Shepherd and Minister of Employment and Imnmigration, 70 O.R. 2d 765, 773-74 (Ont. (Can.) CA 1989), leave to appeal refused, 68 D.L.R.
4th vii (Can. 1989); Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison (Ex parte Soblen), [1963] 2
Q.B. 243, 300-02 (Eng. C.A.); Regina v. Guildford Magis. Ct., (Ex parte Healy), [1983] 1
W.L.R. 108, 111-14 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct.). See generally SHEAaR, supra note 20, at 76-9 1.
26. Ex parte Soblen, [1963]2 Q.B. 243;J. M. EvANs, IMMINGRATION LAw 274-78 (2d ed.
1983); Guy S. GooowiN-GLL, INTERNATONAL LAw AND ThE MOVmE
OF PERSONS
BErWEEN STATES 307-10 (1973); 1 OPmHamM's ITERNAa-ioNAL LAw: PRAcE 940-48 (Sir
Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
27. App. No. 10893/84 v. Germany, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 124, 126 (1985) (Commission
report).
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only becomes objectionable when X deports the individual to Y with the
intent of circumventing extradition proceedings, or perhaps where extradition would ordinarily be unavailable. 28 The key question involves the circumvention of extradition procedures by means of deportation. This
Article argues that rendition which circumvents an extradition treaty violates both international and domestic law, and that the appropriate remedy
for the violation is a stay of the proceedings against the fugitive and his
return to the injured state.
The following sections survey the origin and development of the male
captus bene detentus doctrine, under which courts do not question how the
accused came to be physically before them. Traditionally, the rationale
underlying the male captus bene detentus principle has been threefold.
First, the rule satisfies domestic due process guarantees. According to this
view, a criminal defendant is entitled only to a fair trial, and forcible
abduction does not affect the fairness of the trial itself. Second, there is a
strong public interest in the prosecution of crime. The rule ensures that
alleged offenders are brought to trial. Finally, the judiciary traditionally
has held the view that courts are not the appropriate forum to adjudicate
alleged violations of public international law by the executive. Instead,
courts have adopted the position that any difficulties arising from an irregular arrest are best resolved diplomatically.
The male captus bene detentus doctrine faces severe challenges, however, from domestic constitutional norms as well as international human
rights instruments. Developments in domestic and international human
rights protection weaken the due process rationales underpinning the doctrine. The doctrine's second rationale is challenged by the development of
a supervisory jurisdiction over executive lawlessness by federal courts and
the need to protect the process of the courts from abuse. The third justification is undermined by the argument that domestic courts are under an
obligation to follow certain international norms.
This Article assumes that as a matter of international law domestic
courts must ensure that a state's international legal obligations are carried
out. Accordingly, courts are under a duty to stay proceedings against a
fugitive who has been brought before them in violation of international
law. The existence of this duty is the central issue in the cases which follow. However, the discussion of this duty takes several forms and can lead
to confusion. Most U.S. cases, and many of the earlier English decisions,
28.

CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKEsLzY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE PRO-

LmamTY 279 (1992). See also Torsten Stein, Rendition of Terrorists:
Extradition Versus Deportation, 19 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 281 (1989). For example, there
may be no extradition treaty between state X and state Y,or a procedural protection in
an extradition treaty between X and Ymay prevent formal extradition of the individual.
Alternatively, extradition may previously have been denied. E.g., I.N.S. v. Doherty, 502
U.S. 314 (1992). See Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2 S.C.R. 779, 835 (Can.
1991) (fairness concerns may arise which demand the use of one procedure over the
other). The question of the legality of an individual's deportation should be distinguished from the legality of the decision to deport an individual to a particular state. In
re Buayi, 93 R.G.D.I.P. 160 (1989) (Fr. Cons. d'Etat 1987).
TECTION OF HumAN

1996

English-SpeakingJustice

discuss the duty in terms of whether the domestic court may exercise jurisdiction over the fugitive. American courts traditionally have held that the
manner in which an individual is brought before them does not affect their
ability to exercise jurisdiction over him.29 They have also assumed that
once jurisdiction is established over an individual it may not be displaced
by other considerations.
Conversely, more recent Commonwealth decisions distinguish
between the court's formal jurisdiction to try the defendant, which they do
not deny is present in cases of transnational abduction, and its discretion
to stay charges against the defendant. These courts are essentially asking
whether they have a duty to prevent the trial from proceeding. The true
issue is not whether the court has jurisdiction over the defendant, but
rather, given the existence of this jurisdiction, should the court allow the
trial to proceed? The resolution of the first issue does not determine the
second. 30 Regrettably, most of the U.S. jurisprudence does not distinguish
between the two questions.
II.

The Male Captus Bene Detentus Rule in the United States

A. Origin of the American Rule: Ker v. Illinois

The American variant of the male captus bene detentus rule originated in
Ker v. Illinois.3 1 Ker committed larceny in Illinois and fled to Peru. 32 A

warrant for his arrest was issued to a messenger, Julian, who was entrusted
with bringing it to the Peruvian authorities so that Ker might be extradited
back to the United States. 3 3 Julian arrived in Peru, but took it upon himself
to abduct Ker and return him to Illinois to stand trial instead of going to
the Peruvian authorities.3 4 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Ker's conviction by the trial court, 3 5 rejecting Ker's argument that his arrest and forcible return to Illinois had deprived him of due process of law. 3 6 Ker argued
unsuccessfully that by virtue of the U.S.-Peru Extradition Convention he
had a right of asylum which he could assert to prevent the Illinois court
from exercising jurisdiction over him.3 7 The Court also rejected Ker's
argument that his kidnapping violated the Convention, 3 8 ruling that Ker
29. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH
§ 1.9(a) (2d ed. 1987).
30. Mann, supra note 5, at 414.

& SEiZURE A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

31. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886).
32. Id. at 437.
33. Id. at 438. See Extradition Convention, Sept. 12, 1870, U.S.-Peru, T.S. No. 283,
at 1427.
34. Ker, 119 U.S. at 438. It has been suggested that the warrant was never served to
the Peruvian authorities because there was no functioning Peruvian government in Lima
due to a war with Chile. Charles Fairman, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 AM. J. IN'L L. 678,
685-86 (1953). Moreover, with no functioning government in Peru to protest, there may
have been no international illegality in this case. Id. at 686.
35. Ker, 119 U.S. at 437.
36. Id. at 440.
37. Id. at 441.
38. Id.
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could not invoke the protection of the Convention because his rendition to
the United States was entirely outside its scope.3 9 The Illinois court's jurisdiction over Ker was unaffected by the fact that his presence before it had
40
been obtained by means of forcible abduction.
While Ker is often cited in support of the assertion that the illegal
arrest of a defendant is no bar to a court's ability to exercise criminal jurisdiction over him, 4 1 there is little support for such an interpretation in the
case itself. Ker's limitations should be noted. First, the kidnapping was
not government-sponsored. 4 2 As such, it was not attributable to the United
States, no state responsibility arose, and the abduction did not violate customary international law. Second, the lack of a functioning Peruvian government made regular channels of extradition inoperative, and thus the
Extradition Convention was not given full consideration. It also prevented
Peru from protesting the abduction and requesting Ker's return. Finally,
Ker was based upon an 1886 conception of due process, requiring only a
fair indictment and trial. Later developments in due process call into question Ker's continuing authority.
B. Limiting Ker's Scope: United States v. Rauscher
In United States v. Rauscher,43 decided on the same day as Ker, the
Supreme Court held that a fugitive extradited to the United States under an
extradition treaty is entitled to the procedural protections contained in the
treaty. A violation of the treaty by the requesting state enables a fugitive to
challenge criminal proceedings against him in the requesting state.44 Rauscher had been extradited from Great Britain under the Webster-Ashburton
Treaty on a charge of murder, 4 5 but upon his arrival in New York he was
charged with the separate offense of inflicting cruel and unusual punishment upon a crew member. The Supreme Court held that Rauscher could
not be charged with this latter offense even though the evidence presented
in Great Britain during the extradition proceedings for murder likely
would have supported extradition for this new charge. Although there was
no evidence of a British protest, the Court held that the "specialty principle" applied, according to which the fugitive could not be tried for an
offense other than that for which he was extradited to the United States. 4 6
The specialty principle limits the jurisdiction of domestic courts,
preventing the exercise of jurisdiction which would sanction the breach of
39.
40.
41.
United
42.
43.

Id.
Id. at 444.
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952), reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952);
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992).
Ker, 119 U.S. at 443.
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).

44. Id. at 430-31.
45. Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9, 1842, U.S.-U.K., art. X, 8 Stat. 572, 576
(1848).
46. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 430.
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an extradition treaty.4 7 The Rauscher Court derived the specialty principle
from customary international law and read it into the Treaty.4 8 The fugitive could advance a defense grounded in a violation of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty even though the extraditing state had not protested. 49 The
Court in Rauscher operated within a statist framework in holding that the
controlling treaty was the source of any rights possessed by the fugitive.
Rauscher's focus on the treaty as the primary source of the rights of the
fugitive, while initially protective of fugitives, exercised an unfortunate
influence on the development of the law governing forcible abduction. In
retrospect, it inhibited the subsequent evolution of a broader approach to
the problem of transnational forcible abduction.
However, the Ker Court ruled that the doctrine of specialty-and thus
by analogy any other procedural considerations contained in an extradition treaty-did not apply where the fugitive was not returned to the United
States under color of an extradition treaty. It is difficult to reconcile Rauscher with Ker. Rauscher is based on the assertion that the specialty principle ensures respect for treaties: pacta sunt servanda.50 Considerations of
good faith require that a state not prosecute a fugitive, over whom jurisdiction was gained via an extradition treaty, for a criminal offense other than
that for which he was extradited."1
Moreover, Rauscher suggests that the best way to ensure fidelity to
extradition treaties is not to leave treaty breaches to diplomatic resolution,
but instead to allow a fugitive to raise any breach as a barrier to his prosecution in the requesting state. 52 These considerations should have applied
47. See ChristopherJ. Morvillo, Individual Rights and the Doctrine of Speciality: The
Deterioration of United States v. Rauscher, 14 FORDHAM I ' L.J. 987 (1990-91);
O'CoNNmEL, supra note 5, at 731-33; Jacques Semmelman, The Doctrine of Specialty in the
Federal Courts: Making Sense of United States v. Rauscher, 34 V,. J. INT'L L. 71 (1993)

(arguing that Rauscherwas wrongly decided but that the principle of specialty is now
customary international law and thus part of federal law); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Note,
Standing to Allege Violations of the Doctrine of Specialty: An Examination of the Relationship Between the Individual and the Sovereign, 62 U. CHI. L. Rv.1187 (1995).
48. Even opponents of Alvarez-Machain acknowledge that Rauscheris as unsteady as
Ker, and criticize the Court's derivation of the specialty principle from weak evidence of

state practice. See Bush, supra note 6, at 946. See generally Senmelman, supra note 47.
49. But see Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 435-36 (Waite, CJ., dissenting) (arguing that only

the extraditing state may protest and that the fugitive's rights under the treaty are purely
derivative).
50. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 1.LM. 679 [hereinafter VCLT] ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties
to it and must be performed by them in good faith.").
51. O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure of Persons by States, supra note 5, at 301. Neither
may the requesting state re-extradite the fugitive to a third state without the express

consent of the requested state, where to do so would violate a procedural provision of an
applicable extradition treaty. United States ex rel. Donnelly v. Mulligan, 74 F.2d 220

(2d Cir. 1934). A similar rule is expressly contained in many extradition treaties. E.g.,
European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 15, 359 U.N.T.S. 273. This reextradition rule is itself closely linked to the specialty rule. Viera, supra note 18, at 298.

52. A similar argument might apply to a case in which extradition has been granted

on the basis of a fradulent application by the requesting state. But see United States v.
Peltier, 585 F.2d 314, 334-35 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1978). In
Peltier, the defendant, extradited from Canada to the United States to face murder
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equally to Ker. Good faith surely requires that states not violate each
other's territorial sovereignty by way of abduction. A duty in international
law is no less weighty if it arises through custom than if it arises as a treaty
obligation. 5 3 Furthermore, there is no principled reason as to why a
domestic court should grant broader procedural protections to a fugitive
brought before it under an extradition treaty than to a fugitive who has
been illegally abducted. Indeed, an abducted fugitive is particularly in
need of procedural protection.
Rauscher undermines Ker's putative guiding principle-that a court
will not inquire as to how an accused came before it.5 4 Under Rauscher,
courts will inquire as to the means by which an extradited fugitive was
delivered to trial, and whether these means were consistent with the controlling extradition treaty.5 5 Despite this contrast, Ker continued to be
applied in a boilerplate fashion in later cases involving transnational
58
57
abductions5 6 as well as domestic abductions and non-abduction cases.
charges, argued that the U.S. extradition application consisted of false affidavits. Therefore, his presence in the United States was secured in violation of the Canada-U.S. Extradition Treaty, and the court did not possess jurisdiction over him according to the
Rauscher principle. The court rejected this argument on the ground that he had not
been extradited on the basis of the affidavits alone. Id. See also United States v. Levy, 25
F.3d 146, 159 (2d Cir. 1994).
53. DraftArticles on State Responsibility, [1979] 2 (pt. 1) Y.B. IN'L L. COMM'N 91, 92
(article 17). ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAw AND How WE
USE IT 71 (1994); Fairman, supra note 34, at 679. The answer may lie in the fact that

treaties become U.S. law directly, whereas the role of custom in U.S. law is more controversial. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (holding that international law is
federal law unless superseded by statute or controlling executive act or judicial decision). This different rule of reception of the elements of public international law into
domestic law may affect domestic courts' perception of the limits of their own powers.
Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L.
REv. 1082, 1158 n.318 (1992). See generally Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United
States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. REv.
853, 877-78 (1987) ("Both treaties and customary law are law of the United States
because they constitute binding international obligations of the United States.") (footnote omitted); Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the United States, 82 MICH L.
REv. 555 (1984).

54. See Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 592 (1904) ("The law does not concern
itself with the method whereby a criminal is brought to the bar..."); In re Johnson, 162
U.S. at 125 ("[I]n criminal cases, a forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the
party should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the court which has the
right to try him for such an offense.... ."); Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 708 (1888)
("The jurisdiction of the court in which the indictment is found is not impaired by the
manner in which the accused is brought before it.").
55. SeeJohnson v. Brown, 205 U.S. 309 (1907). The defendant in Johnson was convicted of conspiracy in the United States and fled to Canada. The U.S. extradition
request was refused because the offense of conspiracy was not an extradition crime
under the Canada-U.S. Treaty. The United States amended the request and the defendant was extradited. The United States then brought proceedings against the defendant
under the initial conspiracy charge. Violation of the treaty provision entitled the defendant to challenge the proceedings against him. Id. at 309-12.
56. In one such case, Salvadoran defendants were granted asylum on a U.S. vessel,
but were subsequently refused pernission to leave. When the vessel returned to the
United States they were served with arrest warrants. The court held that their "abduction" to the United States did not displace its jurisdiction, and the defendants could not
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However, a close reading of these subsequent cases suggests that the Ker
doctrine is not as broad as it might first appear,5 9 and that it may only
apply to domestic abductions.6 0
The Rauscher limitation upon the Ker doctrine was reinforced in Cook
v. United States,6 1 one of a series of cases which defined the extent of U.S.
law enforcement interdiction powers during the Prohibition era. 6 2 Britain
and the United States had agreed by treaty that each state could search the
other's vessels outside their territorial limits but within one hour's sailing
time from their respective coasts. 6 3 In Cook the U.S. Coast Guard seized a
British vessel carrying liquor 11.5 miles off the U.S. coast. The master of
the vessel was charged with smuggling offenses, but claimed that the
seizure was illegal because it was made on the high seas. The vessel had
been seized not only outside the three-mile limit, but also outside the sailing-time limit established by the treaty. The United States thus had no
resist extradition to El Salvador. In re Ezeta, 62 F. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1894). However, the
defendants later avoided extradition on the basis of the political offense exception. In re
Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894). See also The Kidnapping of Antonio Martinez, 2 FOREIGN RE. U.S. 1121 (1906). In Martinez, the defendant was kidnapped from Mexico and
delivered to U.S. authorities. The United States later extradited the kidnapper to Mexico.
Mexico protested the abduction, but the United States said that the case was governed by
Ker, and that the executive could not interfere with federal judicial proceedings. Id. See
also Ex parte Wilson, 140 S.W. 98 (Tex. Crim. 1911). In Wilson, the defendant was
brought from Mexico to the United States by Mexican officers. The court concluded that
the U.S. arrest was valid, but if it were shown that U.S. officers had been parties to "the
illegal conduct of the citizens of Mexico, a different question mught be presented." Id. at
99. For further commentary, see Charles C. Hyde, Notes on the ExtraditionTreaties of the
United States, 8 Am.J. INT'L L. 487, 499-501 (1914).
57. See Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183 (1893) (Wisconsin court had proper jurisdiction
over defendant forcibly brought from Illinois); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906)
(federal court could not discharge defendant brought from Colorado to Idaho).
58. See In reJohnson, 162 U.S. 120 (1896) (domestic case, no abduction); Adams v.
New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904) (domestic illegally-acquired evidence case).
59. Mahon v. Justice, 129 U.S. 700 (1887) (in domestic interstate abduction, the
court's jurisdiction is unaffected by the manner in which the accused is brought before
it). But see id. at 715 (Bradley and Harlan JJ., dissenting) (suggesting that Ker applies
only where there is no extradition treaty).
60. Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537 (1893) (holding specialty principle inapplicable to interstate rendition and suggesting that Ker rule is inapplicable to international
rendition).
61. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1932).
62. See Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927); Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 100 (1923). These cases are discussed in 2 DANiEL P. O'Cou-au., THE INTERNATIONAL LAv OF THE SEA 1049-52 (LA. Shearer ed., 1984).
63. In its efforts to stem the liquor traffic, the United States entered into a number of
bilateral treaties with other states whereby each state would mutually recognize the
other's ability to conduct searches of each other's vessels outside the then-recognized
three-mile territorial limit, i.e., on the high seas. In 1924, Great Britain had reluctantly
agreed to the so-called "Liquor Treaty," which allowed British vessels to be searched
when they were within one hour's sailing time of the U.S. coast. Convention for Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, May 22, 1924, U.S.-U.K., 43 Stat. 1761, 27
L.N.T.S. 182. These treaties did not bestow jurisdictional competence where it would
not otherwise exist. The parties merely bound themselves not to protest what otherwise
would be unlawful searches and seizures of their vessels by the other party on the high
seas. See Edwin D. Dickinson, Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing?, 20 Am.J. ItLrr't L.
444 (1926).
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basis in international law for the exercise of criminal enforcement jurisdiction over the ship.
The Supreme Court held that the United States had limited its territorial jurisdiction by treaty, and that a U.S. court could not exercise jurisdiction over an individual seized outside of U.S. territory in violation of
international law as established by this treaty.64 The treaty contained no

specific provision prohibiting the United States from exercising enforcement jurisdiction outside its three-mile limit. Nonetheless, the Court, as it
did in Rauscher, read into the treaty an implied prohibition against such
enforcement actions because they would otherwise vitiate the purpose of
the agreement.
This principle may be extended to cover transnational forcible abductions.65 Although few treaties explicitly limit the territorial jurisdiction of
the abducting state, the principle of territorial sovereignty is so basic to
international law that it must form part of the backdrop against which
treaty formation takes place. 66 Cook cannot easily be reconciled with Ker.
The former prohibits a court from exercising jurisdiction when a seizure
has been effected in violation of international law; the latter permits it. The
alleged distinction is that Cook (and Rauscher) concerned the breach of a
treaty, whereas Ker did not concern a treaty but instead the violation of a
principle of customary international law. Yet this distinction is illusory: a
violation of customary international law is no less a violation of international law than the breach of a treaty.6 7 The approach in Cook and Rau-

scher is preferable. However, later decisions have limited the application of
Cook to cases concerning treaties delineating territorial limits to U.S. jurisdiction, rendering it largely inapplicable.6 8 Nevertheless, Cook supports
the proposition that a U.S. court cannot exercise adjudicative jurisdiction
under domestic law without having enforcement jurisdiction under inter64. Cook, 196 U.S. at 119-22 (treaty held to be self-executing, therefore depriving the

United States and its courts of subject matter jurisdiction which they might ordinarily
possess). See also Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927). In Ford, a British vessel
was seized on the high seas. The Court rejected the U.S. government's interpretation of
the Ker doctrine-that an illegal seizure could not oust a court's jurisdiction to try criminal defendants. The Court emphasized that Ker did not concern a treaty violation,
unlike Ford. Id. at 605-06. However, the jurisdictional objection was not raised at an
early stage and therefore could not be advanced in this case. Id. at 606. In United States
v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925 (N.D. Cal. 1927), the owner of a ship seized on the high seas by

the U.S. Coast Guard argued that the seizure was illegal and violated the 1924 U.S.Panama Treaty. Convention Between the United States and Panama for the Prevention of
Smuggling Intoxicating Liquors, June 6, 1994, 43 Stat. 1875. This treaty is similar to
U.S.-U.K. treaty at issue in Ford and Cook, supra. The court held that "as the instant
seizure was far outside the limit, it is sheer aggression and trespass (like those which
contributed to the War of 1812), contrary to the treaty, not to be sanctioned by any
court, and cannot be the basis of any proceeding adverse to defendants." Id. at 926.
65. See Edwin D. Dickinson, JurisdictionFollowing Seizure or Arrest in Violation of
InternationalLaw, 28 AM. J. IN'L L. 231 (1934).
66. For further discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 161-63.
67. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 661 n.7 (1992); Autry
v. Wiley, 440 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1971).
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national law.6 9

Despite Rauscher and Cook, the Ker doctrine persevered 70 and was
reconfirmed in Frisbiev. Collins. 7 ' In Frisbie,Michigan police officers kidnapped the defendant in Illinois and brought him to Michigan to face trial,
violating both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Federal Kidnapping Act.7 2 Justice Black, writing for the Court, stated
that "[tlhis Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v.
Illinois, that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired
by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction."' 73 The Court reasoned that Frisbie's due process rights had not been violated because due process required only that
74
he be given fair notice of the charges made against him and a fair trial.
Frisbie,however, did not concern an international kidnapping. Moreover,
unlike Alvarez-Machain, Frisbie did not involve an extradition treaty.
Finally, and perhaps most surprising, the Court in Frisbietook no notice of
its earlier decision in Rochin v. California.75 In Rochin, the Court repudiated the view adopted in Frisbie that pre-trial police misconduct does not
76
affect the fairness of the trial.
C.

The Road Not Taken: United States v. Toscanino

The Ker-Frisbiedoctrine, as it became known, was followed in later cases7 7
69. See INTEmATiONAL LAW, BEING THE COLL Cr PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT,
VOL 1: THE GENEAL WoRmS 343-44 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed. 1970). See also Dickinson,
supra note 65, at 231; Garcia-Mora, supra note 5, at 430, 445. But see O'CoNNELL, supra
note 5, at 834-37.
70. Ex parte Campbell, 1 F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Tex. 1932) (abduction from Mexico did
not violate U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty or individual's due process rights); Ex parte
Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342 (1934) (abduction from Mexico did not vitiate court's jurisdiction); United States v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310 (1934) (kidnapping of U.S. citizen from
Greek vessel by Turkish police at U.S. instigation and rendition to the United States by
American agents left court's jurisdiction unaffected).
71. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1988). While the Federal Kidnapping Act may allow charges
to be levied against the officers who kidnapped Frisbie, it cannot bar a state from prosecuting persons "wrongfully brought to it by its officers." Frisbie,342 U.S. at 523.
73. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522 (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 520 (citing In re Johnson, 162 U.S. 120 (1897), for the proposition that
Ker applies to criminal cases because the public interest in bringing fugitives to trial
outweighs infringements of their rights).
75. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (narcotic evidence obtained by forcing
tube down accused's throat and pumping emetic solution into his stomach to induce
him to vomit excluded from state criminal trial).

76. Id.
77. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 119 (1975); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859, 860 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936
(1974); United States v. Vicars, 467 F.2d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
967 (1973); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 602 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 838 (1952), reh'g denied, 344 U.S. 889 (1952); United States v. Sobell, 142 F.
Supp. 515, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), affid 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.

873 (1957).
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and was not challenged until 1974, when United States v. Toscanino7 8
appeared to revolutionize the American law governing the ability of courts
to exercise jurisdiction over fugitives abducted from abroad. Toscanino is
remarkable for its lucid understanding of the role which domestic courts
play in the international legal order, as well as for its broad interpretation
of domestic constitutional rights. In Toscanino, an Italian challenged his
conviction for conspiracy to import narcotics into the United States. He
alleged that U.S. agents had, inter alia, kidnapped him from his home in
Uruguay, taken him to Brazil, tortured him, and finally brought him to the
United States to face trial, all with the knowledge of U.S. authorities. He
claimed that the illegality of his arrest and rendition to the United States,
combined with his torture and interrogation, ousted the court's jurisdiction
to try him. The district court, relying upon Ker-Frisbie,ruled that its jurisdiction was unaffected by the manner of the accused's rendition to the
United States.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed. Judge Mansfield concluded
that the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine's narrow conception of due process--requiring
a fair trial, but not concerned with the manner in which the accused is
brought to trial-rewarded "police brutality and lawlessness." 79 Moreover,
developments in the federal judiciary's interpretation of due process of law
superseded the narrow approach contained in Ker-Frisbie.8 0 In particular,
"due process" had been extended to bar the admission of evidence gained
by pre-trial police misconduct. 8 1
Judge Mansfield acknowledged that many of the cases which he had
cited to support his assertion that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine could not be
reconciled with the Supreme Court's expansion of the right to due process
of law concerned the exclusion of illegally-obtained evidence 8 2 and not the
78. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d
1380 (2d Cir. 1974), on remand, 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).

79. Id. at 272.
80. Judge Mansfield suggested that the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1951), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961):
[U]nmistakably contradict its pronouncement in Frisbie that "due process of
law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after being fairly
apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with
constitutional safeguards." The requirement of due process in obtaining a conviction is greater. It extends to the pre-trial conduct of law enforcement
authorities.
Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 274. Several court of appeals decisions had suggested in obiter
that the Ker-Frisbierule probably was not good law because it could not be reconciled
with the Supreme Court's broader conception of due process. See, e.g., United States v.
Edmons, 432 F.2d 577,583 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding Ker and Frisbieno longer persuasive
because they were decided before Mapp applied the Fourth Amendment to the states);
Government of Virgin Islands v. Ortiz, 427 F.2d 1043, 1045 n.2 (3d Cir. 1970) (recognizing that "the validity of the Frisbiedoctrine has been seriously questioned because it
condones illegal police conduct").
81. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 272-74.
82. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (confession inadmissible unless
defendant voluntarily waives Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (declarations made after arrest without
probable cause excluded as "fruits" of unlawful police action); Mapp, 367 U.S. 643
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wholesale rejection of the court's ability to exercise jurisdiction over the
defendant. Yet in these cases the exclusion of evidence was not an end in
itself. Rather, it was a means to vindicate the underlying goal of the
expanded conception of due process, namely that the government should
not benefit from its own illegal conduct. 8 3 Judge Mansfield held that the
forcible abduction and rendition of a fugitive in violation of the Fourth
Amendment constituted such illegal conduct. The appropriate remedy was
the return of the fugitive to the state from which he had been seized. Judge
Mansfield said: "[W]e view due process as now requiringa court to divest
itself of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant where it has been
acquired as the result of the government's deliberate, unnecessary and
84
unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional rights."
Judge Mansfield held that Toscanino's allegations of governmental
misconduct, if sustained, would amount to a denial of due process. The
court thus recognized the existence of a duty upon domestic courts to
uphold both international legal norms as well as domestic constitutional
rights, which may themselves be informed by international human rights
law. Ker and Frisbiewere distinguished on the basis that they concerned
abductions which did not violate an international treaty, whereas the forcible abduction and rendition of Toscanino violated the guarantees of territorial sovereignty codified in both the U.N. Charter 85 and the O.A.S.
Charter. 86 Judge Mansfield interpreted these treaties as demonstrating an
agreement by the United States not to violate Uruguay's territorial sovereignty, thus supporting a reliance upon Cook rather than Ker.8 7 Judge
Mansfield did not rely upon the U.S.-Uruguay Extradition Treaty, perhaps
because it did not include drug trafficking as an extradition offense. 88
(1961) (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to states); Silverman v. United

States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (evidence gained through electronic eavesdropping without
warrant excluded).
83. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. U.N. CHuARra art. 2, 1 4. Judge Mansfield cited the U.N. Security Council's reac-

tion to the Eichmann kidnapping to suggest that "international kidnappings such as the
one alleged here violate the U.N. Charter," and that the appropriate remedy was the
return of the abducted individual. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 277-78 (citing U.N. Doc. S/

4349 (1960)).
86. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2934,
119 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, art. 17, 21 U.S.T.
2934, T.I.A.S. No. 6847 [hereinafter OAS Charter]. See Mann, supra note 5, at 417 n.50

("It is odd that the Court did not primarily rely on the rule of customary international
law [prohibiting forcible abduction which violates another state's territorial sovereignty]
87. "Ker does not apply where a defendant has been brought into the district court's
jurisdiction by forcible abduction in violation of a treaty." Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 278

(citing Ford, 273 U.S. at 605-06) (emphasis added).
88. The same was true of the U.S.-Bolivia Extradition Treaty. Treaty Between the
United States and Bolivia for the Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, Apr. 21, 1900,
U.S.-Bol., 32 Stat. 1857. See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.

1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975). However, Judge Mansfield noted that the
alleged police misconduct in Toscanino was unnecessary for the capture of the fugitive
because the fugitive's rendition could have been achieved via the U.S.-Uruguay Extradi-
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Judge Anderson concurred in the result but would have disposed of
the case solely upon due process grounds. He suggested that the defendant could successfully challenge the court's jurisdiction if he could demonstrate that he had been brought to trial in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. He rejected Judge Mansfield's extended application of the
Fourth Amendment to the acts of American law enforcement officers
abroad, 89 and also rejected the argument that Toscanino could "clothe"
himself in any treaty rights, either under the U.S.-Uruguay Extradition
Treaty, or the U.N. and O.A.S. Charters. Nevertheless, although these treaties could not be invoked as personal defenses, Judge Anderson suggested
that their violation would be "indicative of the denial of due process." 90
Thus, Judge Anderson accepted that both customary international law and
treaties can inform domestic constitutional norms. He also emphasized
the supervisory jurisdiction of the court over acts of the executive as a basis
for his decision. 9 1 The case was remanded to the district court to determine whether there was sufficient evidence concerning Toscanino's allega92
tions to justify a stay of proceedings against him.

The potentially broad application of the rule in Toscanino never developed because the case was distinguished, circumscribed, or ignored by
subsequent courts. 93 Indeed, even Justice Stevens, dissenting in AlvarezMachain, referred to the case only in passing and then only for rhetorical
flourish rather than for the strength of its legal analysis. 94 In United States
ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler,95 decided soon after Toscanino, the same court
(including two of the same judges) which had decided Toscanino limited it
severely. 96 Subsequent decisions held that a fugitive must establish three
tion Treaty. The Toscanino court did not hold that the extradition treaties had been
violated by the forcible abduction.
89. An approach later adopted in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259
(1990), reh'g denied, 494 U.S. 1092 (1990) [hereinafter Verdugo-Urquidez I] (Fourth
Amendment inapplicable to search and seizure by U.S. agents of property owned by a
non-resident alien outside the United States).
90. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 282 (Anderson, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 281 ("The courts... no longer completely disregard the behavior of our
police agents when they are operating outside of the national boundaries.").
92. On remand, the district court ruled that Toscanino had not proven his allegations that U.S. officials were involved in or directed his abduction. United States v.
Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. 916, 917 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). The inability of defendants to
advance cogent evidence of government involvement in abductions is a recurring theme.
See, e.g., Regina v. Horseferry Rd. Magis. CL, [1994] 1 All E.R. 289 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct.)
[hereinafter Bennett VI] (disclosure of Crown Prosecution Service documents ordered
despite public interest immunity in order to allow applicant to make out his allegations
of collusion between English and South African authorities); Levinge v. Director of Custodial Services, [1987] 9 N.S.W.L.R. 546 (New S. Wales (Austl.) S. Ct. .).
93. A notable exception is Benally v. Marcum, 553 P.2d 1270 (N.M. 1976). In
Benally, the court ruled that the arrest of a Navajo Indian by state police on Navajo land
violated Navajo sovereignty and that an extradition request should have been made.
Police conduct came within Toscanino's "outrageous conduct" exception, and due process principles could be invoked to bar prosecution. Id. at 1273-74.
94. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 2206 n.37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Lujan, 510 F.2d 62.
96. Other courts rejected Toscanino outright. See United States v. Matta, 937 F.2d
567, 568 (11th Cir. 1991); Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 261 (7th Cir.
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elements for the Toscanino prohibition against the exercise of jurisdiction
to apply. First, the governmental conduct in question, i.e., the abduction,
must amount to "grossly cruel and unusual barbarities" or "shock the conscience." 9 7 Second, the abduction must have been the work of state
agents. 98 Third, there must be a protest by the injured state. 9 9 Indeed,
these later interpretations suggest incorrectly that Toscanino was primarily
a "torture" case rather than a "forcible abduction" case. 10 0 This view
imposes a virtually insuperable evidentiary burden upon the fugitive, as he
will rarely be able to advance conclusive evidence of torture, or to demonstrate that government agents were directly responsible for his abduction.
More importantly, it is entirely unclear why a fugitive should have to
demonstrate that he was tortured. Federal courts have generally not relinquished jurisdiction over fugitives on the basis of the Toscanino exception, 10 1 although several cases have suggested in dicta that evidence of a
protest by a foreign state would preclude application of the Ker-Frisbie
rule.102

Toscanino contained two main limitations. First, it purportedly relies
upon the Due Process Clause of either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, but in reality relies on Mapp v. Ohio and other Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule decisions. 10 3 Second, the threshold of government conduct which the Toscanino rule as subsequently interpreted requires the
defendant to demonstrate is too high. Still, the constraints which the Second Circuit faced must be recognized. Certainly, it would have been difficult for the court to expressly overrule Ker-Frisbie.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990); United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1531

(11th Cir. 1984), reh'g denied, 749 F.2d 733 (1984) (en banc), cert. denied sub noma.
Yamanis v. United States, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d
975, 986-88 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
97. United States v. Chapa-Garza, 62 F.3d 118, 121 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Wilson, 732 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 723 (9th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Lara, 539 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Mar-

zano, 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1976); United States v.

Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270, 1271 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975). See also
United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68

(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859
(5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
98. Lara, 539 F.2d 495; Lovato, 520 F.2d at 1271; Lira, 515 F.2d 68; United States v.
Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), affd mem. 559 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977).
99. Reed, 639 F.2d at 902; United States v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975),

cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975) (no evidence of Venezuelan protest); Lujan, 510 F.2d at

67-68. Some commentators suggest that this requirement is difficult to find in Tscanino
itself. SHARoN A. WaInAMs &J.-G. CAsTEL, CANADIAN CRMmnL LAw: INTERNATIONAL AND
TRANSNATIONAL

AsPEcrTs 147 (1981). But see Lujan, 510 F.2d at 67 rL8.

100. Wilson, 732 F.2d at 410-11.
101. United States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
102. See cases cited in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1349 n.9
(9th Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded, 505 U.S. 1201 (1992), affd in part, rev'd in part,

29 F.3d 637 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.. 907 (1995) [hereinafter VerdugoUrquidez II].
103. Cf. Verdugo-Urquidez 1, 494 U.S. 259.

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 29

Toscanino's greatest virtue was that it took its consideration of forcible
abduction at least partially outside the treaty paradigm, within which U.S.
courts-from Ker to Alvarez-Machain, and including Rauscher and Cook continue to operate. Under the Toscanino due process approach the protest
or consent of the injured state is not a conclusive factor because the focus
is largely upon the rights of the fugitive. The court attempted to decouple
the protection of the fugitive's due process rights from the injured state's
advancement of the fugitive's claim on the international plane. Indeed, as
the "injured" state is often complicit in the abduction, there is little hope
that it will actually pursue its claim. Further, Toscanino contains the seeds
of a supervisory jurisdiction framework for analysing forcible abduction
cases, an approach which the English House of Lords developed more fully
in Bennett II.
D.

04
Ker Revisited: United States v. Alvarez-Machain

In what is now the leading U.S. case on forcible abduction by government agents, Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican physician was indicted in the
United States on charges relating to the kidnapping, torture, and murder in
Mexico of an undercover U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent and
a Mexican pilot. The U.S. government alleged that the fugitive had administered drugs to the agent to prolong his life so that he could be tortured
and interrogated. The United States commenced negotiations with Mexico
regarding the extradition of the fugitive, but these negotiations proved fruitless. The DEA then arranged to have Mexican agents kidnap the fugitive in
Mexico and fly him in a private airplane to Texas, where DEA officials
arrested him. From Texas, he was transported to California and brought
10 5
before a federal district court.
06
At trial,' Judge Rafeedie held that there was no evidence of physical
abuse, torture, or mistreatment to bring the case within the narrow Toscanino exception. 10 7 However, Judge Rafeedie upheld the claim that the
abduction and rendition to the United States violated the U.S.-Mexico
Extradition Treaty, and held that the Ker doctrine does not apply where an
international treaty has been violated.' 0 8 The court noted that the United
States had never made a formal extradition request to Mexico for AlvarezMachain; it had attempted only informal negotiations. The trial court held
104. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602 (C.D. Cal. 1990), affd,
946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504
U.S. 655 (1992).
105. Although DEA officials did not personally kidnap or transport the fugitive to U.S.
territory, the district court concluded that they had arranged the kidnapping. CaraQuintero, 745 F. Supp. at 605. This was not disputed in the higher courts. AlvarezMachain, 504 U.S. at 657. See Brief for the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Affirmance in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 31 I.L.M. 934, 940 (1992)
[hereinafter Mexico's Amicus CuriaeBriefl. The DEA offered a reward of $50,000 (U.S.)
to anyone who would deliver Alvarez-Machain to the United States to face trial. CaroQuintero, 745 F. Supp. at 603.
106. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 599.
107. Id. at 605-06.
108. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.- Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656.
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that it was enforceable in domestic
that the Treaty was self-executing, i.e.,
law without the need for implementing legislation.
While Judge Rafeedie conceded that Mexico alone had standing to
raise the violation of the Extradition Treaty, Mexico's express protest was
sufficient to allow the fugitive to invoke the issue of the Treaty's breach.
The fugitive established the responsibility of the United States because of
its integral involvement in the abduction. 10 9 There was no evidence of
Mexican involvement in or consent to the abduction. 110 The court discharged the fugitive and ordered that he be repatriated to Mexico. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that Mexico had made several diplomatic protests."'
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. 112 ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, considered two issues: first, whether criminal proceedings are permissible when the defendant has been brought to trial in violation of an extradition treaty; and second, whether a defendant can
challenge the court's jurisdiction to try him on criminal charges when he
has been brought to trial by forcible abduction. The Court accepted the
government's argument that the case was governed by Ker, and that Rauscher applied only where a fugitive was brought to trial in violation of an
extradition treaty. Thus, the majority believed that its primary task was to
determine whether the abduction violated the U.S.-Mexico Extradition
Treaty. It seems clear that had the Court found that the Extradition Treaty
had been violated, the defendant would have succeeded. Conversely, with
no violation of the Extradition Treaty, Ker would apply, "and the court
need not inquire as to how [the] respondent came before it." "1 3 The majority simply assumed that Ker and Frisbieremained good law, thus avoiding
consideration of the due process issues before the Court.
The Court acknowledged that Ker could be distinguished from Alvarez-Machain in two ways. First, Ker did not involve governmental
action, 114 whereas there was evidence of government involvement in Alvarez-Machain. Second, Peru had not objected to Ker's abduction, whereas
109. Caro-Quintero,745 F. Supp. at 609. The Ninth Circuit confirmed that the abduc-

tors had been "paid agents" of the DEA. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d
1466, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1991).
110. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 613.
111. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991). A note dated May 16, 1990,
demanded the return of Alvarez-Machain to Mexico. Caro-Quintero,745 F. Supp. at 604.

The Ninth Circuit followed Verdugo-UrquidezII, 939 F.2d 1341, in which the kidnapping
of a Mexican national with the authorization or participation of U.S. agents was held to

violate the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty. Mexico protested, and the defendant
was thus entitled to challenge the court's jurisdiction.

112. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). Rehnquist, CJ., was joined by White,
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ. Stevens, J., dissented and was joined by Blackmun and O'Connor, JJ.
113. Id. at 662.
114. Historical research on the case suggests that there may have been government
involvement in Ker's rendition to the United States, although this does not appear in the
reports of the case. Ker, 119 U.S. at 443. See Fairman, supra note 29, at 679-80.
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Mexico had protested Alvarez-Machain's kidnapping. 1 1' The defendant
argued that these distinctions were sufficient to make the Ker rule inapplicable to Alvarez-Machain. But Chief Justice Rehnquist did not allow these
distinguishing factors to control the case even though the Court of Appeals
had invoked these very distinctions to justify its view that Ker-Frisbiedid
not control in Verdugo-Urquidez 11.116
The majority began its interpretation of the Extradition Treaty with a
startling assertion: "The Treaty says nothing about the obligations of the
United States and Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions of people
from the territory of the other nation, or the consequences under the Treaty
if such an abduction occurs." 117 In the Court's view, the Extradition
Treaty did not "cover the field" of U.S.-Mexico extradition relations.
Instead, the Treaty merely provided a mechanism for the rendition of fugitives. To bolster this claim, Chief Justice Rehnquist explored the history of
negotiation and practice under the Treaty. He emphasized that Mexico was
aware of the Ker doctrine as early as 1906,118 yet had not attempted to
insert a provision explicitly forbidding transnational forcible abduction
into the 1978 Extradition Treaty. Therefore, the proper implication was
that Mexico had acceded to the U.S. interpretation of the Treaty.
Moreover, the Court reasoned that Mexico and the United States did
not agree on such a provision, given that they did not expressly adopt the
one provided in the 1935 Harvard Law School Draft Convention onJurisdiction with Respect to Crime, which stated clearly that forcible abduction of
individuals on a foreign state's territory violates international law. 1 19
Thus, the Court concluded that the Treaty does not prohibit abductions
outside of its terms. 120 Because there was no Treaty violation, the Ker rule
12 2
applied, 12 1 and the case was remanded to the district court for trial.
Ironically, the charges against the defendant were later thrown out for lack
123
of evidence.
The Court's majority opinion identified what it took to be an inconsistency in the defendant's argument. He had challenged the Court's jurisdiction by arguing that he had been brought to trial in violation of the
115. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 662. The lack of a functioning Peruvian government ruled out a protest and rendered the regular extradition channel inoperative. Fairman, supra note 34, at 685-86.
116. Verdugo-Urquidez II, 939 F.2d at 1345-49. But see Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at
662.
117. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 663.
118. Id. at 665 n.11 (citing Martinez, 2 FOPGN REL. U.S. 1121 (1906)).
119. Id. at 666 (citing Harvard Research, 29 AM J. INTr'L L. 442 (Supp. 1935)).
120. Id. at 666.
121. Id. at 670 (forcible abduction does not bar criminal trial in U.S. federal court).
122. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused a later motion to file a supplemental brief which argued that customary international law alone would justify the district court's original repatriation order. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 971 F.2d 310
(9th Cir. 1992).
123. Seth Mydans, Judge ClearsMexican in Agent's Killing, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 15, 1992,
at A20; Judge Says U.S. Was Told It Held Wrong Doctor in Agent's Killing, N.Y. TiMES, Dec.
17, 1992, at A27. Alvarez-Machain returned to Mexico soon afterwards. Doctor Cleared
in Killing Returns to Mexico, N.Y. Tim.s, Dec. 16, 1992, at A21.
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Extradition Treaty. He conceded that his rights under the Extradition
Treaty were derivative of Mexico's. Nonetheless the Court concluded that
either the United States or Mexico would be at liberty, as a matter of
domestic law, to render an individual in their country to the other state "on
terms completely outside of those provided in the Treaty," such as by
deportation or expulsion. 12 4 The Court suggested that Mexico must assert
the defendant's claim under the Extradition Treaty for that claim to be successful. In fact, the Court of Appeals had expressed the view that a formal
protest by the injured state was essential to a finding of international illegality.1 25 The Alvarez-Machain majority contended that by agreeing with
the assertion that an individual's rights under the Extradition Treaty were
derivative of the state's rights, the defendant had undercut another strain
of his own argument, which was that the Extradition Treaty conferred procedural protection upon individuals independent of states' rights under the
126
Extradition Treaty.
Yet it is perfectly consistent to view extradition treaties as creating
rights which may be exercised by individuals as well as states. More
importantly, in Alvarez-Machain (as in Verdugo-UrquidezII) Mexico did protest and request the fugitive's return. Therefore, on the facts of the case, the
Court's argument was inapplicable. But it does highlight the concern noted
earlier, namely that if Mexico had neither protested nor requested AlvarezMachain's return, it would have been considerably more difficult for him to
have mounted a defense based upon an alleged violation of the Extradition
Treaty. Indeed, what made Alvarez-Machain's case one of first impression
was that the Supreme Court had never before addressed a transnational
forcible abduction case where the injured state had protested and
requested the fugitive's return. However, several lower courts had suggested that the specialty principle could be advanced by a fugitive regardless of whether the extraditing state protested, indicating that a fugitive
should be able to raise a violation of an extradition treaty even when the
127
state from which he was abducted did not protest.
According to the three dissenting judges, Alvarez-Machain involved
"this country's abduction of another country's citizen; it also involves a violation of the territorial integrity of that other country, with which this
country has signed an extradition treaty." 128 The dissent agreed with the
lower courts' interpretation of the Extradition Treaty. This interpretation,
combined with Mexico's formal protests to the United States requesting the
defendant's return, meant that the forcible abduction violated both the
Extradition Treaty and customary international law, so that U.S. courts
were obligated to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over him and to order his
124. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 667.
125. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 667 (citing Verdugo-UrquidezII, 939 F.2d at 1357).
126. In Rauscher, the issue of Britain's protest was considered irrelevant in the determination that the defendant could benefit from the specialty principle. Rauscher, 119
U.S. at 407.
127. See infra note 166.
128. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 670-71.
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return to Mexico. The dissent accepted that the district court had jurisdiction over the defendant, yet argued that it was under a duty to refuse to
exercise it.
Justice Stevens concluded that the Extradition Treaty was designed "to
cover the entire subject of extradition" between Mexico and the United
States. 129 To accept the view that the Extradition Treaty was merely an
optional framework by which one state could seek the extradition of a fugitive from the other, while at the same time reserving the right to enter the
other state and forcibly remove the fugitive, would transform the provisions into "little more than mere verbiage." 130 Justice Stevens preferred a
purposive approach to treaty interpretation, and argued that there was an
implied provision in the Extradition Treaty prohibiting forcible abductions
from each other's territory. 13 1 Concluding that the abduction violated this
implied provision of the Extradition Treaty, Justice Stevens suggested that
the rule in Rauschershould apply, to the exclusion of the Ker doctrine. Just
as the defendant in Rauscher had been permitted to claim the procedural
protections of the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, the defendant in Alvarezprocedural protections
Machain was entitled to claim the more extensive
13 2
contained in the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty.
Justice Stevens also argued that the abduction violated customary
international law. He did not share the majority's reluctance to read the
customary international law prohibition on transnational forcible abduction into the Extradition Treaty. Indeed, he saw a stronger case for doing
so here than in Rauscher, a move which the majority had described as "a
small step to take.' 133 The principle that a state must not violate the terri34
torial integrity of another state was well recognized in both domestic'
and international law, 13 5 and formed an independent basis for ordering a
stay of proceedings. The dissent also seized on the majority's failure to
distinguish Ker (in which the abduction and rendition had nominally been
the work of a private citizen) 13 6 from Alvarez-Machain (where the kidnapping and rendition were undertaken by U.S. agents). 13 7 The majority
failed to recognize that this distinction meant that Ker could not control
129. Id. at 673.

130. Id.
131. Justice Stevens referred to the "consensus of international opinion that condemns one Nation's violation of the territorial integrity of a friendly neighbour" as evidence that "[i]t
is shocking that a party to an extradition treaty might believe that it has
secretly reserved the right to make seizures of citizens in the other party's territory." Id.
at 678-79 [citations omitted].
132. Id. at 682.
133. Id. at 669.
134. The Apollon, 9 U.S. (1 Wheat.), 362, 370-71 (1824) (seizure for breach of law of
one state cannot be made in the territory of another state); 2 RESTATEmarr (THiRD) oF
FOREIGN REL LAw § 432 (1987).
135. 1 OPPml-rM's IN aaNArionA. Lw 295 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 1955); OAS
Charter, supra note 86, art. 17; U.N. CHArn, art. 2(4); Mann, supra note 5, at 407.
136. Subsequent research suggests that Ker may also have concerned a state-sponsored abduction. Fairman, supra note 34, at 678.
137. Caro-Quintero,745 F. Supp. at 602-04, 609.
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the result in Alvarez-Machain. Justice Stevens noted that it was precisely
this distinction which led Justice Miller in Rauscherto distinguish that case
from Ker itself. The majority's failure to distinguish private abductions
from government-sponsored kidnapping meant that its argument was "thus
entirely unsupported by case law and commentary." 13 8
Justice Stevens insisted that bringing fugitives to trial does not justify
violations of international law. Such pursuit of short-term justice would
violate the rule of law, which in the long term would be neither in the
interests of the executive nor the country as a whole. Justice Stevens noted
139
with no little irony that the South African Court of Appeal in Ebrahim
had looked to the evolving U.S. jurisprudence on transnational forcible
abduction in determining that the trial of a fugitive kidnapped abroad and
brought to South Africa for trial must be halted. He warned that the major140 that it
ity decision was "monstrous" and would be recognized as such,
sanctioned international lawlessness, and that it was bad law and unsound
policy.

14 1

The dissent's concept of the rule of law appears to contain three distinctive elements. The first is a concern with the protection of the court's
process from abuse at the hands of the executive. Equally important is the
dissent's account of a broader, "international" rule of law. This is a concern both with the maintenance of international systems of public order, in
particular the territorial sovereignty of states and the network of bilateral
and multilateral extradition treaties, as well as international human rights
concepts. 142

The remainder of this Article addresses four reasons why the existing
U.S. approach to transnational forcible abduction, as represented by the
Alvarez-Machain holding, is flawed. It is guided by the three strands of the
rule of law outlined in Section I and identified by justice Stevens in Alvarez138. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 686. See Mexico's Amicus CuriaeBrief, supra note

105, at 949; Jaffe v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304, 307 (11th Cir. 1987).
139. State v. Ebrahim, [1991] 2 S.A 553 (S. Mr. App. Div.).
140. This decision was indeed heavily criticized. See, e.g., Stephen Bindman, McDougall Warns U.S. on Kidnapping,CALGARY HERALD, June 17, 1992, at B7; Stephen Bindman,
Kidnap Ruling Shocks Justice Minister, CALRY HERALD, June 16, 1992, at A2; Maxwell
Cohen & Donald McRae, "Kidnap Ruling" Hijacks the Law, TORONTO STAR, July 23, 1992,
at A23; John Hay, Canada and the Law: U.S. Supreme Court ruling that kidnapping is
tolerable undermines Canadians,MoNTREAL GAZETTE, July 20, 1992, at B3. The then-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Hon. Barbara McDougall, stated in response to a
question in the Canadian House of Commons:
[w]e continue to believe that the appropriate way for U.S. authorities to obtain
custody of a criminal suspect is through a request to authorities of other countries, to Canadian authorities for example, under the extradition treaty that

exists between our two countries. Any attempt to abduct someone from Cana-

dian territory we would continue to regard, as we have in the past, as a criminal
act.
41 PAR.. DEB. H.C. (Can.) 12152 (1992).
141. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 687-88. Accord, United States v. Matta-Ballesteros,
71 F.3d 754, 773 (9th Cir. 1995) (Noonan, J., concurring).
142. See also U.S. v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1975) (Oakes, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 847 (1975).
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Machain. First, the majority's assumption that the jurisdiction of the court
can be set aside only where there has been a treaty violation is unwarranted. There is a customary international law norm prohibiting transnational forcible abduction which requires the return of the fugitive upon the
injured state's protest and request. Second, the majority's argument that
the abduction did not violate the Extradition Treaty is unfounded. Third,
the majority failed to take into account the international human rights
dimensions of the case. Fourth, although it did not arise in the majority's
opinion in Alvarez-Machain itself, U.S. federal courts have often relied upon
a "justiciability" framework in transnational forcible abduction cases. This
Article contends that such an approach is misguided: the proper course for
courts to take in such cases is to exercise their supervisory jurisdiction over
unlawful executive conduct.
IlI. Transnational Forcible Abduction in International Law
Customary international law clearly prohibits transnational forcible abduction. Custom requires that where the injured state protests the abduction
of a fugitive from its territory and demands his return, the abducting state
is obliged to return the fugitive. Three issues will now be examined in
turn. First, what are the international legal consequences of an abduction?
Second, what is the appropriate remedy for the breach of international law
occasioned by an abduction? Finally, what are the effects upon domestic
law of a finding of international illegality?' 143
A. The International Legal Consequences of a Forcible Abduction
A transnational forcible abduction may violate one or more of three distinct international obligations. The first of these is respect for the territorial sovereignty of the injured state. The exercise of law enforcement by
one state upon the territory of another without the latter's consent violates
its sovereignty. The second consideration is that forcible abduction may
breach a treaty, most likely an extradition treaty, with the injured state.
Where the abducting state and the injured state have entered into a treaty
regulating their extradition relations, the rendition of a fugitive outside of
the terms of the treaty may violate the treaty. Third, an abduction, in violating the human rights of the fugitive, may also violate duties owed to the
state of which the fugitive is a national. States incur international responsibility for harm done to foreign nationals by their agents. Beyond the
abduction itself, trial of the fugitive may constitute a separate international
143. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Still More on Kidnaping,85 Am. J. INT'L L. 655 (1991);
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Kidnaping by Government Order: A Follow-Up, 84 AM. J. INT'L L.
712 (1990); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and
InternationalLaw, Continued, 84 Am. J. INT'L L. 444 (1990); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S.
Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitutionand InternationalLaw, 83 Am. J. INT'L L. 880
(1989).
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1. TransnationalForcibleAbduction Violates TerritorialSovereignty
It is beyond controversy that a state violates customary international law by
sending its agents into another state to abduct an individual for trial.1 45
Respect for the territorial integrity of other states is a fundamental principle of international law. 46 While a state's ability to proscribe certain conduct outside of its territory with criminal sanctions is undisputed, the
exercise of enforcement jurisdiction in the territory of another state is
primafaciewrongful. It would make a mockery of state sovereignty, a principle at the very foundation of the international legal order, if states were
free to send their agents into other states to abduct fugitives. 147 Thus,
extraterritorial forcible abduction, absent a conventional right, 48 is presumptively illegal under customary international law.' 4 9 The injured state
144. Mann, supra note 5, at 412. Cf. Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw: Politics, Values
and Functions [GeneralCourse on Public InternationalLaw], 216 REcUE DES Couns 310

(1989-IV).
145. 2 RFSrATEMENr (THIRD) or FOREIGN REa. LAw § 432(2) (1987); SATYA DEvA BEai,
EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 21 (1966); HERBERT W. BRIGGS, THE
LAw OF NATIONS 312 (2d ed. 1952); SHEARER, supra note 20, at 72-75; Coussirat-Coust&re
& Eisemann, supra note 5, at 348-49; Marchand, supra note 5, at 244.
146. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 L.CJ. 14, 111;
Corfu Channel Case (Merits) (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4, 35; The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v.
Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19; F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdictionin
International Law, in MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 112-13 (1973); NGUYEN
Quoc DIHN, PATRICK DaLumR & ALAiN PELLEr, DRorT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 447 (4th ed.
1992); OPPEaHEm'S INTERNATIONAL Law, supra note 26, at 388-89.
147. The United States does not recognize the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction by
other states on its territory. Kasenkina Case, 19 DEP'T OF STATE BULL 251, 261-62
(1948); Edwin Borchard, The Kasenkina Case, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 858 (1948) (Soviet
attempt to abduct Soviet citizen from the United States). Case of Converse and Blatt,
[1912] FOREIGN REL. U.S. 971. In Converse and Blatt, U.S. citizens in the service of Mexican revolutionaries were captured by Mexican troops in the United States. The U.S.
government protested, arguing that the abduction was "a clear and a grave violation of
the sovereign rights of the United States" and an "international wrong." Id. at 973-74.
These citizens were released and brought claims for damages. Id. at 971-72. See also
Canti Case, [1914] FOREIGN RE. U.S. 900 (Mexican abducted from United States by
Mexico, but released upon U.S. protest and demand for his return).
148. Some treaties allow hot pursuit on land, although there is no customary rule to
this effect. See, e.g., Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Suppression of Common Frontier Controls, Belg.-Fr.-F.R.G.-Lux.-Neth., 30 LLM. 68; Agreement, June 14, 1985, 30
LL.M. 73; Convention, June 19, 1990, art. 41, 30 LL.M. 84. But see Peter Conradi,
Europe's Borders Refuse to Fade Away, SUNDAY TImEs (LONDON) Apr. 30, 1995, at 15 (noting that the hot pursuit arrangment has proven difficult and controversial). Similarly,
states may agree by treaty to allow enforcement by foreign agents on their territory. See,
e.g., Channel Tunnel (International Arrangements) Order 1993, SI 1993/1813 (U.K.);
Boundary In the Tunnel, TImEs (LONDON), Feb. 2, 1995, at 23 (British citizens arrested by
British police in France under Channel Tunnel agreement). Note also that secret treaties

existed between South Africa and the "Bantustans" allowing each state's police to operate in the other's territory. SeeJ. T. Schoombee, A Licence for Unlawful Arrests Across the
Border?, 101 S. Am LJ. 713 (1984) (questioning constitutional status of the treaties).
For further examples, see 1 JOHN BAss=r MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION §

188 (1891).

149. In rare situations, a state may be able to justify a forcible abduction and thus
preclude international wrongfulness if it can advance a "circumstance precluding
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may bring a claim against the abducting state, regardless of the nationality
of the fugitive or the reason for his presence in the injured state.' 5 0
The majority opinion in Alvarez-Machain (and indeed, the dissent as
well) considered only whether the Extradition Treaty was violated. There
are, of course, strong arguments which suggest that it was violated, 15 1 but
the majority was simply wrong in viewing the Treaty as the sole source of
controlling law. The customary international legal norm prohibiting forcible abduction exists independently of treaties, so that a forcible abduction
may violate customary international law even where there is no extradition
treaty. 152 The majority in Alvarez-Machain completely ignored this prohiwrongfulness." Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 53, at 93-94 (articles 2934, especially article 30 (counter-measures) and article 34 (self-defense)). It may be
argued, for example, that states are under a positive obligation to ensure that their territory is not used by private citizens to attack other states. Richard B. Lillich & John M.
Paxman, State Responsibilityfor Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by TerroristActivities, 26 AM.
U. L. REv. 217 (1977). While state responsibility does not lie where a state's nationals
commit an international wrong without its sanction, it may be argued that a state violates international law by allowing its territory to be used as a base from which private
individuals commit international wrongs. Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.) 2
L.A.A. 829, 839 (1928). See also Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, Oct. 24, 1970, GA. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.,
(Supp. No. 28), at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971). Knowledge of such activities combined with inaction on the part of the harbouring state indicate the violation of a due
diligence obligation. In the face of such a violation, a state which was a victim of such
attacks could argue that the forcible abduction of offenders who were committing international wrongs would be justified as a self-help measure. J. Walcott & A. Pasztor, Reagan Ruling to Let CIA Kidnap Terrorists Overseas is Disclosed, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1987,
at 1, 14 (possible justification of kidnappings as anticipatory self-defense under U.N.
Charter art. 51); Halberstam, supra note 7, at 736 n.5; Glennon, supra note 6, at 749,
755. However, the U.N. collective security system restricts the lawful use of force to selfdefense and collective police actions under U.N. control. IAN BROWNLE, INTERNAMONAL
LAw AND THE USE or FORCE By STATES (1963); Oscar Schachter, The Lawful Use of Force
by a State Against Terroristsin Another Country, 19 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 209 (1989). The
abducting state would have to demonstrate that the fugitive was engaging in an "armed
attack" against it, a difficult burden to discharge. See Military and Paramilitary Activities
Case, 1986 I.CJ., at' 195. In addition, it is likely that the fugitive would have to be state
supported (and not merely a private individual) for article 51 to apply. Lowenfeld, 84
AM. J. INT'L L., supra note 143, at 488.
150. James E.S. Fawcett, The Eichmann Case, 38 BmRT. Y.B. INr'L L. 181, 199 (1962).
Accord, Gluck, supra note 6, at 644-45.
151. See infra text accompanying notes 154-71.

152. See Brief of the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 31 I.L.M. 919, 924 (1992) [hereinafter Canada's
Amicus Curiae Brief]. In many ways, Canada's Amicus Curiae Brief was an attempt to relitigate Jaffe v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304, 307 (11th Cir. 1987). In Jaffe, a private bail bond
agency arranged to have private individuals kidnap a Canadian businessman from
Toronto and bring him to the United States. The Court's jurisdiction was unaffected by
his abduction, and there was no violation of the U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty. Id.
Jaffe did not involve government action; the actions of the bail agency bounty hunters
were neither supported nor condoned by either the United States or Florida. Id. at 30708. The agency relationship is a matter of debate. See Lewis, supra note 5, at 355-56,
360. U.S. Secretary of State Schultz appealed for Jaffe's early release, expressing concern that the case was souring U.S.-Canadian relations. State Territory and Territorial
Jurisdiction,78 AM. J. INTr'L L. 207 (1984).
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bition, giving no acknowledgment to Mexico's formal protest and demand
3
for Alvarez-Machain's return."5
2.

TransnationalForcibleAbduction Violates Extradition Treaties

In addition to the customary prohibition against violations of territorial
sovereignty, the abducting state will incur international responsibility if
the abduction violates a treaty with the injured state. 154 Through an extradition treaty, a state may partially limit its exclusive jurisdiction over its
inhabitants by agreeing to extradite them for certain crimes committed in
another state. Extradition treaties serve the interests of states in law
enforcement. When two or more states enter an extradition treaty, they
agree to establish a procedural framework by which one state may request
that a fugitive present in the other state be extradited to the requesting
state to face charges relating to offenses committed there. 15 Extradition
treaties also protect the rights of individuals," s6 and thus regulate the
transfer of fugitives between states. If one state secures the presence of a
fugitive from a state with which it has an extradition treaty by means of
forcible abduction and rendition, there is a primafacie violation of the
treaty.
Thus, the majority's conclusion that the Extradition Treaty was not
violated in Alvarez-Machain is incorrect. A careful reading of the Treaty
provides a further explanation. Article 9 of the treaty provides that neither
state is required to extradite its own nationals, but a state exercising its
discretion not to extradite a fugitive is obligated to prosecute him for the
alleged offense under its domestic law. The abduction of a fugitive from
the other state's territory violates this provision because it deprives the
injured state of its right to decide whether to extradite the fugitive or to
prosecute him domestically."5 7 To view forcible abduction as a permissible activity outside the scope of the Treaty would vitiate the purpose of the
Treaty."58 As Justice Stevens noted in dissent, article 9 would serve no purpose if a state's decision not to extradite a fugitive to the requesting state
simply could be overridden by the latter's decision to abduct the fugitive
and bring him to trial before its courts.
153. See Mexico's Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 105, at 938-39.
154. In most cases, this will be an extradition treaty, but states may also have limited
their jurisdiction by separate treaty. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1932);
Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927).
155. See generally GEorr Gn.mRT, ASPECTS OF ExTRADITION LAw (1991); SHEARM, supra

note 20.
156. See Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International
Law, Continued, supra note 143, at 473.

157. Recall that in Alvarez-Machain, unlike Ker, the defendant was a national of the
state from which he was abducted. Peru could not have refused to extradite Ker on the
basis of his nationality, whereas Mexico might have refused to extradite Alvarez-Machain
on such a basis. Forcible abduction thus deprived Mexico of its right to exercise this
discretion under the Extradition Treaty.

158. See Mexico's Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 105, at 934. See also Canada's Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 152, at 923, 932.
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Moreover, the Extradition Treaty would not prevent one state from
deporting an individual to another state merely because the individual is
sought for criminal offenses in the latter state. Of course, this issue could
not have arisen in Alvarez-Machain, because there the fugitive was a
national of Mexico and thus could not have been deported from Mexico.
But imagine that Alvarez-Machain had been a U.S. national. The AlvarezMachain majority suggests that because the Extradition Treaty does not
"cover the field" of rendition, and thus does not outlaw deportation of individuals between the two states, it could not be said to outlaw another alternative to extradition, forcible abduction. It is true that the deportation of
an individual from one state to the other would not automatically violate
the terms of the Extradition Treaty. Yet deportation would violate the
Treaty in circumstances of "disguised extradition," where deportation is
used to circumvent the more formal procedures contained in the Extradition Treaty. It is the element of circumvention which violates the Extradition Treaty. As discussed above, deportation is an action of the deporting
state."59 Unlike forcible abduction, deportation does not involve a violation of the territorial sovereignty of the deporting state. As a result, the
Alvarez-Machain Court's deportation argument should be rejected. But it is
not surprising, given the majority's views, that subsequent case law has
interpreted Alvarez-Machain as rejecting the argument that a treaty must be
interpreted so that attempts to circumvent the treaty are violations of the
1 60
treaty.
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Alvarez-Machain was correct in stating that
the Extradition Treaty does not contain a clause specifically prohibiting
extraterritorial abduction. The Extradition Treaty also lacked specific provisions to limit the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction, as were present in
the treaty at issue in Cook. However, the absence of such provisions does
not mean that a forcible abduction engineered by one state on the territory
of the other party is permissible under the Treaty. The better view is that a
prohibition upon forcible abduction, which is a clear rule of customary
international law, formed part of the normative background against which
the Extradition Treaty was made. 16 1 International abductions are "so
clearly prohibited in international law"16 2 that to include a clause to that
effect in the Extradition Treaty would have been redundant, even absurd.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
160. E.g., Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, 22 F.3d 634, 643 (5th Cir. 1994); ChapaGarza, 62 F.3d 118, 120-21 (5th Cir. 1995).
161. Vtzquez, supra note 53, at 1158 n.318.
162. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 666. The general rule of interpretation of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is:

1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its
object and purpose
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:

(c) any relevant rules of internationallaw applicable in the relations between the
parties.
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Moreover, treaties should be interpreted in a purposive manner. 16 3 The
customary international law norm must inform interpretation of the Extradition Treaty, leading to the inevitable conclusion that a forcible abduction
violates the Treaty.
The Court claimed that there was no basis in state practice to conclude that the United States and Mexico entered the Extradition Treaty
with the prohibition of forcible abduction in mind. Notwithstanding that
in Rauscher the Supreme Court had implied the specialty principle into the
Webster-Ashburton Treaty ("because of the practice of nations with regard
to extradition treaties"), 16 4 the majority in Alvarez-Machain claimed that it
would be too ambitious for the Court to imply a term into the Extradition
Treaty derived from "the practice of nations with regards to international
law more generally." 165 The majority's reference to Rauscher is ironic,
given that courts have interpreted Rauscherto allow a defendant to advance
the specialty principle as a defense even where the extraditing state does
not make a formal protest, suggesting that the principle is not the prerogative of states alone. 16 6 Moreover, Canada's amicus curiae brief cited ample
VCLT, supra note 50, art. 31 (emphasis added). Thus, the customary international law
rule becomes an implied term of the treaty. This argument was also advanced in Mexico's Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 105, at 942. It is conceded that the same argument
does not apply to the specialty principle. The specialty principle is also arguably a
customary norm, which suggests that it would be redundant to write it into the treaty.
Nevertheless, there is a treaty provision dealing with it. The apparent inconsistency is
illusory, however. Treaties often contain provisions addressing issues already "covered"
by customary norms, often with the intention of structuring and clarifying them, and
providing a procedural framework by which they may be recognized. By contrast, the
customary norm against transnational forcible abduction is so clear that it does not
require clarification via a provision in an extradition treaty. Indeed, Rauscher, 119 U.S.
407, held that the specialty principle is implicit in all extradition treaties signed by the
United States, and since Rauscher, all U.S. extradition treaties have included it explicitly.
163. VCIT, supra note 50, art. 31(1). CompareFothergill v. Monarch Airlines, [1981]
App. Cas. 251, 282 (Eng. H.L.) (treaties to be interpreted by reference to public international law rules of treaty interpretation); Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551,
577-78 (Can.) (same); Regina v. Parisien, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 950 (Can.) (extradition treaties
to be interpreted by reference to VCLT); In re Regina and Palacios, 45 O.R. 2d 269, 277
(Ont. (Can.) C.A. 1984) ("The principles of public international law and not domestic
law govern the interpretation of treaties.").
164. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 667.
165. Id. at 668. The Court said that inferring the specialty principle into the WebsterAshburton Treaty in Rauscherwas "a small step to take," whereas implying the proposed
principle into the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty would involve "a much larger inferential leap." Id. at 669. This rationale is opaque at best.
166. 1 REsrATEMENT (THuw) OF FORIGN RE.. LAw § 477 cmt. b, rep. n.1 (1987).
Admittedly, the federal courts are divided into three schools of thought on this point.
The first school argues that individuals do not have standing to raise the specialty
defense unless the requested state protests the violation. See United States v. Kaufman,
874 F.2d 242, 243 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571,
584 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d
894 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 884 (1973); Kaiser v. Rutherford, 827 F. Supp.
832, 835 (D.D.C. 1993). The second school contends that individuals may raise the
specialty defense independently of whether the requested state protests. See United
States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326, 328 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1049 (1991);
Leighnor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d
1417, 1426-27 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989). The third approach
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evidence of such international practice and opiniojuristo support the exist16 7
ence of a customary norm against transnational forcible abduction.
The Court's argument seems to have been that it is incoherent to view
the Extradition Treaty as a prohibition against a violation of general principles of international law, such as the prohibition against the exercise of
police power in the territory of another state. By way of example, the Chief
Justice suggested that it would be absurd to view an invasion of the United
States by Mexico as a violation of the Extradition Treaty. 168 Of course, this
assertion is in one sense true. No one would argue seriously that any violation of customary or general principles of international law by a state,
suggests that the individual has standing to raise the specialty defense where the
requested state might have done so but did not. It does not require that the requested
state protest as a precondition to allowing the individual to invoke the defense, but it
does preclude the individual from raising the specialty principle where the requested
state waives the provisions of the extradition treaty and consents to charging the individual with offenses other than that for which he was extradited. See United States v.
Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Fowlie, 24 F.3d 1059, 1064
(9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Diwan, 864 F.2d 715 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989); United States
v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042
(1988); United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 n.5 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986) (individual may raise specialty principle, but not if requested state waives treaty's procedural
requirements). Recent decisions indicate that a more individual-focused approach may
be evolving. United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 767 n.6 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting
that because the specialty doctrine is based on international comity and not on individual rights it may be waived by the requested state, but acknowledging that "the side that
favors individual standing has much to commend it"). See generally Papandrea, supra
note 47 (arguing that individuals should have standing to raise the specialty doctrine
defense only where the requested state is not a liberal democracy which guarantees due
process and is representative of its citizens); Semmelman, supra note 6.
167. Canada's Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 152, at 924-28. Canada surveyed
existing domestic decisions and also conducted a survey of the legal advisors from Western states (including Australia, Austria, Britain, Finland, Germany, The Netherlands,
Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland) in order to demonstrate that the U.S.
interpretation of international extradition treaties was not supported by state practice.
The survey respondents unanimously viewed forcible abduction as a violation of international law. This position is reinforced by the hostility with which Alvarez-Machain has
been received in the international community. See Communique of Commonwealth Law
Ministers, in 64 Bmr. Y.B. INT'L L. 615 (1993); Organization of American States Permanent Council, Legal Opinion on the Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of
America, OEA/ser. G/CP/doc.2302/92 (Sept. 1, 1992), reprinted in 4 CuM. L. Fou. 119
(1993). Many of the states surveyed by Canada indicated that they would consider such
an abduction to violate a bilateral extradition treaty, and most insisted that the appropriate remedy in cases of transnational forcible abduction would be the return of the fugitive to the injured state. Canada concluded that the U.S. position in Alvarez-Machain
"diverges substantially from generally accepted conduct" and also contradicted the custom between Canada and the United States. Canada's Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note
152, at 925.
168. The choice of this example is unfortunate, since such an invasion would violate
the Extradition Treaty if in its course, an individual were abducted and brought back to
face trial in the abducting state. The irony is that this example is not as fantastic as
might be hoped. See, e.g., The PanamanianRevolution: Diplomacy, War and Self-Determination in Panama - ExtraterritorialLaw Enforcement and the "Receipt" and Trial of
Noriega: Toscanino and Beyond (II), 84 PRoc. AM. Soc. INr'L L. 236 (1990).
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entirely unrelated to the subject matter of a treaty, would violate that
treaty.
However, the central issue is the nexus between the international law
violation and the treaty's purpose. Rauscher indicates that a violation of
those general principles or customary norms which have a close nexus to
the treaty's subject matter is a violation of the treaty. In these circumstances, customary international law and general principles of international law must guide treaty interpretation. Therefore, it is difficult to
understand how a treaty governing extradition relations cannot be said to
"cover the field," at least to the extent of including the customary international legal norms against forcible abduction. 169 Interestingly, the Court
conceded that the abduction at issue in Alvarez-Machain may well have
been "shocking" and a violation of international law. 170 But as there was
no violation of the Extradition Treaty, there was consequently no violation
of domestic law, and the Court felt that any alleged violations of interna17 1
tional law were best left to diplomatic channels for resolution.
3.

TransnationalForcible Abduction Violates Obligations Owed to the State
of Which the Abducted Individual Is a National

A third consideration which may ground state responsibility is that an
abduction may violate a duty owed to the state of which the individual is a
national. 172 This consideration is often overlooked, although of course it
is inapplicable when a state abducts one of its own nationals from another
169. The better view is that ofJudge Rafeedie in the district court:
The government's contention in the present case that a state violates an extradition treaty when it prosecutes for a crime other than that for which the individual was extradited (the doctrine of specialty), but not when a state unilaterally
flouts the procedures of the extradition treaty altogether and abducts an individual for prosecution on whatever crimes it chooses, is absurd. It is axiomatic that
the United States or Mexico violates its contracting partner's sovereignty, and the
extradition treaty, when it unilaterally abducts a person from the territory of its
contracting partner without the participation of or authorization from the contracting party where the offended state registers an official protest.
Caro-Quintero,745 F. Supp. at 610 (emphasis added). See also Riley v. Commonwealth,
159 C.L.R. 1, 15 (AustL 1985) ("Treaties dealing with a specific subject, such as extradition, must also be construed in the light of any particular principles of international law
and of any particular standards accepted by member states of the international community in relation to that subject.").
170. As supporters of the Alvarez-Machain decision note, the U.S. Supreme Court conceded that the case may well have given rise to a violation of public international law.
Halberstam, supra note 7, at 736. However, the Court's refusal to consider the status of
the abduction under customary international law is more difficult to understand. See
Bush, supra note 6, at 939.
171. See infra text accompanying notes 225-32.
172. Reparations Case (Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations) (Adv. Op.), 1949 LCJ. 174; Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (jurisdiction),
1924 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 2, at 12. One may argue that international human rights
norms are obligations owed to all other states ("erga omnes") (see Barcelona Traction,
Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.CJ. 3), although the category of obligations so
covered is the subject of considerable debate. THEODOR MERON, HuMAN RIGHTS AND
HumANrrANuaI NoRmS As CustomARY LAw 192-201 (1989); Yoram Dinstein, The Erga
Omnes Applicability of Human Rights, 30 ARcHuv DES VOucmaaCirr 16 (1992).
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state. When a state abducts a national of the injured state, the violation of
this duty may be obscured by the breach of an extradition treaty or the
violation of the injured state's territorial sovereignty. Despite its low profile, it may be an important consideration where state X abducts a national
of state Y from the territory of state Z. 173 A separate duty may be owed by
state X to state Y for mistreatment of state Y's national, regardless of where
this mistreatment occurred. 174 Moreover, the individual abductors may be
liable to criminal prosecution under the criminal law of state y.175 This
consideration was not a factor in Alvarez-Machain, where the fugitive was a
national of the injured state, but it may play a role in cases where the fugitive is a national of a third state.' 76 It is noted here only to provide a
complete account of the international legal consequences of transnational
forcible abduction.
B. The Appropriate Remedy for a Forcible Abduction in Violation of
International Law
Once a breach of an international obligation has been established, attention must turn to the appropriate remedy.' 7 7 In choosing a remedy, the
attitude of the injured state is largely determinative. Following a determination that an international wrong or delict has been committed, custom
requires reparation. 178 The general principle of reparation is that the
173. Or when X circumvents an extradition treaty in sending a national of Y to Z. See
Cerica Case, 93 R.G.D.I.P. 135 (1989) (France protested extradition of French national

from Tunisia to Italy where extradition from France to Italy had previously been refused
by French courts); Case of Mr. Wynne (1962), reprinted in 2 THE CONTEMPORARY PRACOF INTERNATIONAL Lw-1962, at 210, 210-14 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1963) (U.K. protested extradition of Briton to U.S.S.R. from Hungary).
174. BROWNUm, supranote 20, at 518-19. This duty would be entirely independent of
TICE OF THE KINGDOM IN THE FItL

any extradition treaty between state X and state Z. State Ywould have no standing in
domestic law to protest the breach of such a treaty. United States v. Trujillo, 871 F.
Supp. 215, 221 (D. Del. 1994), explaining dicta in United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d
1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988).
175. Many states criminalize harmful acts done to their nationals abroad on the basis

of the passive personality principle of jurisdiction. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F.
Supp. 896, 901-03 (D.D.C. 1988); Louis HEimN Er AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERmALS 839-40 (2d ed. 1987); JENNINGS & WATrs, supra note 26, at 471-72.
176. Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. 42 (Eng. H.L. 1993) (New Zealand citizen
abducted from South Africa to United Kingdom); Ex parte Driver, [1986] Q.B. 95 (Australian sent to United Kingdom from Turkey); Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (Italian abducted
from Uruguay and Brazil to the United States). Cochrane Case (1984), in Sean Fine,
FugitivesCan Be Snatched From Canada,GLOBE & MAIL (TORoNTO), June 19, 1992, at Al

(Briton lured to United States from Canada). There was no protest in these cases by the
fugitive's state of nationality. See The Koszta Case (1853), in 3 JOHN BASSrr MooRE,
ITRTIoNA.

LAw DIGEST 820, 820-54 (U.S. citizen abducted from Turkey, brought to

Austrian warship, and released and returned to the United States, upon U.S. protest).
177. 2 RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL LAW § 901 (1987).
178. Veldsquez Rodriguez (Compensation), 95 I.L.R. 306, 314, 1 25 (Inter-Amer.

C.H.R. 1989); Chorz6w Factory (Jurisdiction) (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 9,
21; Corfu Channel, 1949 LCJ. at 23; Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims (U.K. v. Spain),
[1923] 2 R.I.A.A. 615, 641.
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offending state should return the injured state to the status quo ante.179 In

the context of forcible abduction, three possible remedies exist: satisfaction (official apologies and/or declarations of the wrongfulness of the
impugned act),1 80 indemnity (a money payment to the injured state), 18 ' or
restitution (the return of the fugitive to the injured state).' 8 2 The prevailing view is that if the host state objects to the abduction and demands the
return of the fugitive, then the abducting state is required to effect restitution. 183 The injured state has a choice of remedies, and the return of the
fugitive seems most appropriate. 184 However, if the host state makes no
such objection, then the requirement of restitution is waived. There also
the abductors
may be an obligation for the abducting state to either8 punish
5
domestically or extradite them to the injured state.'
179. Rodriguez, 95 I.L.R. at 314, cl 26; Texaco v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389,
497-508 (1977); Chorz6w Factory (Indemnity) (Ger. v. Pol), 1928 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No.
17, 47 ("[Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the
illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if
that act had not been committed.").
180. The I'm Alone (Can. v. U.S.), [1935] 3 R.LA.A. 1609, 1618 (United States obligated to acknowledge illegality and apologize to Canada for sinking Canadian-registered
vessel on high seas); G. Arangio-Ruiz, Second Report on State Responsibility, [1989] 2 (pt.
1) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1, 4-7, 31-42.
181. Indemnity is the most common form of reparation in international law, generally because in many cases restitution is impossible due to a change in circumstances
since the wrongful act took place. Moreover, most acts of wrongfulness can be compensated for in money. Lusitania (U.S. v. Ger.), [1923] 7 R.I.A.A. 32, 34; Colunje (Pan. v.
U.S.), [1933] 6 RIAA. 342 (U.S.-Pan. Gen. Claims Comm'n). In Colunje, the defendant,
induced to enter the Canal Zone from Panama on false pretences, was arrested and
charged with mail fraud. The court required the United States to pay Panama $500 on
his behalf. Note, however, that the individual had already been released, and the charges
against him dropped. The payment of $500 was made in addition, and not as an alternative, to restitution. Id. However, where restitution is possible, it takes remedial precedence over indemnity. Texaco, 53 I.L.R. at 502-04. Generally, indemnity is an
inappropriate remedy in the case of a forcible abduction because it does not restore the
status quo ante as effectively as restitution.
182. Eduardo Jimdnez de Ar~chaga, InternationalLaw in the Last Third of a Century,
159 REcUML DES Couas 285-87 (1978-1); G. Arangio-Ruiz, PreliminaryReport on State
Responsibility, [1988] 2 (pt. 1) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 6, 11.
183. Mann, supra note 5, at 411; 3 MAURICE TRAvs, LE DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL
161 (1921). See also de Ar~chaga, supra note 182, at 285 (suggesting that as restitution
is the primary remedy, indemnity is appropriate only where restitution is not possible).
See Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 182, at 36-39. More generally, see Maximiliano Bernard
Alvarez de Eulate, La "Restitutioin Integrum" en La Practicayen LaJurisprudenciaInternationales, 29-32 TEws: REvIsTA DE CtmcIA Y TPCHNICAJURIDICAS 11 (1971-72).
184. F.A. Mann, The Consequences of an International Wrong in International and
National Law, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1976-77). Restitution (restitutio in integrum) is
widely accepted as the primary remedy in international law. Texaco, 53 I.L.R. at 497504. But see CHRSTINE GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 16 (1987). See
also IAN BRowNuE, SYsTEm OF THE LAW OF NATIONS-PART ONE STATE REsPoNSIBILY 87
(1983) (espousing the view that issues of state responsibility and remedies should be
governed by context rather than by abstract principles).
185. The injured state may seek the extradition of the private abductors (kidnapping
is a common extradition crime) in order to try them for the abduction. Ker v. Illinois,
119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (suggesting that kidnapper could be extradited at Peru's
request); Kear v. Hilton, 699 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1983) (bondsman who kidnapped and
transported Canadian citizen to the United States was extradited to Canada to face kid-

420

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol. 29

1. If the Injured State Consents, There Is No Wrong
The customary rule prohibiting the exercise of police power upon the
territory of another state does not apply where the injured state consents to
the intrusion upon its territorial sovereignty. 18 6 An abduction may take7
18
place with the tacit assistance or active participation of the host state.
Alternatively, the host state may grant permission to abduct the fugitive. 18 8
The consent must be express' 8 9 and free of defects (such as fraud, corrupnapping charges); Villareal v. Hammond, 74 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1934) (private citizens
extradited to Mexico to face kidnapping charges for abduction of a Mexican citizen to
the United States from Mexico); Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1931) (kidnapper extradited to Canada for abduction of U.S. citizen from Canada to the United States);
Regina v. Kear and Johnson, 51 C.C.C. 3d 574 (Ont. (Can.) C.A. 1989) (bondsman convicted of kidnapping); Martinez case, [19061 2 FOREGN REtL U.S. 1121-22 (United States
extradited kidnappers of Mexican citizen to Mexico); Clair Case (1986), in Fine, supra
note 176, at Al (bounty-hunters convicted of kidnapping in Canada). Ordinarily, only
private abductors would be subject to extradition, while state agents would be protected
by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. But see Jeffrey J. Carlisle, Extradition of Government Agents as a Municipal Law Remedy for State-Sponsored Kidnapping, 81 CAL. L. REv.
1541 (1993) (arguing that U.S. federal courts should warrant the extradition of government agents to injured states in state-sponsored abduction cases).
186. For consent as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, see Draft Articles on
State Responsibility, [1979] 2 (pt. 2) Y.B. Ir'L L. COMM'N 91, 106-15. Further:
Mention should also be made, again in the context of action taken by organs of a
State in the territory of another State, of cases of arrests made by the police of a
State on foreign soil. There is no doubt that such arrests or abductions normally constitute a breach of an international obligation towards the territorial
State. But it is clear from international practice and judicial decisions that the
same actions cease to be wrongful if the territorial State consents to them.
Id. at 111.
187. United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1980) (abduction to United States
with Thai assistance and consent); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975) (Chile cooperated in abduction and did not protest);
Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973) (Vietnamese officials
involved in arrest); United States v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff d 244
F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957), reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 920
(1958) (Mexican police brought defendant to Texas); United States v. Insull, 8 F.Supp
310 (N.D. 111.1934) (Turkish police abducted individual from Greek vessel, handed him
to U.S. agents for rendition to the United States); In re Keroly R., 11927-28] 4 Ann. Dig.
345 (Budapest (Hung.) Royal Hung. Crim. Ct.) (Egyptian police brought individual from
Egypt to Italy, from which he was deported to Hungary).
188. United States v. Toro, 840 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1988) (Panama did not protest
abduction of defendant to the United States); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902
(2d Cir. 1981) (Bahamas did not protest or seek return of abducted individual, despite
existence of extradition treaty); United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert, denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979) (defendants arrested in Haitian territorial waters with
Haitian consent); Rex v. Garrett, 86 LJ.K.B. 894 (Eng. C.A. 1917). In Garrett,Russian

citizens were arrested on a Danish ship in an English port and convicted. Neither Denmark nor Russia protested.
189. Several cases suggest that mistaken consent is valid. Savakar Case (France v. Gr.
Brit.), 6 BRrnsH DIGFsT oF INTERNArnoNAL LAw 487-95 (Clive Parry ed., 1965) [hereinafter
PARRY]. In Savahar, a French Gendarme returned a fugitive who had escaped from a
British vessel in French waters. The court held that because France had voluntarily
returned the fugitive to the British, Britain had no obligation to return him to France. Id.
at 494-95. It would seem, however, that the gendarme was acting under a mistake which
negated French consent. McNair, supra note 17, at 193 (suggesting that Savakarwas not
a case of mistaken surrender because France had agreed with Britain that Savakar
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tion, or coercion) in order to be valid. 190 Consent from local officials is
sufficient, even if it is mistaken or ultra vires.1 9 1 Moreover, consent must
be given before or contemporaneous with the abduction. 19 2 Consent provided after the abduction does not preclude wrongfulness; it amounts to a
waiver of the right to claim reparation for the wrong. 19 3 Conversely, if a
state initially consents to the exercise of police power within its territory by
another state, its subsequent change of heart after the latter state has
abducted a fugitive is irrelevant.' 94 Where there is no effective government
in the host territory, no offense, consent, or protest is possible. Thus, an
abduction will engender no state responsibility on the abducting state's
s
part.19
should remain in British custody). Compare Keyes Case (1901), reprinted in 6 BRITISH
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 485-87. In Keyes, French authorities in French Dahomey
detained Frenchmen who had murdered a British officer in Nigeria. However, they mistakenly handed the fugitives over to British officials in Nigeria, where the fugitives were
charged with murder and sentenced to death. Britain refused the French request for
their return, arguing that their transfer to British control was voluntary even if mistaken.
Id. More recently, in Government of Jamaica v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 627 (M.D.
Fla. 1991), Jamaica alleged that a fugitive had been surrendered mistakenly to the
United States. The court declined to order the fugitive's release and return, and held
instead that any such decision was for the executive to make.
190. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 186, at 112; Marchand, supra
note 5, at 253 (same); O'Higgins, supra note 5, at 311-12 (mistake induced by fraud or
deception should result in a duty to return).
191. S. v. Mahala, [1994] 1 S.A.C.R. 510 (S. Afr. App. Div. 1994); Ben Barka Case
(1966), in (1966) ANN. FL DE DL INT'L 899 (Moroccan abducted from France with
assistance of French police acting without authority); Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 186, at 113-14; Savakar,supra note 189. But see Henkin, supra note 144,
at 313.
192. Eduardo Jim~nez de Artchaga & Attilla Tanzi, InternationalState Responsibility,
in INTERAnONAL LAw: AcHIEvEMErrs AND PROSPEcrs 347, 353 (Mohammed Bedjaoui
ed., 1991).
193. Eduardo Jimdnez de Ar~chaga, InternationalResponsibility, in MANUAL oF PuBc
INTERNATIONAL LAW

531, 541 (M. Sorenson ed., 1968).

194. Aunis Case, [1979] 2 (pt. 2) Y.B. INT'L L. Comm'N 111. In Aunis, the Prefect of
Genoa arrested five fugitives aboard a French vessel with French permission. The
French Consul later reversed his position and sought their return. Italy refused, arguing
that France had consented to their arrest. Id.
195. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 254 (1886), may be such a case (no operational Peruvian
government to lodge protest with the United States). See also Iva Ikuko Toguri D'Aquino
v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951) ("Tokyo Rose"); Gillars v. United States,
182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (U.S. citizen brought to the United States from Germany
and charged with treason. Because the U.S.-Germany Extradition Treaty was inapplicable, the accused could not object to her forcible transfer to the United States); Chandler
v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied 336 U.S. 918 (1949), reh'g
denied, 336 U.S. 947 (1949) (defendant brought from occupied Germany to the United
States to face charges of treason); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla.
1990); Afouneh v. Attorney-General, [194142] 10 Ann. Dig. 327 (Palestine) (defendant
brought from Allied-occupied Syria to British Mandate Palestine outside regular extradi-

tion proceedings). Similarly, there is no state to protest an abduction or seizure from a
stateless vessel on the high seas, although in theory the individual's state of nationality
could exercise its rights of diplomatic protection. See supra text accompanying notes
172-74. See also United States v. Monroy, 614 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Cortes, 588 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1979); Molvanv. A.-G. for Palestine, [1948] App. Cas. 351

(P.C.).
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The Injured State Does Not Consent, But Does Not Protest

196
Where a forcible abduction is met with silence from the injured state,
the presumption against the violation of the injured state's territory is not
displaced. 197 However, the lack of protest likely affects the remedy
required under international law. 198 Custom usually will require an official apology to the injured state, and perhaps financial compensation as
well. State practice suggests that there is no duty upon the abducting state
to return the fugitive to the injured state in the absence of a protest, or at
least a request for his return. 199

3.

The Injured State Does Not Consent, But Does Not Request the
Individual's Return

There may be a diplomatic solution to an incident of transnational forcible
abduction, as in the famous Eichmann case. 20 0 Eichmann was seized from
Argentina by Israeli agents and brought to Israel to face trial for war crimes
and crimes against humanity. Argentina protested vigorously and
requested that the U.N. Security Council convene to consider the issue.
196. United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988) (no protest from
Belize or Guatemala when Belize citizen was abducted from Guatemala); Waits v.
McGowan, 516 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1975) (no Canadian protest); United States v. Unverzagt, 299 F. 1015 (W.D. Wash. 1924), affd sub nom. Unverzagt v. Benn, 5 F.2d 492 (9th
Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 566 (1925) (no Canadian protest where alleged abduction from Canada by U.S. officials); State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118 (1835) (no Canadian
protest).

197. "Presumed" consent is not proper consent. Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
supra note 186, at 112.
198. Gluck, supra note 6, at 624 (injured state's silence should result in a presumption of consent); Semmelman, supra note 6, at 552-53 (same); Maurice Travers, Des arrestations au cas de venue involontaire sur le territoire,13 REVUE DE Dgorr INTERNATIONALE
Piva [R.D.I.P.] 627, 643 (1917) (silence should be construed as consent). But see
Lowenfeld, supra note 143, at 489; Mann, supra note 5, at 409 (silence should not be
construed as consent, although it affects remedy). Silence is not so much consent as it is
a waiver of the right to a remedy. Verdugo-Urquidez 11, 934 F.2d at 1352.
199. 2 RESTATEMENT (THnR) OF FOREIGN REL. LAw § 432, cmt. c, rep. n.3 (1987); Re
Argoud, 45 I.L.R. 90 (Cass. crim. (Fr.) 1964). In Re Argoud, French agents kidnapped a
French fugitive from Germany. In France, he was arrested and brought to trial. Irregular jurisdiction did not affect court's ability to hear the case. Although the abduction
might have violated Germany's territorial sovereignty, there was no evidence of a German protest. The court held that the fugitive had no standing to make such a claim. Id.
at 4748. See ANDRE CocATRE-ZiLGIEN, L'Ainrm ARGo=: CONSIDRATIONS SUR LES A -RE.
sTATIONS INERNATIONALEMENT naRGuu.Rs (1965); Karl Doehring, Restitutionsanspruch,
Asylrecht und Auslieferungsrechtim FallArgoud, 25 ZEIrr. FOR AUSLSANDICHES OFFENTLICHES
RECHT UND VOLKERREcHT 209 (1965); 39 NEUE JuR. WOCH. 1427 (1986) (Ger. Fed.

Const. CL 1985) (abductee may be tried if injured state does not protest or demand
return). See also Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990); Canadian

Amicus CuriaeBrief, supra note 152, at 928.
200. Attorney-General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18 (Isr. Dist. Ct. 1961), affd, 36 I.L.R.
2
77 (Isr. 1962). See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN INJERusALEM: A REPORT ON THE
BANAurrY OF EvL 263-65 (1977); Hans W. Baade, The Eichmann Trial: Some Legal
Aspects, 1961 DUKE L.J. 400 (1961); Fawcett, supranote 150; L C. Green, The Eichmann
Case, 23 MOD. L. REv. 507 (1960); Georg Schwarzenberger, The EichmannJudgment, 15
CuaR. LEG. PROBs. 248 (1962); Helen Silving, In re Eichmann: A Dilemma of Law and
Morality, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 307 (1961).
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The Security Council adopted a resolution which required Israel to make
"cappropriate reparation" to Argentina, but crucially, did not require Eichmann's return. 20 1 Argentina initially sought Eichmann's return, but later

dropped this demand. 20 2 Eichmann was tried in Israel, and his objection
to jurisdiction was rejected. 20 3 He was convicted, condemned to death,
and hanged. The case concerned crimes of such a unique and grave nature
that it would be imprudent to abstract general principles from it. 2 °4 Moreover, its precedential value is clouded by a possible universality principle
exception to enforcement jurisdiction. 20 5 However, it does demonstrate
201. 1960 U.N. Y.B. 196, U.N. Doc. S/4349.
202. Argentina and Israel issued a joint communiqu& on Aug. 3, 1960, in which they
indicated that they considered the matter closed, while acknowledging that the incident
had "infringed the fundamental fights of the State of Argentina." Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at
59 (District Court decision).
203. Id. at 57-71. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 304-08 (Supreme Court decision).
204. Mann, supra note 5, at 414. At the Security Council, Israel argued that "this
isolated violation of Argentine law must be seen in the light of the exceptional and
unique nature of the crimes attributed to Eichmann." U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 866th
mtg., at 1, 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.866 (1960) (Mrs. Meir, Israel). See ARENDT, supra note 200,
at 264 (noting argument that abduction might be justified by the unprecedented nature
of the crime); Lowenfeld, 84 Am. J. INT'L L. 444, supra note 143, at 490 (Eichmann case
"bigger than law").
205. A possible "Eichmann exception" to the rule against the exercise of police power
within another state's territory might be grounded in the universality principle, which
permits states to prescribe certain crimes and to try persons for them, regardless of
where the offenses were committed, or the nationality of the offenders. Piracy is the
classic example of a crime prescribed on the basis of the universality principle. The
class of crimes which are susceptible to universal jurisdiction has expanded to include
slavery, hijacking and skyjacking, genocide and crimes against humanity, and some
forms of terrorism. 1 RESTATEMENr (THIRD) OF FOREGN RL. LAw § 404 (1987); Kenneth
C. Randall, UniversalJurisdictionUnder InternationalLaw, 66 TEx. L. REv. 785 (1988).

However, there is considerable disagreement among states as to what this list should
include. The major limitation is that the universality principle applies only to offenses
which are "crimes under international law," a relatively narrow category. See BROWNmE,
supra note 20, at 304-05 (distinguishing universality jurisdiction from jurisdiction over
crimes under international law). Although the universality principle is the basis for prescriptive and not enforcement jurisdiction, in cases where the fugitive is accused of war
crimes or crimes against humanity, it is arguable that the presumption against enforcement jurisdiction within the territory of another state may be realigned. States may be
able to abduct a fugitive from another state and charge him with crimes under international law without incurring international responsibility for the violation of the latter's
territorial sovereignty, particularly where the asylum state has refused to either extradite
or prosecute a fugitive accused of an international crime. See, e.g., Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, arts. 5-7, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (states have an obligation to prosecute or extradite individuals in their
jurisdiction accused of genocide). The abducting state's violation of the injured state's
territorial sovereignty may be outweighed by both the abducting state's and injured
state's jus cogens obligation to prosecute the fugitive for international crimes. See Draft
Articles on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 30
I.L.M. 1585, 1594 (1991) ("A State in whose territory an individual is alleged to have
committed a crime against the peace and security of mankind is present shall either try
or extradite him."). Such an approach is implied in Barbie, Judgment of Oct. 6, 1983,
Cass. crim., 78 I.L.R. 125, 131 (Fr.). See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS:
INTERNATIONAL LAv AN How WE USE IT 72-73 (1994) (arguing that in the case of "universally condemned offenses," the issue of the fugitive's abduction should be
"decoupled" from his subsequent trial, so that the illegality of the former would not
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that in the absence of a specific request for the fugitive's return, a protest
may not require restitution. Here, reparation amounted to censure of
Israel and an Israeli apology to Argentina.20 6
4. The Injured State Does Not Consent, Protests, and Requests the
Individual's Return
Where the injured state does not consent to the abduction, but instead
protests to the abducting state, there is a strong presumption that the fugitive must be returned to the injured state. 20 7 A protest must be accepted at
face value. 20 8 It seems, however, that the injured state must specifically
request his return. 20 9 The duty to return is an established rule of custom-

affect the abducting state's ability to proceed with the latter, and allowing an "Eichmann

exception"). For a similar view, see Fawcett, supra note 150, at 199-200. The abducting

state would still be obligated to provide a remedy to the injured state, but this would not

necessarily involve the return of the fugitive. An "Eichmann exception" should be limited to extremely grave crimes. The difficulty is that the range of universality offenses is
malleable. It is arguable, for example, that the defendant's alleged involvement in torture
in Alvarez-Machain would justify his abduction under this exception. However, this concern might be met by the requirement that at the very minimum the would-be abducting
state must exhaust all other avenues to secure the return of the fugitive before resorting
to abduction, which clearly did not take place in Alvarez-Machain. See Baker & R6ben,
supra note 6, at 676-77. But see Henkin, supra note 144, at 313 (rejecting any such
"universality exception"). It is difficult not to sympathize with the concern that any

Eichmann exception would be open to abuse. Nevertheless, it is one way to rationalize
the caselaw.
206. An international body's finding of wrongfulness may itself be a form of satisfaction. Rainbow Warrior Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 82 I.L.R. 499, 577 (Fr.-N.Z. Arb. Trib. 1990).
207. Canada argued that the United States and Canada "have traditionally subscribed
to the principle that-in the face of protest-an official transborder abduction must result
in repatriation." Canada's Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 152, at 925. Interestingly,
Canada's amicus brief cited Regina v. Walton, 10 C.C.C. 269 (Ont. (Can.) C.A. 1905)
(Canadian fugitive brought from United States to Canada by Canadian policeman to face
criminal charges; court rejected fugitive's jurisdictional challenge), but distinguished
Walton on the grounds that there was no U.S. protest, and that it was a pre-Charter
decision, implying strongly that under the Charter a different result would have been
reached. Canada's Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 152, at 925. See LA FoR.sT, supra
note 16, at 46-48 (arguing that pre-Charter jurisprudence would likely not be followed).
Canada expressed concern that two recent incidents suggested divergent interpretations
of the U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty as the exclusive instrument for the conduct of U.S.Canada extradition relations. Id. at 926-27 (citing Jaffe v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304 (11th
Cir. 1987), and Derrick Hills Case (1991), reprinted in 31 LL.M. 932 (1992)). Canada
believed that Alvarez-Machain provided the U.S. Supreme Court with the opportunity to
confirm that U.S. law was in line with what Canada viewed as constituting international
custom. Id. at 928.
208. Contra Thomas L. Horan, Case Comment, 21 GA.J. IArr'L & COMP. L. 525 (1991)
(suggesting that court should look behind protest of foreign state and conduct inquiry
into its validity). It is true, however, that the protest must emanate from the injured state
itself. Peltier v. Hemnan, 997 F.2d 461, 474-75 (8th Cir. 1993) ("protest" of 49 members
of Canadian Parliament does not amount to official protest).
209. See 1 Moom, supra note 148, § 193 (discussing case in which, following abduction of fugitive in Mexico by Texas sheriff, Mexican government requested that abductors
be charged for their unlawful acts, but made no request for the return of the fugitive).
One commentator indicates in the context of a general discussion of reparation in international law that "fin certain situations the simple payment of compensation would be
inappropriate." BROwNUm, supra note 184, at 235. He describes a situation in which
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ary international law. 2 10 This custom is demonstrated through state practice, specifically in cases involving: Canada and the United States;2 11 the
United Kingdom and the United States; 2 12 Mexico and the United
"the reparation could only take the form of the return of the victim and the punishment
of the officials concerned." Id. See also BRowNLIE, supra note 20, at 317 n.6 ("Much
depends upon... a waiver of a claim to reconduction.").
210. Custom requires a general and consistent practice engaged in under a sense of
legal obligation. 1 REsTATEmENT (Tnm) oF FOREIGN Rn. LAw § 102(2) (1987); North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Neth., F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.CJ. 3; Military and
Paramilitary Activities, 1986 LCJ. at 97-98.
211. For examples of U.S. abduction coupled with Canadian demand, see Walters
Case (1985), discussed in Fine, supranote 161, at AIO (Canadian forced onto airplane by
unidentified abductors, flown to the United States. Canada protested, individual
released by United States.); Cochrane Case (1984), discussed in Fine, supra note 176, at
A10 (Briton lured from Canada to U.S., released upon Canadian protest); Anderson Case
(1974), discussed in C.V. Cole, Extradition Treaties Abound But Unlawful Seizures Continue, INT'L PERSPECTIVES, Mar.-Apr. 1975, at 40, 42, reprintedin 9 L. Soc. UPP. CAN.GAZ.
177 (1975) (U.S. Army deserter, arrested by U.S. police in Canada, brought back to the
United States but returned upon Canadian protest); Kohosed Case (1960), discussed in
Cole, supra, at 41; Bratton Case (1872), reprinted in 1 MooRE, supra note 148, § 190
(U.S. returned individual who had been abducted from Canada to the United States). In
Kohosed, two Canadian Indians were arrested by Michigan police on the St. Clair River.
There was a dispute as to what side of the border they were on at the time of arrest.
Canada argued that they should have been released and returned, although they pleaded
guilty to the charges. Kohosed Case, supra.
For cases involving Canadian abduction coupled with U.S. demand, see Derrick Hills
Case (1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 932 (1992). In Derrick Hills, a U.S. citizen was
arrested by Canadian police on the U.S. side of the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel. After the
United States protested, Canada stayed its proceedings and returned Hills to U.S officials. Canada subsequently made an extradition request to the United States for his
return. See the discussion of the case in Roy Carleton Howell, InternationalExtradition:
The CanadianExample of Justice and Fair Play, 4 PAcE Y.B. INT'L L. 147 (1992). See also
Marker Case (1909), reprinted in 4 HAcicVORTH, supra, at 226-27; Lafond Case (1908),
reprinted in 4 GREaN H. HAcKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTEmRAIONA LAw 224 (accused allegedly abducted from Illinois to Canada, charged with larceny and returned to the United
States upon U.S. request). Markerinvolved an alleged abduction from North Dakota to
Saskatchewan by two plainclothes men, one of whom identified himself as "a constable
of the North West Mounted Police of Canada." Marker Case, supra, at 226. When the
fugitive was charged with theft in Canada, the United States expressed concern. The
British Ambassador reported that the Saskatchewan Attorney-General had agreed to stay
the charges, release the fugitive, and give him an opportunity to leave the country. Id. at
227. See also Martin Case (1876) in 1 MooRE, supra note 148, § 192 (U.S. citizen
released upon U.S. protest after capture on U.S. territory); Wilson Case (1863), 1 FOREIGN RE. U.S. 559 (1863) (two defendants abducted from Michigan by Canadian
officers, the United States protested, and Canada agreed that they should be returned); 4
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, DIGESr OF IrTERNIONA LAw 328-32 (1906).
212. For cases involving British abduction and U.S. demand, see Blair Case (1876),
discussed in 1 MOORE, supra note 148, § 191 (Britain offered to return Englishman
abducted from United States), also discussed in Lawrence Preuss, Settlement of the Jacob
Kidnaping Case, 30 Am.J. INT'L L 123 (1936); 3 TRvERs, supra note 183, at 158-59; 6
PARRY, supra note 189, at 482-83; Grogan case (1841), discussed in 1 MOORE,supra note
148, § 189 (Britain returned fugitive abducted from United States to Canada by British
soldiers). Regarding U.S. abduction and British demand, see Vincenti Case (1920),
reprinted in 1 GREEN H. HAcKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONA. LAw 624 (Britain protested kidnapping of U.S. citizen from Bahamian territorial waters, resulting in return of
prisoner to British authorities); Tyler Case (1863), 1 FOREIGN RE.. U.S. 524 (1863)
(abduction from Canada by U.S. soldiers ends in agreement with British demands for
release and return); Trent Case (1861), in 7 JOHN BAssErr MooRE, DIGEST OF INTERA-
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States; 21 3 Spain and the United States;21 4 Germany and Switzerland; 21 5
France and Germany; 21 6 Italy and Switzerland; 2 17 and the United King21 8
dom and South Africa.
In all of these incidents the fugitive was returned by the abducting
state to the injured state upon protest and a request for his return.

21 9

Cases where the abducting state made this determination, either by the
221
executive2 20 or its domestic courts, support the viability of this doctrine.
TIoNALO
LAw 768-79 (1906) (Confederate officers abducted from British vessel. Britain

protested and the United States released the officers.).
213. For cases on Mexican abduction and U.S. demand, see Blatt and Converse Case
(1911), 2 HAcxwoRTH, supra note 212, at 309 (Mexico returned defendants to United
States); Gonzales Case (1872), 1 FoRIGN RE. U.S. 448 (1872) (U.S. government
demanded return of individual abducted from United States by Mexican officer);
Nogales Case (1887), discussed in 1 MooRE, supra note 148, § 196 (Mexican officer
under arrest in the United States was rescued by Mexican soldiers and brought to Mexico, only to be returned upon U.S. demand and Mexican consent.). Regarding U.S.
abduction and Mexican demand, see Martinez, 2 FoREIGN RL U.S. 1121 (1906); Ex
parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342 (1934); Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (Mexico was
unsuccessful in each case). Compare Two Texas Fugitives Case (1878), in 1 MOORE,
supra note 148, § 194 (U.S. supports Mexican demand for return of two fugitives illegally rendered to Texas from Mexico).
214. Rueda Case (1891), in 4 MooRE, supra note 211, at 330 (Spain agrees to return
U.S. citizen abducted from Florida to Cuba by Spanish agents).
215. Jacob-Salomon Case, discussed in Lawrence Preuss, Kidnappingof Fugitivesfrom
Justice on Foreign Territory, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 502 (1935) (German agents kidnapped
German from Switzerland, Germany later returned him after Swiss demand).
216. In the Schnaebeld Case, a French policeman was lured into Germany under false
pretences by German officials, arrested, and imprisoned. Germany returned him upon
protest. SchnaebelE Case, in 3 TRAvms, supra note 183, at 152-54.
217. Mantovani Case (1965), reprinted in Charles Rousseau, Affaire Mantovani
[Chronique des Faits Internationaux], 69 R.G.D.I.P. 761, 834-35 (1969) (After Switzerland protested the abduction of an Italian from Lugano by Italian police officers, Italy
apologized and returned him to Switzerland).
218. Higgs Case (1964), reprintedin BRITISH PRaCtICE I INTERNATIONAL LAw-1964, at
185 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1966). In Higgs, a Briton was abducted from Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and transported to South Africa, where he was taken into police
custody. Northern Rhodesia protested to the United Kingdom. After U.K. officials confronted the South African government regarding the matter, Higgs was released to the
British ambassador in South Africa for return to Northern Rhodesia.
219. Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 182, at 18 n.61. See Florida Case (1864), reprintedin 7
MooRE, supra note 212, at 1090-91 (U.S. vessel towed Confederate ship from Brazilian
waters to U.S. When Brazil protested, the United States apologized and released crew.).
See 1 McNAIR, INTERNATIONALI LAw OPInoNs 78-79 (1956) ("The remedy recommended
for the wrongful recapture of an escaped prisoner was the restitutio in integrum of the
aggrieved State whose territory had been violated by releasing the prisoner.").
220. J&6me Case (1885), in 3 TRAvEas, supra note 183, at 141 (French deserter
arrested in Germany, deported to France with collusion of French authorities, and
returned to the frontier by French authorities.).
221. In reJolis, [1933-1934] 7 Ann. Dig. 191 (1933) (Trib. Correctionnel d'Avesnes
(Fr.)). In Jolis, a Belgian citizen, followed into his home country from France, was
arrested by French police officers, returned to France, imprisoned, and charged with
theft. When Belgium protested and demanded his return, the French court ordered his
release, declaring that his arrest by the French police was "of no legal effect." Nollet
Case, 18J. Du DR. ITr'L 1188 (1891) (Cour d'appel de Douai (Fr.)). In Nollet, a Belgian
citizen was arrested in Belgium by French police and then handed over to Belgian
authorities, who mistakenly transferred him to French police at the border. The French
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Until Alvarez-Machain, the U.S. Supreme Court had never denied this rule
of customary international law. 22 2 In fact, federal appellate courts had

never refused to return a fugitive when there was a protest and request for
the fugitive's return. 22 3 Moreover, the rule is well-grounded in opinio
juris.2 24 Thus, the assertion that there is no rule of customary interna-

tional law requiring the return of a fugitive is inaccurate. Only the broad
formulation of the rule (i.e., without the stipulations that the injured state
must protest and request the fugitive's return) is inaccurate. Where there
is a violation of territorial sovereignty by state agents, and the injured state
protests and requests the return of the fugitive, customary international law
requires that the fugitive be returned to the state from which he was
abducted.
C. Domestic Law Consequences of International Illegality
1. Rejecting the justiciability Myth
The previous section established the existence of a rule of customary international law prohibiting transnational forcible abduction and requiring
abducting states to return the abducted individual upon the injured state's
protest and request for his return. However, this important issue remains:
which branch of the domestic government in the abducting state is responsible for ensuring that this international obligation is carried out? This
court ordered his release because his presence in France resulted from illegal acts of the
French police. Jabouille Case (1905), in [1905] R.D.I.P. 704 (Cour de Bordeaux (Fr.)).
In Jabouille, the victim of a disguised extradition from Spain to France demanded that
his arrest in France be quashed. The court found the arrest to be illegal, ordered the
defendant's release, and gave him a grace period to reach the frontier.
222. Of course the United States did not deny the rule in Alvarez-Machain either: the
issue was not argued. The Ninth Circuit later refused to hear argument on the point,
however. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 971 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1992).
223. Some lower courts decided differently. See, e.g., Ex parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342
(S.D.Tex. 1934) (court ignores Mexican protest). However, practice need not be universal to establish a customary rule. Contrary practice may be viewed as inconsistent with
custom rather than establishing a new customary rule. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 98. On decisions of municipal courts
as evidence of customary international law, see 1 O'CoNNE., supra note 5, at 31-32.
224. 1 REsTATEmENT (THia) OF FoREGN REL LAw § 432, cmt. c (1987). See Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, Part11, [1984] 2 (pt. 1) Y.B. Ir'L L. CoMM'N 3. Article 6
of the Draft Articles states: "The injured State may require the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act to: (a) discontinue the act, release and return the
persons and objects held through such an act, and prevent continuing effects of such act
.." Id. (emphasis added). See [1985] 2 (pt. 1) Y.B. IN'TL L COM'N 9 (Where an act
violates international law, "the author State should at least, if required by the injured
State to do so, release and return the person or property held through that act."). See
also Harvard Research, 29 Am.J. IVr'L L 623 (Supp. 1935). According to article 16:
In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or
punish any person who has been brought within its territory or a place subject
to its authority by recourse to measures in violation of international law or international convention without first obtaining the consent of the State or States
whose rights have been violated by such measures.
The commentary notes that "[w]hile it is frauldy conceded that the present article is in
part of the nature of legislation, it is not to be understood that the principle stated is
without support in national jurisprudence or international practice." Id. at 624.
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Article posits that in the case of the customary international norm regulating transnational forcible abduction, domestic courts are the most appro2 25
priate branch of the state to oversee its implementation in domestic law.
The Alvarez-Machain Court decided otherwise. At the core of the
majority decision in Alvarez-Machain was the view that a refusal to exercise
jurisdiction over the fugitive, and/or to order the return of the fugitive to
2 26
Mexico, would intrude upon the executive's conduct of foreign affairs.
The majority adopted elements of a 'justiciability" framework which suggests that legal issues with an international dimension are matters for the
executive, and not the courts, to decide. 22 7 Granted, the majority did not
decline to decide the case on the grounds that the issue presented to it was
non-justiciable. However, consistent with earlier case law, the Court
remained reluctant to engage in the supervision of executive action in foreign affairs. 228 In the event of a forcible abduction of an individual from
one state to stand trial for criminal charges in another, the domestic courts
of the latter state should not deal with the matter by refusing to exercise
jurisdiction over the abductee. Instead, the issue should be resolved on the
"higher stage" of interstate relations. Why? Because domestic courts in
225. See, e.g., CONFORTI, supra note 11, at 8-9 ("[Clompliance with international law
relies not so much on enforcement mechanisms available at the international level, but
rather on the resolve of domestic legal operators such as public servants and judges to
use to their limits the mechanisms provided by municipal law to ensure compliance with
international norms.").
226. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669 ("the decision of whether respondent should
be returned to Mexico, as a matter outside of the Treaty, is a matter for the Executive
Branch") (foomote omitted).
227. The Alvarez-Machain majority suggested that the issue of a possible international
law violation was not justiciable. Rather, it involved a "political question," or matter to
be resolved on the diplomatic plane. Yet the Alvarez-Machain majority did not explicitly
invoke the political question doctrine. See Xiao v. Reno, 837 F. Supp. 1506, 1547 (N.D.
Cal. 1993). A similar reliance upon a justiciability framework has been taken in other
cases. See, e.g., Unverzagt v. Benn, 5 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1925); United States v. Sobell,
142 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Il.
1934); State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118 (1835). However, Martinez, [1906] 2 FOREIGN RL.
U.S. 1121, shows that this approach rings hollow. There the State Department
attempted to shift responsibility to the federal courts, telling Mexico that Ker bound its
hands, and that the separation of powers prevented it from interfering with a federal
judicial decision. Id. at 1122. This undermines the claim that assigning the issue to the
executive will ensure its resolution.
228. The reluctance is based largely upon the U.S. Constitution's implicit allocation
of responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations to the executive branch. United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See generally RANDALL,
supra note 205, at 785. See Ex parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Tex. 1934). In Lopez,
the defendant was abducted from Mexico and charged with narcotics offenses in Texas.
Mexico sought his release and indicated that it would hold him, awaiting a proper extradition request from the U.S. authorities. However, the court rejected this request: "The
intervention of the Government of Mexico raises serious questions, involving the
claimed violation of its sovereignty, which may well be presented to the Executive
Department of the United States, but of which this Court has no jurisdiction." Id. at 344
(citation omitted). This judicial reluctance to tread upon what is perceived to be executive territory can be traced as far back as Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884). See
also The Ship Richmond, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815); The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). It has been criticized. See MicHAELJ. GLEN.
NON, CoNsnrmuoNAL DIPLOMACY

(1990).
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several arguably analogous situations don't inquire into international relations, often showing deference to either the executive or legislature. 22 9
This approach is an abdication of both the international legal obligation to vindicate international law, and the domestic legal obligation to
supervise executive conduct. The question before the Court in AlvarezMachain certainly contained a significant international dimension, but it
was in essence a criminal case, an area inherently within the competence of
has a foreign relations element to it
the judiciary. The mere fact that a 2case
30
does not render it non-justiciable.
Indeed, it is the exercise of jurisdiction by the abducting state's domestic courts in transnational forcible abduction cases which is likely to
embroil that state in an international controversy. By turning a blind eye to
violations of international law, a domestic court actually encourages such
conduct, thereby resulting in further international controversy. This is not
to deny the existence of a "political question" or "non-justiciability" doctrine. 2 31 The real issue, however, is whether a criminal trial following a
transnational forcible abduction is an appropriate ground for its exercise. 2 32 Surely it is not. There is an important distinction between evaluating the legality under domestic or international law of the actions of a
229. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (validity of
Cuban sugar expropriation decrees in Cuba); Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua
v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (funding of Nicaraguan Contras in violation of
customary international law and U.N. Charter); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d
202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (support of Contras); Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v.
Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 755 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985) (deployment of cruise missiles in England); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C.
1982), affid, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984) (U.S.
presence in and military assistance to El Salvador).
230. Japan Whaling Assoc. v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1986);
Baker v.Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). See alsoKadic v. Karadiit, 70 F.3d 232, 249-50
(2d Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2524

(1996).

231. The scope of such a doctrine is unclear. Louis Henkin, Is There a Political QuesMANN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS INENGLISH COURTS
63-83 (1986); Michael TigarJudicial Power, the "PoliticalQuestion Doctrine," and Foreign
Relations, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1135 (1970). Certainly, in some contexts, a doctrine of
non-justiciability may be appropriate, e.g., where a domestic court is asked to adjudicate
a dispute between foreign sovereign states. J. H. Rayner Ltd. v. Dep't of Trade and Indus.
(Tin Council Case), [1990] 2 App. Cas. 418, 499 (Eng. H.L.); Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v.
Hammer (No. 3), 1982 App. Cas. 888, 931-32 (Eng. H.L.); Westland Helicopters Ltd. v.
Arab Org. for Industrialization, 1995 Q.B. 282, 292-94 (Eng. 1994). The doctrine is
criticized in T.R.S. ALLAN, LAw, LIBRTY,ANDJusTIcr: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF BRISH
CONSTITUTIONALISM 211-36 (1993); THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL
ANSWERs: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFAIas? (1992). The Supreme
Court of Canada denied the existence of a justiciability doctrine in Operation Dismantle
v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 459 (Can.), at least to the extent that the court did
not consider disputes of a political or foreign policy nature to be inherently nonjusticiable.
232. Verdugo-Urquidez II, 938 F.2d at 1357. See Bennett 11, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 78
(Lord Lowry) (refusing to leave forcible abduction cases to the executive or diplomatic
plane for resolution); RANDALL, supra note 11, at 107-13; Note, Judicial Enforcement of

tion Doctrine?, 85 YALE LJ.597 (1976); F.A.

International Law Against the Federal and State Governments, 104 HA-v. L. REv. 1269
(1991).
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foreign state and assessing the legality of the acts of the domestic executive.
The former is likely to be considered non-justiciable, whereas the latter
should be adjudicated.
2.

The Demise of Supervisory Powers?

U.S. federal courts possess an inherent supervisory power to control the
administration of justice before them.23 3 This power goes beyond merely
ensuring that due process requirements have been satisfied. 234 The supervisory power arises from the need to protect the integrity of the judicial
process. It acts as "a remedy designed to deter illegal conduct." 23 5 The
supervisory power acts as an important check over executive conduct and
has been relied upon by lower courts in the forcible abduction context to
2 36
justify refusing to exercise jurisdiction over an abducted individual.
Although in recent years the Supreme Court has sharply bounded the federal courts' power of supervisory jurisdiction, 23 7 it remains at least in theory a viable route by which the federal courts may ensure that executive
lawlessness is not permitted to taint the judicial process.
A picture of where the law governing transnational forcible abduction
after Alvarez-Machain is headed may be gleaned from the recent decision of
the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Matta-Ballesteros.38 U.S. marshals,
assisted by Honduran paramilitary troops, abducted a Honduran fugitive
involved in drug-trafficking from Honduras and brought him to the United
States for trial. The U.S. government did not dispute that it had abducted
the fugitive from Honduras, but disputed his claims that he had been
beaten and burned by U.S. agents in the process. The fugitive brought an
application for habeas corpus on jurisdictional grounds, but it was
233. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
234. Id. at 340.
235. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983).
236. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 276 ("the supervisory power is not limited to the admission or exclusion of evidence, but may be exercised in any manner necessary to remedy
abuses of a district court's process"); United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599,

615 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (although the court did not rest its decision on the exercise of its

supervisory jurisdiction). See also the concurring judgment by Oakes, J., in United
States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1975) ("To my mind the Government in the
laudable interest of stopping the intemational drug traffic is by these repeated abductions inviting exercise of that supervisory power in the interests of the greater good of
preserving respect for law.") But see United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981)
(refusing to exercise supervisory jurisdiction in forcible abduction cases); United States
v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896
(D.D.C. 1988).
237. See United States v. Williams, 112 S. CL. 1735, 1741 (1992) (supervisory power
is limited to control of court's own process); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 50609 (1983) (supervisory power does not extend to disciplining prosecutors in cases of
harmless error); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735-36 (1980) (supervisory
power does not allow court to exclude evidence on the basis that it was served unlawfully from a third party). See also Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in
Criminal Cases: Constitutionaland Statutory Limits on the Authority of the FederalCourts,
84 COLUM. L. REy. 1433 (1984) (arguing that the supervisory power doctrine should be
abandoned and replaced by narrower constitutional and statutory heads of authority).
238. United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995).
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narcotics offenses in Florida,
refused. 23 9 He was then convicted of federal
24 °
convictions which were upheld on appeal.
Following his conviction in Florida, the fugitive was brought to California to face charges of conspiring to kidnap and murder D.E.A. agent
Camarena, the victim of Alvarez-Machai's alleged crimes. At trial he was
acquitted of murder, but convicted of conspiring to and participating in the
kidnapping of a federal agent, and violations of federal racketeering legislation. 24 1 He appealed the convictions on the same jurisdictional grounds
which had supported his earlier challenge; namely, that his abduction from
Honduras by U.S. agents violated the extradition treaty between Honduras
and the United States, and that the circumstances of his abduction and the
treatment to which he had been subjected were sufficiently egregious that
the court was divested of jurisdiction over him.24 2
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the fugitive's appeal. 24 3 Judge Poole, with
whom Judge Browning joined, considered three possible grounds upon
which the fugitive's jurisdictional challenge could succeed. The first was
that the U.S. government's abduction of the fugitive violated the U.S.-Honduras Extradition Treaty. 244 The fugitive argued that Alvarez-Machain

stood for the proposition that a federal court could not exercise jurisdiction over a fugitive brought before it in violation of an extradition treaty.
The court did not disagree with this characterization, but noted that the
Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain had been careful to state that an extradition treaty would only be so violated where forcible abduction was specifically prohibited by the express terms of the treaty. 245 Unsurprisingly,
as with its Mexico-United States counterpart, there were no such express
terms in the Honduras-United States Extradition Treaty, and thus, accordauthority of Alvarez-Machain, no violation of the
ing to the controlling
2 46
extradition treaty.
The second was that the U.S. government's treatment of the fugitive
was so shocking as to invoke a Toscanino-like due process exception to the
Ker-Frisbie rule. 24 7 Judge Poole held that the old Ker-Frisbie doctrine
applied in the absence of an extradition treaty violation. He read AlvarezMachain as 8 having snuffed out the lingering Toscanino due process
24
exception.
The final possibility was that the court would decline to exercise jurisdiction over the fugitive. Judge Poole held that the court could exercise its
"inherent supervisory powers" to order dismissal for only three reasons:
239. Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 498

U.S. 878 (1990).
240. United States v. Matta, 937 F.2d 567 (11th Cir. 1991).
241. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 762.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 754.
244. Id. at 772.
245. Id.

246. Id. at 762.
247. Id. at 763.
248. Id. at 764.
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(1) to implement a remedy for the violation of a recognized statutory or
constitutional right; (2) to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a
conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before a jury; and
(3) to deter future illegal conduct. 249 Given this narrow scope of the supervisory powers, the circumstances surrounding the fugitive's abduction,
while "disturbing," did not meet these criteria. 250 In light of AlvarezMachain, the purported actions of the U.S. marshals had "Violated no recognized constitutional or statutory rights."25 1 The only circumstances in
which the court could exercise its supervisory powers would be where the
fugitive could demonstrate governmental misconduct "of the most shockhe
ing and outrageous kind."25 2 The fugitive had not done so, even though 253
had adduced evidence that he had been shocked with stun guns.
Accordingly, there was no ground for the exercise of the court's supervisory powers. With this, Judge Poole reluctantly rejected the fugitive's jurisdictional objections and proceeded to affirm the district court's decision
25 4
on substantive grounds.
Judge Noonan wrote a concurrence which is remarkable for its clarity,
yet ultimately disappointing because of its timorousness. Judge Noonan
focussed his attention solely on the supervisory powers. He began by distinguishing the case before him from similar precedents. The involvement
of government abductors rather than private agents, and the abduction of
2 55
the fugitive for trial in federal rather than state court distinguished Ker.
The transnational as opposed to interstate nature of the case distinguished
Frisbie.25 6 Unlike Noriega, the fugitive was not the head of a foreign state
abducted by U.S. military forces acting on behalf of the President in his
capacity as commander in chief. 25 7 The case did not turn on a treaty violation (Alvarez-Machain), nor an alleged violation of customary international
law (Alvarez-Machain on remand), and Honduras did not protest (Matta25 8
Ballesteros v. Henman).
To the contrary, the case was about a violent abduction, in breach of
domestic and international law, by U.S. agents and their Honduran associates, of a fugitive for trial in the United States. 25 9 Judge Noonan was particularly concerned that the court was being asked to lend its assistance to
the abduction. These considerations reinforced his conclusion that the
court could invoke its inherent supervisory powers to dismiss prosecutions
249. Id. at 763 (citing United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir.
1991)).
250. Id. at 763.
251. Id. at 763-64.
252. Id. at 764 (citing United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal quotes omitted)). This is the Toscanino standard.
253. Id. at 761.
254. Id. at 772.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 773.
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in order to deter illegal conduct. 2 60 Indeed, Judge Noonan was of the view
that the supervisory power could be invoked even where there was no constitutional or statutory violation. Mindful of the limits which had developed as to the exercise of supervisory powers, Judge Noonan emphasized
the involvement of U.S. marshals in the abduction, so that the exercise of
supervisory powers over the conduct of U.S. marshals could be said to
amount only to control over the administration of justice rather that a
261
more-wide-ranging power over executive misconduct.
Judge Noonan was, accordingly, willing to exercise the supervisory
powers of the court to dismiss the prosecution, save for one technicality.
As noted above, after being brought into the United States, the fugitive had
been convicted for various drug offenses. 26 2 The fugitive had not advanced
the supervisory jurisdiction argument before the Eleventh Circuit, and so
in Judge Noonan's view, he had waived that argument. The conviction of
the fugitive by the Eleventh Circuit had "broken the confinement caused by
the abduction."2 63 Accordingly, the fugitive "stands before us not as the
victim of abduction (which he once was) but as a lawfully-held prisoner,"
26 4
so that the court need not dismiss the case against him.
For observers hoping for a reinvigoration of the federal courts' supervisory jurisdiction in the transnational forcible abduction context, the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Matta-Ballesteros is a great disappointment. The
majority accepted that Alvarez-Machain had effectively foreclosed arguments based upon violations of an extradition treaty, other than where a
specific provision of the treaty expressly prohibits abduction. Similarly,
Alvarez-Machain had sounded the death-knell for the Toscanino due-process
exception, even if it did not explicitly overrule Toscanino. On these first two
grounds, it is difficult to find fault with the majority's reasoning, given
Alvarez-Machain.
Given the majority's almost unassailable conclusions on the first and
second arguments, its clouded exposition of the court's inherent supervisory powers is very troubling. The majority was prepared to exercise its
inherent supervisory powers, but concluded that such exercise would be
inappropriate in this case. Yet the test set out by the majority reveals that
its due process analysis clouded its thinking on the issue of supervisory
powers. It is particularly difficult to understand how the transnational forcible abduction at issue in the case can be said to have violated no constitutional or statutory rights.
Judge Noonan, on the other hand, outlined a more robust account of
the court's inherent supervisory powers, but then abruptly declined to set
them in motion on the basis of a technicality of questionable merit. Given
the tenor of most of Judge Noonan's opinion, his concluding paragraphs
are unexpected. His conclusion that the intervening decision of the Elev260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 774.
Id.
Matta, 937 F.2d at 567.
Matta-Ballesteros,71 F.3d at 775.
Id.
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enth Circuit precluded the fugitive from raising a jurisdictional objection
before the court was unsupported by reference to authority. Judge Noonan's resolution of the case is particularly surprising given that the majority itself rejected such analysis on the issue of collateral estoppel. Judge
Poole indicated that there was simply no authority for the proposition that
the earlier decisions in the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits precluded the
2 65
fugitive from raising a jurisdictional challenge before the Ninth Circuit.

The continued vitality of the inherent supervisory power of the federal
courts in the transnational forcible abduction context is thus an open question after Matta-Ballesteros. But it will take another case to set the supervisory power on stronger footing. In a sense, the circumstances of the case
were inopportune: had the fugitive been before a U.S. court for the first
time after his abduction to the United States, Judge Noonan's technical
objection would have fallen away, and his view of the court's inherent
supervisory power might have commanded more support. Yet the general
picture is dispiriting. The majority's account of the supervisory power was
confused, and even Judge Noonan's account of the supervisory power was
dependent upon the involvement of U.S. marshals. Any attempt to revitalize the supervisory power should look abroad, to the experience of the
courts in Commonwealth jurisdictions.
3.

The Role of Domestic Courts

There is an increasing awareness that domestic courts have a special role to
play in the enforcement of international law as it relates to human

they are obliged to enforce applicable customary
rights.2 66 In particular,
2 67
international norms.
From the viewpoint of the international legal system, domestic courts
are part of the political apparatus of states. 268 States are responsible in

international law for the acts of all of their officials, including the judiciary.2 69 Given this responsibility, domestic courts must enforce the interna265. Id. at 762 n.2.
266. HiGGiNs, supranote 205, at 218; Henkin, supranote 144, at 303; Note, supra note
232, at 1269.
267. See FALK, supra note 11, at 9-10, 12. Richard Falk supports the application of
public international norms by domestic courts where the norm has strong support from
the community of states, but favors deference to the executive where there is a "significant diversity of outlook among major nations." Id. at 177. However, customary norms
by definition require general, if not universal, support in international practice. See
North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.Cj. 3. Therefore, if a customary norm can be
demonstrated to exist-such as that prohibiting transnational forcible abduction and in
favour of certain remedies-it should be applied by domestic courts in the absence of
conflicting federal legislation.
268. Internal constitutional considerations, such as the separation of powers, are
irrelevant for the purposes of state responsibility. VCLT, supra note 50, art. 27; Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, [1979] 2 (pt. 1) Y.B. INr'L L. COMM'N 91; Henkin, supra
note 144, at 103.
269. BRowNuE, supra note 184, at 144; Eduardo Jim~nez de Ar~chaga, International
Responsibility of States for Acts of the Judiciary, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW INA CHANGING
Socrm= 171 (Wolfgang Friedmann et al. eds., 1972); ARNoLD McNAiR, THE LAw oF TREATEs 346 (2d ed. 1961).
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tional legal obligations of their own state. If they do not, the judiciary will
be a partner in or an agent of the state's illegal international acts. 2 70 When
a state violates international law by forcibly abducting a fugitive for trial, it
is incumbent upon its courts as a matter of international law to ensure that
the violation ceases. When a state does not have valid enforcement juriscourts candiction under international law, it may even be argued that2 7its
1
not exercise adjudicative jurisdiction under domestic law.
If a domestic court makes a decision incompatible with international
27 2
law, the state of which it is a part will incur international responsibility.
At the least, this requires a duty to stay proceedings against the fugitive,
and more likely, a duty to order the fugitive's return to the state from which
he was abducted. These international law duties should not be confused
with the duties of domestic courts under national law. Indeed, the central
difficulty is that domestic law may seem to compel such courts to act in a
way which places their state in violation of its international legal obligations. On the international plane, a failure of domestic courts to fulfill a
state's international obligations will place the state in breach of those
obligations.
How then might the customary international law norm against transnational forcible abduction enter domestic law? Customary international
law is part of domestic common law by virtue of the doctrine of incorporation (or adoption, as it is sometimes known).27 3 The position is slightly
different in the United States, where customary international law is part of
domestic (fedfederal law under the Constitution.2 74 However, conflicting2 75
eral) legislation prevails over customary international law.
270. See Morgenstern, supra note 5, at 265, 267, 279. But see In re KAroly R., [192728] 4 Ann. Dig. 345 ("There is no rule of public international law according to which
courts of a State have no right to conduct criminal proceedings against an accused who
returned from abroad by any means other than extradition.").
271. 1 RESTATEmENr (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. LAv § 432, cmt. a (1987); Edwin D.
Dickinson, JurisdictionFollowing Seizure or Arrest in Violation of InternationalLaw, 28
AM.J. INT'L L. 231, 244 (1934); Garcia-Mora, supra note 5, at 445.
272. Jiminez de Archaga & Tanzi, in INTERNATONAL LAw: ACHIEVEmENTS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 192, at 365 ("the case of a fugitive offender being dealt with contrary to
a provision of an extradition treaty... [is an example of] judicial decisions which constitute direct breaches of international law").
273. J. H. Rayner Ltd. (Mincing Lane) v. Dep't of Trade and Industry (Tin Council
Case), [1990] 2 App. Cas. 418, 499 (Eng. H.L.); Trendtex Trading Corp. Ltd. v. Cent.
Bank of Nigeria, [1977] Q.B. 529 (Eng. C.A.); In re Newfoundland Continental Shelf,
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 86 (Can.).
274. U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398 (1964); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 688 (1900); Lea Brilmayer, InternationalLaw
in American Courts: A Modest Proposal,100 YALE L.J. 2277 (1991); Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L REv. 1555 (1984); David F. Klein, A
Theoryfor the Application of the Customary InternationalLaw of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 332 (1988).
275. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. See Saint John v. Fraser-Bruce Overseas
Corp., [1958] S.C.R. 263 (Can.); Gordon v. R. in Right of Canada, 19 B.C.L.R. 289 (B.C.
(Can.) S. Ct. 1980), affid 22 B.C.L.R. 17 (B.C. (Can.) C.A. 1980) (federal statute prevails
over customary international law). There is debate in the United States over the ability
of the President to violate customary international law. CompareJordan J. Paust, The
Presidentis Bound By InternationalLaw, 81 Am. J. INT'L L 377 (1987) (President cannot
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As discussed above, in the forcible abduction context customary international law prohibits one state's exercise of enforcement jurisdiction
within the territory of another state without the latter's consent. The
appropriate remedy for such a violation is dependent upon whether the
injured state protests and requests the return of the fugitive. The court
must also determine whether there is conflicting domestic legislation (or a
"controlling executive act" in the United States) which would preclude the
application of the customary rule. If there is such legislation, the customary rule cannot apply. However, if there is no such legislation, and if the
abduction violates customary international law, a domestic court should
order the return of the fugitive to the injured state. The existence of such
legislation (or in the United States, "controlling executive act") in violation
of customary international law would not, of course, relieve the state of its
international obligations.
Many forcible abduction situations, however, do not involve a clear
violation of the customary rule. Where there is no protest by the injured
state, or indeed active cooperation in the abduction by the injured state,
the customary rule is inapplicable. Similarly, there may be uncertainty as
to whether the abduction was state-sponsored as opposed to the work of
private individuals. As to the remedial issue, where the injured state does
not request the return of the fugitive, custom does not require that the
abducting state return him. In such cases, the customary rule provides
little guidance to a domestic court. Answering these problems requires an
examination of the role of the international human rights framework in
domestic law.
IV. Transnational Forcible Abduction in International Human Rights
Law
A. The International Human Rights Law Framework
A third major criticism of the majority's reasoning in Alvarez-Machain is
that the U.S. Supreme Court assumed a statist framework and ignored the
international human rights dimension to the case. The dialogue between
the majority and the dissent omitted any mention of international human
rights law. Moreover, the Alvarez-Machain Court declined to consider
whether domestic constitutional guarantees might be informed by international human rights jurisprudence. This section concludes that the U.S.
violate customary international law) with Michael J. Glennon, Can the PresidentDo No
Wrong?, 80 Am. J. Iwr'L L. 923 (1986); Michael J. Glennon, Raising the Paquete Habana:
Is Violation of Customary InternationalLaw by the Executive Unconstitutional?,80 Nw. U.

L. REv. 321 (1985) (President may violate customary international law with the authorization of Congress); Louis Henkin, The Presidentand InternationalLaw, 80 Am. J. lNr'L
L. 930 (1986); and Henkin, supra note 53, at 878 (president acting as commander in
chief or under foreign affairs power may violate customary international law). But no
one doubts that Congress (and in Canada, the federal Parliament) can legislate in violation of customary international law. It is also likely that Canadian provincial legislatures may legislate in violation of custom, at least in provincial heads of jurisdiction.
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Supreme Court made a grave -error in Alvarez-Machain by ignoring the
international human rights norms against transnational forcible abduction.
Classical international law views illegal abduction as a violation of
states' rights. As a result, its protection of individual human rights is subject to the vagaries of diplomatic compromise and state discretion. Earlier
discussion in this Article illustrates that in the case of a primafacie violation of international law, the attitude of the injured state is a central consideration. This focus may be desirable in that it lends flexibility and a
spirit of compromise to the international legal system which a more rigid
approach to remedies would preclude. Invariably, however, this flexibility
is gained at the expense of the abducted individual, whose fate is entirely
dependent upon whether the injured state is inspired to espouse his case.
A state's decision whether to protest an abduction is purely discretion2 77
27 6
and may be influenced by politics rather than principle.
ary
Happily, in some cases the fugitive benefits from the injured state's
protest. However, even where it does protest, the injured state may opt for
a remedy other than return or restitution (as Argentina did in Eichmann).
Under customary international law, the fugitive is then without recourse.
Moreover, the injured state may not protest because it is unaware that the
abduction ever took place. The classical framework, with its state-centered
approach, is a poor guarantee of the rights of individuals.
Nevertheless, since the end of the Second World War there has been a
groundswell of development in international human rights law with a focus
on the inalienable rights of individuals as distinct legal actors. International human rights law thus provides-at least in theory-a more comprehensive protection of the human rights of individuals than is contemplated
by customary international law. This section explores the question of
whether the abduction of an individual from one state and his rendition to
face trial in another can be considered a violation of the rights of the individual under international human rights law, as well as the related issue of
how international human rights law informs the interpretation of domestic
civil liberties.
Transnational forcible abduction is an alternative to, and a circumvention of, extradition. Traditionally, it was said that extradition treaties regulate relationships and create obligations between states alone, 2 78 but there
is growing recognition that there is a human rights aspect to extradition. 2 7 9 Much debate has raged as to whether extradition treaties create
276. Regarding a state's discretion as to whether to protest an international wrong,
see Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.CJ. 3, clc 78-83. It is conceivable that this discretion

could be subject to judicial review under domestic law.
277. John Dugard, No JurisdictionOver Abducted Persons in Roman-Dutch Law: Male
Captus, Male Detentus, 7 S. AR.J. HUM. RTs. 199, 201 (1991) (Protest "has proved to be
ineffective in the Southern African context as states have generally failed to protest
against the actions of their more powerful neighbour [South Africa].").
278. Georg Schwarzenberger, The Problem of International Criminal Law, 3 Cumtmrr
LEGAL PROBS. 263, 272 (1950).
279. H.F. van Panhuys, Le traite d'extradition en tant que source de droits pour les
individus, in LE DRorr PtNAL I nTmNATIONAL: RECUEIL D'8TIDES EN HOMMAGE AJAcOB MAAR-

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol. 29

rights in individuals as well as in states. 280 Extradition treaties protect the
interests of states in regulating the transfer and rendition of fugitives, but
also ensure that fugitives will be extradited only in accordance with provisions of such treaties. Developments in extradition law-such as the specialty principle, the principle of double criminality, and the political
offense exception- indicate an increasing concern for the due process
rights of individuals. Indeed, these developments are not easily explained
otherwise. 2 8 1 Thus, it may be argued that circumvention of the regular
extradition process by means of transnational forcible abduction is itself a
violation of the human rights of the fugitive because it denies him the procedural protections which would be available under an extradition treaty.
However, the debate as to whether individuals possess rights under
extradition treaties obscures the larger issue of the legality of forcible
abduction, because it places undue emphasis upon the existence and
proper interpretation of extradition treaties, whereas human rights exist
independently of extradition treaties. The better approach is to recognize
that a state does injustice to an individual by exercising jurisdiction over
the individual in an inappropriate manner. Instead, a state must look to
both public international law and human rights law to determine the legality of the prosecuting state's exercise of jurisdiction. 2 2 Once the debate
shifts its focus to this account, the task of domestic courts is clarified considerably. This is not to suggest that the scope of individual rights under
extradition treaties is insignificant, but only that it is a separate issue.
TN vAN BEMMEIEN

57 (1965); John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition

Law, 76 GEo. J. 1441, 1465-68 (1988); Christine Van den Wyngaert, Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora'sBox?, 39 INT'L &
Cop. L.Q. 757 (1990).
280. See generally United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981) (extradition treaties exist for the benefit of states

alone and do not confer rights upon individuals); United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308
(9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 916 (D.D.C. 1988);
CHINK N, THIRD PAR

CHRISTINE

LAw 120-33 (1993) (discussing rights of individuals as third parties under treaties); Yoram Dinstein, Some Reflections on Extradition,
36 GE. Y.B. INT'L L. 46, 54 (1993) (extraditing state's ability to waive formalities under
an extradition treaty indicates that extradition treaties do not create rights in individuals
other than those derived from states); Morgenstern, supra note 5, at 271 (individuals
have no rights under extradition treaties); United States ex rel. Lujan, 510 F.2d 62 (2d
Cir. 1975). But see Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 62 (Lord Griffiths) ("Extradition
procedures are designed not only to ensure that criminals are returned from one country to another but also to protect the rights of those who are accused of crimes by the
requesting country.").
281. See United States of America v. L~pine, 111 D.L.R. 4th 31, 37-38 (Can. 1994) (La
Forest, J.) (Doctrines of double criminality and speciality "are the procedures adopted
by the high contracting parties to protect the individual."); United States of America v.
McVey, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 475, 519 (Can.); United States of America v. Cotroni, 48 C.C.C.
3d 193, 219 (Can. 1989) (La Forest, J.) ("[E]xtradition practices have been tailored as
much as possible for the protection of the liberty of the individual.").
282. Henldn, GeneralCourse, supra note 144, at 304-05. See alsoJEAN-GABRI LCASTEL,
EXTRATERUIToRIaUA
IN INTErN TiONAL TRADE CANADA Am U.S.A. PRAcncES COMPARED
24-25 (1988) (arguing that emerging doctrine of customary international law deems an
exercise of jurisdiction to be unlawful when it is unfair, arbitrary, or unreasonable).
s IN INTERNATIONAL
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From the viewpoint of the fugitive, the international human rights
framework offers two important advantages over the classical international
law system. First, it does not require the injured state to protest in order
for the fugitive to invoke the protection of international human rights
norms. The invocation of these norms is not discretionary; they guarantee
rights which are inalienable and thus unaffected by the consent of the
injured state. Under international human rights law, individuals have legal
rights and duties; they are not stand-ins or beneficiaries of rights derived
from states. Thus, individuals may assert their own rights and need not
wait for the injured state to do this for them. Second, fugitives need not
rely upon the violation of an extradition treaty to show that their abduction
violates international law norms. It is not the circumvention of extradition
proceedings (although this should weigh as an important factor) so much
as it is the improper exercise of jurisdiction over individuals which violates
their human rights. Obviously, this violation is of particular importance
when an abduction takes place in the absence of an extradition treaty.
Again, the emphasis is upon rights distinct from and independent of extradition treaties.
The two main sources of international human rights law are custom
and convention. 28 3 This Article primarily concerns the latter. Although
there is a range of international human rights instruments, 28 4 the most
important ones in the present context are the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 28 5 and its Optional Protocol, 28 6 and the
283. Several U.S. cases have held that certain international human rights norms
embodied in conventions have entered custom. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
880 (2d Cir. 1980) (torture violates "law of nations"); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.
Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (prolonged arbitrary detention violates customary international law); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), affd on other
grounds sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981)

(freedom from arbitrary detention). See also Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179
(D. Mass. 1995). But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801 (D.C. Cir.

1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) (violation of international law does not necessarily ground right of action under Alien Tort Claims Act).
These cases concern the question of whether a violation of the law of nations confers a

right of action upon individual litigants under the Alien Tort Statute of 1789. See AnneMarie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the JudiciaryAct of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83

Am. J.

INV'L

L. 461, 462-63 (1989).

284. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees the right to

life, liberty, and security of the person; article 9 guarantees freedom from arbitrary
arrest, detention, or exile. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. GAOR 5th Comm., 30th Sess., Supp., at 77-7, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Article 5 of
the American Convention on Human Rights provides the right to have physical, mental,
and moral integrity respected and protected against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-

ment; article 7 ensures freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, at 1, reprintedin 9 LL.M. 673,

676-77 (1970) (entered into force July 18, 1978). SeeJohn Quigley, Government Vigilantes at Large: The Danger to Human Rights From Kidnapping of Suspected Terrorists, 10
HUM. RTs. Q. 193 (1988). But see Henkin, General Course, supra note 144, at 305 (arguing that nothing in the Universal Declaration suggests that the exercise of exorbitant
jurisdiction violates human rights).
285. InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR,

21st Sess., Supp. No. 21, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention"). 2 8 7 Canada is a signatory to both
the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol. 288 The United States is a signatory to
the ICCPR but not its Protocol, 28 9 although at the time of AlvarezMachain's abduction the ICCPR was not yet in force under American
law. 290 While neither Canada nor the United States is a signatory to the
European Convention, the Convention is nonetheless an important source
of human rights jurisprudence due to the cultural, social, and political similarities between North America and the European states. Moreover, the
European Convention is the most comprehensive international system for
the articulation, interpretation, and enforcement of human rights.
B.

Forcible Abduction Under the ICCPR

The United Nations Human Rights Committee, which is charged with interpreting the ICCPR and Optional Protocol, has held in four decisions
(Celiberti de Casariego,29 1 L6pez Burgos,2 92 Almeida de Quinteros,2 93 and
286. First Optional Protocol to the International Convenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302.
287. Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
[European Convention], Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
288. Canada acceded to both the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol on May 19, 1976;
both treaties entered into force for Canada on Aug. 19, 1976.
289. Marion Nash Leich, Contemporary Practiceof the United States Relating in International Law, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 96, 109 (1995); D. P. Stewart, U.S. Ratification of the
Convenants on Civil and PoliticalRights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, 14 HUM. RTs. L. J. 78 (1993).
290. The ICCPR would now preclude the United States from engaging in transnational forcible abduction. Theodor Meron, Extraterritorialityof Human Rights Treaties,
89 AM.J. INT'L L. 78, 80 (1995); John Quigley, CriminalLaw and Human Rights: Implications of the United States Ratification of the InternationalConvenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 6 -LIav. Hum. RTsJ. 59, 86 (1993) (noting that the extent of U.S. adherence to the
ICCPR is an open question, but will nonetheless demand the attention of U.S. prosecutors); Timothy D. Rudy, Did We Treaty Away Ker-Frisbie?, 26 ST. MAiY's L. J. 791, 792
(1995) (arguing that the U.S. ratification of the ICCPR ultimately may change the American courts' disregard for the manner in which a defendant is brought before it).
291. Case of Lilian Celiberti de Casariego, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
185, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981), reprintedin 68 I.L.R. 41 (1981) [hereinafter Casariego].
In Casariego,a Uruguayan/Italian citizen was abducted from Brazil by Uruguayan agents
with the connivance of Brazilian police, brought to Uruguay, detained, and charged with
subversive activities. The U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC) determined that the
abduction violated ICCPR article 9(1) and that Uruguay was obligated to release and
compensate de Casariego and allow her in leave the country. Id.
292. Case of Sergio Ruben L6pez Burgos, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., supp. No. 40, at 76,
U.N. Doc. A/36/40, reprintedin 68 I.LLR. 29 (1981) [hereinafter LOpez Burgos]. In Ldpez
Burgos, a Uruguayan exile in Austria brought an application on behalf of her husband,
who had been abducted from Argentina by Uruguayan agents with the assistance of
Argentine paramilitaries. He had been brought to Uruguay, detained, and tortured. The
HRC found that the forcible abduction violated ICCPR article 9(1) and ordered that
L6pez Burgos be released, compensated, and permitted to leave Uruguay. Id.
293. Case of Almeida de Quinteros, Comm. No. 107/1981,July 21, 1983, reprinted in
2 SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE HuMAN RIGHTS Comn-rra UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL

138 (1990) [hereinafter Almeida de Quinteros]. A Uruguayan national was abducted
from the grounds of the Venezuelan embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay, by Uruguayan
troops. Her mother, in exile in Sweden, brought an application before the HRC. Uru-
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the Cafin Garcia case 29 4) that forcible abduction of an individual from
one state to another for the purposes of his rendition to face a criminal trial
(or torture) violates article 9(1) of the ICCPR 29 5 The Human Rights Committee has also been careful to indicate that the fact that a state acts outside
its territory (e.g., by sending its agents abroad to abduct an individual)
does not preclude application of the ICCPR 29 6 Thus, the ICCPR has extraterritorial effect and applies to all actions of agents of states parties, wher2 97
ever they may take place.

In Giry v. Dominican Republic,29 8 the Human Rights Committee considered the role played by the rendering state in a deportation case. By
analogy, Giry indicates the responsibilities of a state involved in a forcible
abduction from its territory. A French citizen was detained by Dominican
officials at an airport in the Dominican Republic and prevented from taking a flight to the Netherlands Antilles. Instead, he was deported to Puerto
Rico to face drug trafficking charges. The Committee held that the Dominican Republic's expulsion of Giry to the United States violated the procedural protections contained in the U.S.-Dominican Republic Extradition
Treaty as well as article 13 of the ICCPp 2 99 The Dominican explanation of
events-that it had arrested Giry with the sole intention of deporting himwas viewed with suspicion, given that Giry had been at the airport to take a
flight out of the country when he was detained. Some Committee members
were of the opinion that there had also been a violation of ICCPR article

guay failed to comply with its obligations with regard to the application. The HRC
found that responsibility for the disappearance of the applicant's daughter fell upon
Uruguay, and ordered that Uruguay release her and compensate her.
294. Caft6n Garcia v. Ecuador, Hum Rts. Comm., 43d Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/43/D/319/1988 (1991) [hereinafter Catiin Garcia]. In Cain Garcia, a
Colombian citizen was abducted in Ecuador by Ecuadorian agents at the behest of the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and deported to the United States to face drug
trafficking charges. As a non-signatory, no action could be brought against the United
States under the ICCPR. However, the HRC found Ecuador in violation of ICCPR article
9(1). Ecuador conceded that there were administrative and procedural irregularities and
gave assurances that it was investigating the matter. Id.
295. ICCPR, supra note 285, art. 9(1) ("Everyone has the right to liberty and security
of the person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures
as are established by law.").
296. Casariego,supra note 291, at 188; L6pez Burgos, supra note 292, at 182-83.
297. Compare Verdugo-Urquidez 1, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (Fourth Amendment has no
extraterritorial application to non-resident aliens).
298. Giry v. Dominican Republic, 95 I.L.R. 321 (U.N.H.R.C. 1990).
299. Article 13 of the ICCPR states:
An alien lawfully in the territory of a state Party to the present Covenant may be
expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with
law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise
require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his
case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent
authority or a person or persons especially designated by the competent
authority.
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9(1).300 Thus, Giry suggests that a state which assists in a forcible abduction from its territory will violate human rights obligations owed to the
abducted individual.
The Committee has been remarkably vigilant in its protection of the
human rights of abducted individuals. In all five cases the Committee
found for the applicant. The Committee reinforced the customary international law rule prohibiting forcible abduction and transplanted the rule
into the human rights context, protecting individuals qua individuals. This
focus on the individual is heightened by the fact that the absence of protests by the injured state, of cardinal importance under customary international law, was not even considered in these cases. In fact, the active
collusion in the abductions by agents of the host states would amount to
consent by those states to the abductions under customary international
law and preclude a finding of an international wrong.
C.

Forcible Abduction Under the European Convention

The European Court of Human Rights has ruled on the issue of disguised
extradition on two occasions. Both decisions offer persuasive evidence of
an emerging international human rights norm against forcible abduction.
In addition, the European Commission on Human Rights has considered a
number of applications in cases of alleged abduction or disguised extradition, although in each case it has declared the application to be inadmissible. 30 1 As a preliminary matter, it also should be noted that the European
ICCPR, supra note 285, art. 13.

300. Giry, 95 Int'l L. Rep. at 326 (individual opinion of Ms. Chanet and Messrs.
Urbina, Ando, Wennergren) ("[T]he arrest of Mr. Giry and his enforced boarding of [a]
...flight... constitute unlawful and arbitrary arrest within the meaning of article 9,
paragraph 1, of the Covenant.").
301. The most recent consideration of transnational forcible abduction within the
European system for the protection of human rights took place before the European
Commission of Human Rights. In July of 1996, the Commission declared a petition
from Illich Ramirez Sanchez, better known as Carlos the Jackal, to be inadmissible. Carlos' Arrest Legal, Rights Group Rules, GLOBE & MAL. (Toronto), July 16, 1996, at A10.
Carlos complained that he had been illegally abducted in the Sudan by French agents,
drugged, and brought to France for trial. The Commission has rejected a number of
other applications. Sec, e.g., X v. The Netherlands, App. No. 1963/63, 1965 Y.B. Eur.
Cony. on Hum. Rts. 228, 230 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) and 1966 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on Hum.
Rts. 286 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) (applicant alleged disguised extradition from Netherlands to United States where he was wanted for drug offenses). In another case, the
applicant alleged disguised extradition from Belgium to Germany where he was returned
to the border by Belgian police. Because there was no extradition offense in the BelgiumF.R.G. Extradition Treaty under which the applicant could have been extradicted, the
application was dismissed. App. No. 10893/84 v. Germany, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 124, 125
(1985) (Commission report). See also Altmann (Barbie) v. France, App. No. 10689/83,
37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 225 (1984) (declaring inadmissible application alleging disguised extradition of fugitive from Bolivia to French Guinea, and thence to
France); Freda v. Italy, App. No. 8916/80, 21 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 250 (1980)
(declaring inadmissible application relating to deportation of fugitive from Costa Rica to
Italy); X v. Austria, App. No. 2547/65, 1966 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on Hum. Rts. 464 (Eur.
Comm'n on H.R.) (declaring inadmissible application by German arrested in Italy by
Austrian police and brought back to Austria, due to applicant's failure to exhaust local
remedies).
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Court, like the U.N. Human Rights Committee, 30 2 has determined that the
territorial scope of the application of the European Convention's human
rights guarantees is not limited to the national territory of signatory
states. 30 3 Thus, a transnational forcible abduction carried out by agents of
a signatory state outside its national territory would still engage the respon30 4
sibility of the abducting state under the Convention.
In Bozano v. France,3 0 5 an Italian court had convicted the applicant in
absentia and sentenced him to life imprisonment for offenses including
abduction, murder, and indecent assault. He fled to France, where he was
arrested. A French court refused Italy's request for the applicant's extradition, and he was eventually released from custody. The applicant claimed
that soon after his release, he was abducted by plain-clothes police officers,
served with a deportation order, driven to the Swiss border, escorted to a
Swiss police station, and informed that Italy was seeking his extradition.
He was later extradited to Italy and imprisoned there.
30 6
Bozano challenged his abduction, both under French domestic law
and through applications to the European Commission.30 7 In his application against France, he argued that his deportation to Switzerland had violated his rights to personal liberty and freedom of movement, contrary to
article 5(1) of the European Convention 30 8 and article 2(1) of Protocol No.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 296-97.
303. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 20 Eur. H.P. Rep. 99 (1995) (Eur. Ct.

H.R.).

304. This position was adopted by the Commission in Stocke v. Germany, 13 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 126 (1991) (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
305. Bozano v. France, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 297 (1987) (Eur. Ct. H.P.); see discussion in
Van den Wyngaert, supra note 279, at 774.

306. Bozano sought an injunction in the French courts requiring the French Interior
Minister to seek his return from the Swiss authorities. The Tribunal held that while it
did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because it "[put] relations between States in
issue," his arrest was riddled with irregularities, and appeared to have been prearranged
with the Swiss police. Upon his application, the deportation order was set aside.

Bozano, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 305.
307. Bozano brought an application against Switzerland complaining of his arrest on

French territory by Swiss police. Bozano v. Switzerland, App. No. 9009/80, 39 Eur.
Comm'n H.PL Dec. & Rep. 58 (1984). The Commission considered the application to be

partly admissible and partly inadmissible, but held that Switzerland could not have
avoided its treaty obligation to extradite the fugitive to Italy, even if he had been unlawfully deported to Switzerland from France. Id. at 70. Bozano also brought an application against Italy, complaining that the in absentia proceedings against him there were
unlawful. This application was deemed inadmissible, and Bozano's allegations that the

Italian authorities had corroborated with their counterparts in France and Switzerland to
secure his return were deemed to be "manifestly ill-founded." Bozano v. Italy, App. No.
9991/82, 39 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 147, 157 (1984). Finally, Bozano brought

an application against France, which the Commission declared to be admissible.
Bozano v. France, App. No. 9990/82, 39 Eur. Comm'n H.P. Dec. & Rep. 119 (1984).
308. Bozano, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 307. Article 5(1) of the European Convention reads:
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person. No one shall be

deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law-
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The Commission upheld his complaint, and the court found his
deportation to be unlawful and incompatible with the "right to security of
the person" contained in article 5(1).310 The court thus concluded that
France had acted unlawfully in circumventing regular extradition proceedings, so that there was insufficient justification for the detention of the
applicant. While the court held that it did not have the power to order his
release, 3 11 it did order that he be financially compensated. 3 12
There was, however, some dissent at the Commission which is instructive for the present discussion. Mr. Sperduti dissented on the basis that a
state's deportation decision is a matter of purely domestic jurisdiction. 3 13
Mr. Schermers' dissent, indicative of a strain of argument which we shall
see recurring in the cases which folow, 3 1 4 was premised on the argument
that extradition law has been unable to cope with the lowering of border
obstacles within Europe. While fugitives are increasingly mobile within
Europe and are able to move between its states as if they were borderless,
law enforcement is hampered by the imposition of traditional borders. Mr.
Schermers was concerned that both European unity and the rule of law
would suffer if an individual could "get greater protection when he moves
from one national jurisdiction to another than when he stays within one
3 15
jurisdiction."
In Stockd v. Germany,3 16 a German resident in France alleged that he
had been lured back into Germany by a German police agent on false
pretences. He had boarded a private airplane in France, ostensibly to fly to
Luxembourg. Instead, the airplane landed in Germany, where Stock was
arrested, convicted of tax offenses, and imprisoned. After unsuccessfully
4.309

(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken
with a view to deportation or extradition.
309. Bozano, 9 Eur. H.. Rep. at 308; Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention, art.
2(1): "Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have
the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence."
310. Bozano, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 317-20 ("Depriving Mr. Bozano of his liberty in this
way amounted in fact to a disguised form of extradition" in violation of article 5(1). The
court declined to rule on the other alleged violations.).
311. Because the application had been brought against France and not Italy, where
the applicant was detained, no challenge was before the court concerning the criminal
proceedings or imprisonment in Italy, the notional "requesting" state.
312. Bozano v. France (Just Satisfaction), 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 428, 430 (1987) (Eur. Ct.
H.t) (France ordered to pay Bozano 100,000 FF damages and legal costs).
313. Bozano, 9 Eur. H.. Rep. at 324.
314. Id. at 326; see also Lord Oliver's dissenting opinion in Bennett H1,[1994] 1 App.
Cas. 42, 72-73 (Eng. H.L. 1993) (Lord Oliver, dissenting).
315. Bozano, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 326 (Mr. Schermers, dissenting). On this view, "Special legal protection against extradition may be sound when the extradition is to a foreign country, but for re-extradition within Europe (one could call it intradition) such
protection should not be necessary." A similar view is evident in Lord Jauncey's majority opinion in Schmidt II, [1995] 1 App. Cas. 339, 362 (Eng. H.L. 1994). The Schengen
Agreement, supra note 148, highlights these concerns. Cf. United States of America v.
Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469, 1485 (Can.) (LaForestJ.) ("The only respect paid by the
international criminal community to national boundaries is when these can serve as a
means to frustrate the efforts of law enforcement and judicial authorities.").
316. StockE v. Germany, 13 Eur. H.. Rep. 839 (1991) (Eur. Ct. H..).
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challenging his arrest and conviction in the German courts, Stocki applied
to the Commission, arguing that the German police had arranged the
scheme, which amounted to kidnapping, in violation of French sovereignty
and his personal rights under articles 5(1) (unlawful detention) and 6
(unfair trial) of the Convention. Both the Commission and the court dismissed the allegations as unproved. However, the Commission indicated
that a violation of article 5(1) would have been established had the allegations been proven.3 17 It said:
An arrest made by the authorities of one State on the territory of another
State, without the prior consent of the State concerned, does not, therefore,
only involve State responsibility vis-d-vis the other State, but also affects that
person's individual right to security under Art. 5(1). The question whether
or not the other State claims reparation for violation of its rights under international law18 is not relevant for the individual right under the
Convention.3

The Commission thus recognized that two strains of international illegality must be discerned in forcible abduction cases: the customary international law concern with the territorial sovereignty of the injured state,
violations of extradition treaties, and injury to foreign nationals, as well as
the international human rights law concern as to the violation of the rights
of the individual. By decoupling the latter concern from the former, the
Commission has indicated a route which, this Article argues, domestic
courts should themselves adopt.
Neither the U.N. Human Rights Committee nor the European Convention system have hesitated to assert expansive conceptions of the right to
liberty and security of the person. But at the same time, there is a countervailing strain of argument, represented by Mr. Schermers' dissent in
Bozano, which suggests that considerations of international comity and
public protection must be weighed against the rights of fugitives. But these
concerns are not mutually exclusive, and should not obscure the recognition that the overwhelming weight of authority in international human
rights law is on the side of an expansive interpretation of the rights of
abducted individuals. The accomodation of individual and social interests
takes place when the domestic court fashions an appropriate remedy.
What is the impact in domestic law of the determination that transnational forcible abduction is a violation of international human rights law?
International human rights law may enter domestic law directly in one of
two ways: through the domestic implementation of an international convention, or through the incorporation of customary principles of human
rights law. It may also enter domestic law indirectly as an interpretive aid
to domestic legislation, constitutional provisions, and common law.
Where there has been a violation of an international human rights
convention, the abducted individual may file an application seeking relief
317. 13 Eur. H.R Rep. 126, 129, cl 168 (1991) (Commission report) ("The Commission considers that such circumstances may render this person's arrest and detention
unlawful within the meaning of article 5(1) of the Convention.").
318. Id. at 129, 5 167.
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before the appropriate body. However, several preconditions apply. First,
the abducting state must be a party to the relevant convention to be constrained by that convention. Second, international human rights conventions are typically not self-executing, but must be implemented through
domestic legislation to have the force of domestic law. Few states have
implemented any applicable human rights treaties into their domestic law,
with the result that such treaties do not ground a cause of action in domestic courts. Third, individuals typically face an obligation to exhaust local
remedies in the domestic courts of the abducting state before commencing
proceedings before an international human rights body. Fourth, there is
likely to be considerable expense and delay associated with an application
by an individual under an international convention. Finally, even if successful, the abducted individual may face the possible reluctance of the
abducting state to abide by an unfavorable result, despite the fact that this
would place the abducting state in breach of its international
3 19
obligations.
A more promising route may be to argue that applicable norms of
international human rights law have acquired the status of customary law,
and thus have the force of domestic law in the absence of conflicting
domestic legislation. Neither the majority nor the dissent in AlvarezMachain considered whether any human rights which have attained the
status of customary international law might be applicable. The problem is
that most international human rights law is commonly thought to be confined to treaty. 3 20 Conventional law can contribute to the development of

customary international law norms where it demonstrates a broad consensus among states as to the creation of such norms. The customary human
rights norms which have developed so far are generally thought to be limited to the prohibition of conduct which is incontrovertibly and universally
rejected. 32 1 Cumulatively, decisions by the U.N. Human Rights Committee
and the European Court of Human Rights on the issue of forcible abduction provide clear evidence of constant and uniform practice, as well as
3 22
opiniojuris, so that it arguably constitutes custom.

319. Even if not implemented into domestic law, international human rights obliga-

tions remain binding upon the states party to an international convention. Moreover, it
may be argued that states have an obligation "to organize the governmental apparatus
and, in general, all the structures through which public power is exercised, so that they
are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full employment of human rights."
Veldsquez Rodriguez (Merits), 95 I.L.R. 295, c 166.

320. But see generally THEODOR MERON, HUmAN RIGHTS AND HumANtrARuN NoRMs AS
CUSTOMARY LAW (1989).
321. 1 RESTATEMENT (THD) oF FoREiGN RE. LAW § 404 (1987). HIGGINS, supra note

205, at 70 (arguing that forcible abduction and removal violate human rights which
have attained the status of custom).
322. Giry v. Dominican Republic, 95 LL.R. 321 (U.N.H.R.C. 1990); Bozano v. France,
9 Eur. H... Rep. 297 (1987) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Stock v. Germany, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 839
(1991) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Celiberti de Casariego,68 I.L.R. 41; L6pez Burgos, supra note 292;
Almeida de Quinteros,supra note 293; Cafifn Garcia, supra note 294. See also 1 RESTATE.
mEWr (THIRD) OF FOREIGN R.
LAW § 102(2) (1987) (test of custom is evidence of state
practice which is engaged in out a sense of legal duty (opinio juris)).
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However, even if the international human rights prohibition against
abduction cannot be said to have entered custom, there may be another
role for customary international law or international human rights law in
the domestic arena. Domestic courts should look to international legal
principles-both customary and conventional human rights law-as interpretive aids in fleshing out the content and scope of domestic civil liberties
and constitutional protections. 3 23 This interpretative assistance would be
particularly important where an individual has been abducted from one
state and brought to trial in another, but the injured state either consents
to the abduction, does not protest it, or does not request the return of the
abducted individual, so that there is no violation of classical international
law. A mixture of domestic and international norms has led to a reconsideration of the male captus bene detentus doctrine in a number of Commonwealth states. The evolution of this reconsideration is examined in the
next section.
V. The Commonwealth Male Captus Bene Detentus Rule
Until 1978, Commonwealth courts followed the American approach to the
male captus bene detentus rule. Since 1978, however, a series of judicial
decisions in New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, and the U.K. indicate
that the male captus rule is no longer good law in these countries. Other
developments suggest that the rule is probably no longer valid in Canada.
This Section outlines the origin and development of the traditional English
rule, traces its fate in various Commonwealth states, and examines the
recent decisions of the House of Lords in Bennett II and Schmidt II.
323. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). For example, the

Canadian Charter's roots lie both in the constitutional instruments of other states, such
as the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights, as well as international human rights instruments, particularly the ICCPR and the European Convention. Alan Brudner, The Domestic Enforcement of InternationalConvenants on Human Rights: A Theoretical Framework,
35 U. TORONTO LJ. 219, 232 (1985); Maxwell Cohen & Anne Bayefsky, The Canadian
Charterof Rights and Freedoms and Public InternationalLaw, 61 CAN. BAR REv. 265, 26872 (1983). Several commentators have consulted the European Convention in an effort
to articulate the scope of Charter rights. Anne F. Bayefsky, International Human Rights
Law in CanadianCourts, in LAw, PoLIcY, AND INTMNATIONAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF MAXW.EL COHEN 107 (William Kaplan & Donald McRae, eds. 1993); Anne Bayefsky
&Joan Fitzpatrick, InternationalHuman Rights Law in United States Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L 1 (1992); G. Cliche, L'utilisation de la Convention
europlenne des droits de l'homme pour l'interpretationde la Charte canadienne, 7 REUu
JURIDIQUE DFS EmTUDArrs DE L'UNvERsrra LAvAL 93 (1993). It may be argued, however,

that international human rights law has been used by Canadian courts solely to limit the
scope of Charter rights, and not to establish or extend them. D. Sanders, The Canadian
Charterand the Protection of InternationalHuman Rights, 4 CRiM. L. F. 413, 417 (1993).
For the influence of international human rights standards on the development and interpretation of domestic Charter norms, see also Davidson v. Slaight Communications,

[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 (Can.) (Dickson, CJ.C.) and Re Public Service Employee Relations
Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 317-20 (Can.) (Dickson, CJ.C., dissenting on other grounds).

For a similar approach in the United States, see Louis Henkin, Rights: American and
Human, 79 COLUM. L. Rav. 405, 413-20 (1979); Jordan Paust, On Human Rights: The Use
of Human Rights Preceptsin U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic
Courts, 10 MicH. J. INT'L L. 543, 609 (1989).
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Throughout, it emphasizes the different approach of the Commonwealth
courts relative to their American counterparts.
An examination of the development of the Commonwealth rule provides the basis for a critique of the fourth element of the majority decision
in Alvarez-Machain, namely, the Court's abdication of its supervisory jurisdiction to control executive lawlessness. Within the Commonwealth,
supervisory jurisdiction developed in a distinct fashion and so avoided the
current impasse in the U.S. law.
A. The Origin and Development of the English Male Captus Bene
Detentus Rule
The English male captus bene detentus rule originated in ex p. Scott.32 4 The

accused, under indictment in England for perjury, was apprehended in
Belgium and returned to England by an English police officer, where she
was arrested. Lord Tenterden, CJ., held that the court would not divest
325
itself of jurisdiction over an individual detained on a criminal charge.
That her arrest may have violated Belgian law did not bar her prosecution
in England, even though she may have retained a right of action against the
English police officer for wrongful arrest in Belgium.
Similar cases followed Scott.326 In Regina v. Sattler,32 7 the accused

committed larceny in England and escaped to Hamburg, then an independent city. There was no extradition treaty between Hamburg and England.
An English police officer went to Hamburg, and without a warrant arrested
Sattler with the assistance of the local police. Sattler was brought aboard
an English steamer and killed the English police officer while the steamer
was on the high seas. Upon his return to England, he challenged the
court's jurisdiction over him on the basis that he had been illegally arrested
and brought on board the English vessel. At trial, he was convicted of murder. Lord Campbell, CJ., upheld the conviction: because the killing had
taken place upon an English ship, the defendant was amenable to an English criminal court's jurisdiction, regardless of the lawfulness of his initial
capture and subsequent detention. However, the Sattler court was not con324. 9 B. & C. 446,447-48, 109 Eng. Rep. 166, 166-67 (K.B. 1829) [hereinafter Scott].
England has a long history of transnational forcible abduction cases. For a discussion of
the abduction of John Story, the first Regius Professor of Civil Law in the University of
Oxford and later a Catholic refugee from Elizabeth 1, from Flanders by English
merchants, see A DECLARATION OF THE LYFE AND DEAm OF JOHN STORY, LATE A ROMISH
CANoNicIA. DOCTOR, BY PROFESSYON (1571).

325. Scott, 9 B. & C. at 448, 109 Eng. Rep. at 167:
The question, therefore, is this, whether if a person charged with a crime is
found in this country, it is the duty of the Court to take care that such a party
shall be amenable to justice, or whether we are to consider the circumstances
under which she was brought here. I thought, and still continue to think, that
we cannot inquire into them.

326. See Regina v. Nelson and Brand (1867), reprinted in CHARGE

OF THE LORD CHIEF
GRAND JURY AT THE CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT IN THE CASE OF
THE QUEEN AGAINST NELSON AND BRAND 118-19 (F. Cockbum ed., 1867).

JusTicE OF ENGLAND TO THE

327. 1 Dears. & Bell 539, 546-47, 169 Eng. Rep. 1111 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1858) [hereinafter Sattler].
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cemed with the original charge of larceny, but rather with the murder of
the English police officer. If anything, Sattler stands for the proposition
that a wrongful arrest does not justify a subsequent murder.3 28 The court
did not determine whether Sattler could be tried for larceny; indeed, it is
arguable that his illegal arrest would prevent his trial on the count of larceny. But in time, the English rule came to be that the illegality of an arrest
could not affect the court's jurisdiction over the accused. 32 9
Scotland adopted the nascent English rule in Sinclair v. H.M. Advocate.3 30 The fugitive, charged in Glasgow with theft, embezzlement, and
breach of trust, was arrested and detained in Portugal by local authorities
acting without a warrant. There was no extradition treaty between Portugal
and the United Kingdom. The Portuguese police took the fugitive aboard a
British ship in the presence of a Scottish detective, whence he was brought
to and imprisoned in Scotland. The fugitive argued that his illegal arrest
and imprisonment divested the court of jurisdiction over his person. The
court held that any alleged irregularities on the part of foreign officials in
his arrest were not cognizable by the court and could not affect the fugitive's trial; the domestic authorities had not acted unlawfully. Any impropriety in his transfer to the British vessel in Portugal was actionable in
damages against the detective alone, or against the Portuguese authorities
in the Portuguese courts; the court was not concerned with the manner in
which the fugitive had come into its jurisdiction. His transfer onto the British ship was a matter of diplomatic rather than judicial concern, and the
Portuguese authorities had not objected to the transfer.
Lord McLaren joined the majority in following Scott and Sattler in
denying the fugitive's challenge to the court's jurisdiction over him, but
argued that the court would intervene to prevent the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction where there had been "substantial infringement of right."
However, "the public interest in the punishment of crime is not to be
prejudiced by irregularities on the part of inferior officers of the law in
relation to the prisoner's apprehension and detention."3 3 1 It is unclear,
however, why the case before him did not involve such a "substantial
infringement of right." Nevertheless, Lord McLaren's suggestion that
courts would refuse to allow criminal proceedings in certain circumstances
suggests that the male captus bene detentus doctrine was not absolute.
The crowning case in the Scott line of decisions was Elliott.3 3 2 British
army officers accompanied by Belgian policemen arrested a British army
deserter in Belgium. The accused was brought to England and charged
with desertion. On a writ of habeas corpus, he argued the illegality of his
arrest under Belgian law precluded the court from exercising jurisdiction
328. But see The Queen v. Anderson, [1868] 1 L.R. 161, 162 (Cr. Cas. Res.) (Blackbum, J.) (stating in oral arguments that "Sattler's Case decides that even if wrongly
brought here, it makes no difference").
329. The Queen v. Hughes, [1879] 4 Q.B.D. 614, 629 (Cr. Cas. Res.).
330. 17 R.(Ct. of Sess.) 38 (H.CJ. 1890).

331. Id. at 44.
332. Regina v. O./C. Depot Battalion, R.A.S.C. Colchester (Ex parte Elliott), [1949] 1

All E.R. 373 (K.B.) [hereinafter Elliott].
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over him. Lord Goddard, CJ., rejected this argument as "entirely false."
Dismissing the application, he stated:
If a person is arrested abroad and he is brought before a court in this country charged with an offence which that court has jurisdiction to hear, it is no
answer for him to say, he being then in lawful custody in this country: "Iwas
laws of the State of A or the State of B where I was
arrested contrary to
3 33the
actually arrested."
In the event of an illegal arrest, the applicant would have a civil action
against those who had arrested him. However, the court's jurisdiction over
to
him could not be challenged because the court would have no power
33 4
inquire into the circumstances by which the defendant was before it.
Three features of this line of cases should be noted. First, in all four
cases there was little awareness or discussion of the international law
dimension to the abductions at issue. No effort was made to determine
whether the foreign state had protested, although in each case the fact that
the abduction had been made in concert with local police suggests that the
abductions were made with the consent of the respective foreign states.
Certainly, there was no mention of a protest by the foreign state in any of
them. There would thus seem to have been no violation of international
law. Moreover, the cases echo the American approach in their view that
resolution of any international conflict was best achieved at the diplomatic
level. A very different result might have obtained had one of the arrests
been followed by a protest and demand for the return of the abducted individual. It is also important to note that none of the cases provide support
for Alvarez-Machain;not one affirms a court's jurisdiction to try the defendant in the face of a foreign protest.
Second, in each case the court acknowledged that the abduction may
have violated the domestic law of the foreign state. But this was not considered to be relevant, except insofar as the defendant might retain a cause of
action in the foreign state against his abductor(s). 335 Finally, later cases
echo Lord McLaren's recognition in Sinclair that the male captus bene
detentus rule is inherently limited in scope. In particular, the Toscanino
"outrageous conduct" exception limits the force of male captus bene detentus.3 36 Regrettably, this traditional English rule was influential outside of

the U.K. 33 7 But as developments in domestic and international law eroded
333. Id. at 376.
334. Id. at 376-77. However, Lord Goddard, CJ., noted somewhat cryptically that "it
may influence the court if they think there was something irregular or improper in the
arrest," suggesting that in certain (unspecified) circumstances a stay of proceedings

would be ordered. Id.

335. See discussion infra notes 499-500.
336. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
337. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Afouneh v. Attorney-General, 10 Ann. Dig.
327 (Palestine 1941-42); Youssef Said Abu Dourrah v. Attorney-General, 10 Ann. Dig.
331 (Palestine 1941-42); Attorney-General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18 (Isr. Dist. Ct. 1961),
afPd 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. 1962); Abrahams v. Minister ofJustice, [1963] 4 S.A.L.R. 542 (S.
Ar. C.P.D.); The King v. Walton, 10 C.C.C. 269 (Ont. (Can.) C.A. 1905); Re Argoud, 45
I.L.R. 90 (Fr. Cass. crim. 1964); Emperor v. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, 13 Bombay L.R.
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the rule, it came into question in several Commonwealth states.
B. Emerging Developments in the Commonwealth
1. New Zealand
The New Zealand Court of Appeal moved away from the restrictive English
male captus bene detentus rule in Regina v. Hartley.3 38 The fugitive, a New
Zealander wanted in connection with a murder in New Zealand, fled to
Australia. At the instigation of the New Zealand police, he was arrested by
Australian authorities and forcibly placed on a flight back to New Zealand,
where he was arrested upon arrival and later convicted. The fugitive
appealed his conviction on two grounds. First, that the trial court did not
have, or should have declined, jurisdiction over him because his arrest and
detention in Australia and rendition to New Zealand were illegal. Second,
that his statements during the extended interrogation after his return had
been extracted illegally.
Although Woodhouse, J., held-following Scott, Sinclair, and Elliottthat the court unquestionably had jurisdiction over the fugitive, he further
considered whether the court possessed the discretion to stay the proceedings, contemplating a supervisory jurisdiction for the court over executive
conduct. 33 9 Woodhouse,J., held that the court could not turn a "blind eye"

to the fact that the fugitive had been brought into its jurisdiction in violation of existing extradition arrangements. 340 The central consideration
was not that the Australian police had returned the fugitive in a manner
which circumvented extradition procedures, but that they had done so at
the instigation of the New Zealand authorities. The court was concerned
with the unlawful behaviour of the domestic executive, and ruled that it
was within the court's discretion to view the manner in which the fugitive
had been brought before it as an abuse of process. The fugitive's conviction was overturned.
While Hartley was the first decision to reject the traditional English
approach to forcible abduction, it had limited force. First, Hartley was
decided not on the basis of the fugitive's forcible abduction alone, but
upon the combination of the forcible abduction and his subsequent interrogation. 34 1 In a later case, 34 2 Richmond, P., expressed doubt that forcible
abduction alone would provide a sufficient basis for the exercise of the
296 (Special Bench 1910) (circumstances of arrest "irrelevant"); Lemmel v. Rex, 18 Int'l
L. Rep. 232 (W. Indies C.A. 1951) (same).
338. [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 199 (C.A. 1978).
339. Id. at 216,following Connelly v. D.P.P., [1964] App. Cas. 1254, 1354 (Eng. H.L.)
(Lord Devlin) ("[t]he Courts cannot contemplate for a moment the transference to the

Executive of the responsibility for seeing that the process of law is not abused."). Woodhouse, J., held that "this must never become an area where it will be sufficient to consider that the end has justified the means. The issues raised by this affair are basic to

the whole concept of freedom in society." Id. at 217.
340. [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 216.
341. Id. at 217 (declining to decide the case on the first ground alone).
342. Moevao v. Department of Labour, [1980] 1 N.Z.L.R. 464. (C.A.).
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court's discretion to stay proceedings. 34 3 Nevertheless, in the same case
Woodhouse, J., reaffirmed his reasoning in Hartley.34 4 Second, the court
of appeal did not consider the international law dimensions of the case. In
particular, its decision on whether to stay proceedings was not explicitly
influenced by the possible illegality of the forcible abduction under international law. Australia's consent to the abduction suggests that there was
no international illegality, forcing the court to rely upon the ground of
domestic executive illegality. Third, the possible international human
rights elements of the case eluded comment. Despite these limitations,
Hartley remains influential, 345 and it is now well established that superior
inherent jurisdiction in criminal matters to prevent
courts possess an3 46
process.
of
abuses
2. Australia
Australia soon followed New Zealand's lead in calling the male captus bene
detentus doctrine into question. In Levinge, 34 7 the fugitive faced trial for
numerous dishonesty offences in New South Wales. He claimed that he
had been arrested by Mexican police at his home in Mexico, brought to the
American border, and delivered into the custody of U.S. FBI agents who
then brought him into the U.S. and held him until he was extradited to
Australia. He argued that this forcible abduction rendered his subsequent
extradition to Australia unlawful and an abuse of process, such that proceedings against him in Australia should be stayed. Moreover, he alleged
that the Australian authorities had been aware of and even involved in his
abduction from Mexico.
The court held that there was no evidence to connect the Australian
authorities with the fugitive's transfer from Mexico to the United States.
Yet Kirby, P., conceded (and McHugh, J.A., assumed arguendo) that the
fugitive may well have been removed illegally from Mexico to the United
States. Even so, the court found this to be a matter for the American and
not the Australian courts. McHugh, J.A., rejected the argument that the
fugitive's extradition from the United States to Australia was made unlawful by his alleged abduction from Mexico. In his view, Australia had followed all of the proper procedures.
Kirby, P., and McHugh, J.A., approved of Hartley and Mackeson, and
held that the court could stay proceedings in order to prevent an abuse of
343. Id. at 470.
344. Id. at 475-76.

345. See S. v. Beahan, [1992] 1 S.A.C.R 307 (Z.S.) (Zimbabwe) (Fugitive from
Zimbabwe to Botswana returned by Botswanan police to Zimbabwean police. Zimbabwe
court held (following Hartley) that it possessed a discretion to refuse to try the fugitive,
although it declined to exercise this power on the facts.); Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas.
42 (Eng. H.L. 1993); S. v. Ebrahim, [1991] 2 S.A.L.R. 553, 95 I.L.R. 417 (S. Mr. App.
Div.), summarized and tranaslated in 31 I.L.M. 888 (1992); Levinge v. Director of Custodial Services, 9 N.S.W.LR. 546 (New S. Wales (Austl.) C.A. 1987).
346. Samleung International Trading Co. v. Corrector of Customs, [1994] 3 N.Z.L.R.
285, 292 (H.C.).
347. 9 N.S.W.LR. 546.
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process in those cases where an individual was brought before it illegally.3 48 Kirby, P., suggested two conceptual bases for this power to stay

proceedings. First, the executive should be estopped or deterred from relying upon its own misconduct in bringing a case to trial. Second, the court
must exercise its power to protect the integrity of its own processes. While
precedent tended to favor the first argument, Kirby, P., preferred that the
court's power be grounded upon the second rationale.
However, the court would only order a stay where it could be demonstrated that the executive had been "either a party to the unlawful conduct
or connived at it 3 49 Here, there was no evidence of Australian involvement
or connivance in the fugitive's expulsion from Mexico. McHugh, J.A.,
noted that there is no unfairness in the trial of a forcible abduction case:
So it is necessary to balance the public interest in having the charge or complaint determined. This is not to say that the end can justify the means and
that the more serious the charge the greater is the scope for the prosecution
to engage in unlawful conduct. But conduct which might be regarded as
charge
constituting an abuse of process in respect of a comparatively minor
35 0
may not have the same character in respect of a serious matter.
Australia was the unwitting beneficiary of the FBI's conduct, itself lawful
under U.S. law. The FBI's conduct could not be imputed to Australian officials. McHugh, J.A., and Kirby, P., held that the court possessed an inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings to prevent an abuse of process, but
would not exercise this power on these facts.
McLelland, A.-J.A., applied the male captus bene detentus rule to reject
the fugitive's claim that the court did not have jurisdiction over him,
although he did not doubt that the court possessed the power to prevent an
abuse of process. In this case, however, Australian authorities were not
involved in the abduction of the fugitive from Mexico to the United States,
and McLelland, A-J.A., thus found it unnecessary to determine whether a
Hartley- or Mackeson-like rule existed in New South Wales.
Levinge is particularly important with respect to the domestic legal
effects of forcible abduction. 3 5 ' The majority, fleshing out the Hartley
rationale, recognized that the issue of jurisdiction is distinct from the question of whether a court should try an abducted fugitive. Equally important
348. 9 N.S.W.L.R. at 556, following Herron v. McGregor, 6 N.S.W.L.R. 246 (New S.

Wales (Austl.) C.A. 1986) (power of courts to stay proceedings in disciplinary tribunals
where institution or continuation of proceedings would be harsh and oppressive and an

abuse of process).
349. 9 N.W.S.L.R. at 565.
350. Id.

351. Levinge was followed in Regina v. Fan, 98 F.LR. 119 (New S. Wales (Austl.)
Crim. Div. 1989) (The fugitive alleged that New South Wales police colluded with Hong

Kong police to return him to New South Wales to face narcotics charges. The court
found no evidence of Australian executive impropriety because the fugitive had returned
voluntarily to New South Wales. Levinge was held to stand for the proposition that

abuse of process could be alleged only where an extradition treaty had been circumvented by the prosecuting authorities or with their connivance.). See also Re Lessur-

Millar a.k.a. Levinge, 47 A. Crim. R. 111 (Austl. Fed. Ct. 1990) (rejecting similar application for a stay on abuse of process grounds).
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was Kirby, P.'s, contention that the need to protect the court's processes
from abuse, rather than deter police misbehavior, justified the court's
power to order a stay. Both factors were subsequently reflected in the
majority speeches of the Law Lords in Bennett 1I. Australian courts have
since gone on to develop a fuller conception of the abuse of process
352
doctrine.
3.

South Africa

35 3
South
After a long history of adherence to the traditional English rule,

Africa became the third jurisdiction-after New Zealand and Australia-to
move decisively away from male captus bene detentus. In Ebrahim,35 4 two
men identifying themselves as South African police officers seized a South
African member of the military wing of the African National Congress
from Swaziland; Swaziland did not protest this abduction. Ebrahim was
bound, gagged, blindfolded, and brought to Pretoria and charged with treason. He applied for release, alleging that his abduction had been orchestrated by the South African police. South African authorities denied these
allegations. Ebrahim argued that his abduction and rendition violated
international law, and that the trial court was thus incompetent to try him
because international law was a part of South African law.
The court found that the strong circumstantial evidence of direct
police involvement made it highly likely that the abductors were "agents of
352. See Ridgeway v. The Queen, 184 C.L.R. 19 (Austl. 1995); Rogers v. The Queen,
181 C.L.R. 251 (Austl. 1994); Walton v. Gardiner, 177 C.L.R. 378 (Austl. 1993).
353. Ex p. Ebrahim, [1988] 1 S.A.L.R. 991 (Transvaal Prov. Div.) (illegal capture of
fugitive in foreign state and return to face trial could not affect South African court's
jurisdiction over him); Nkondo v. Minister of Police, [1980] 2 S.A.L.R. 894 (Orange
Prov. Div.) (holding that court cannot question validity of arrest or order release of
detainee where detainee on airplane grounded in South Africa by bad weather, took bus
to Lesotho, and was arrested by South African police at the border); Nduli v. Minister of
Justice, [1978] 1 S.A.L.R. 893 (S. Afr. App. Div.) (holding that court had jurisdiction over
defendants kidnapped from Swaziland by South African police contrary to their commanding officer's instructions and where Swaziland protested and demanded their
return, so long as South Africa did not expressly authorize the abduction); Ndhlovu v.
Minister of Justice, [1976] 4 S.A.L.R. 250 (Natal Prov. Div.) (holding that court had
jurisdiction over defendants even if they were abducted from Swaziland); S. v. Ramotse
(unreported), summarized in ANN. Surv. S. Am L. 1970, at 80 (1970) (rejecting jurisdictional challenge where defendant allegedly had been arrested by Rhodesian soldiers in
Botswana, brought to Rhodesia, interrogated by Rhodesian and South African police,
brought to South Africa and charged with terrorism); Abrahams v. Minister of Justice,
[1963] 4 S.A.L.R. 542 (Cape Prov. Div.) (holding that the circumstances of a fugitive's
arrest and capture are irrelevant if the fugitive is properly detained, where applicant
claimed he was arrested in Bechuanaland by South African police, brought to South
West Africa, and then arrested and charged); Regina v. Robertson, 1912 S.A.L.R. 10
(Transvaal Prov. Div.) (Holding that court's jurisdiction unimpaired where a defendant
was arrested in Natal and brought to the Transvaal to be extradited to Scotland on a
faulty warrant: "Whether he was brought here legally or illegally, this court has nothing
to do with."). See Schoombee, supra note 148; JoHm DuGAan, INTFmRWAoNAL LAw: A
SouTH AFRcAN PERsPEcTivE 142-47 (1994).

354. S. v. Ebrahim, [1991] 2 SAL.R. 553 (S. Afr. App. Div.), translated in 95 I.L.R.

417, summarized and translated in 31 IL.M. 888 (1992).

1996

English-SpeakingJustice

the South African state."35 - Steyn, J.A., concluded that neither Roman nor
Roman-Dutch law would allow a court to try a person brought before it
from another state by means of state-sponsored abduction. 3 56 Distinguishing earlier cases which had followed the English male captus bene detentus
rule, he held that the English common law influence had never altered the
Roman-Dutch rules. 35 7 These rules embodied fundamental legal princi-

ples, including "the preservation and promotion of human rights, friendly
international relations, and the sound administration of justice." 35 8 He
continued:
The individual must be protected from unlawful arrest and abduction, jurisdictional boundaries must not be exceeded, international legal sovereignty
must be respected, the legal process must be fair towards those affected by it
and the misuse thereof must be avoided in order to protect and promote the
dignity and integrity of the judicial system. This applies equally to the State.
When the State is itself party to a dispute, as for example in criminal cases,
it must come to court "with clean hands" as it were. When the State is itself
involved in an abduction across international
borders as in the instant case,
35 9
its hands cannot be said to be clean.
The court strongly approved of Toscanino.360 It allowed the appeal,
ordering that the conviction and sentence be set aside on the basis that the
trial court did not have jurisdiction over the fugitive. Ebrahim demonstrates that domestic courts are under a duty to vindicate international law
principles as well as domestic law considerations, and that domestic courts
are agents of the international legal system. 3 6 ' That the lack of a Swazi
protest was not fatal to Ebrahim's claim suggests that the court looked
beyond classical international law to international human rights law.
Ebrahim subsequently pursued a successful action for damages for unlaw3 62
ful abduction, arrest, and detention.
Ebrahim represents a path which other jurisdictions may find attractive. It has been argued that the case can be distinguished entirely from
355. Ebrahim, 95 I.L.R. at 424.
356. Id. at 441-42. But see Hercules Booysen, Jurisdictionto Try Abducted Persons and
the Application of InternationalLaw in South African Law, 16 S.A. Y.B. IN'L L. 133, 138
(1990/91) (arguing that Ebrahim is based on weak Roman-Dutch authority).
357. Ebrahim, 95 I.L.Ik at 441.

358. Id. at 441-42.
359. Id. at 442.
360. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). But see Jacques Semmelman, Case Comment, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 133, 135-36 (1993) (criticizing the court for
its reliance on Toscanino).
361. But see DermottJ. Devine, The RelationshipBetween InternationalLaw and Municipal Law in Light of the Interim South African Constitution 1993, 44 INrr'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1,

3 (1995) (arguing that the court in Ebrahim did not rely upon international law in coming to its decision). Nevertheless, the reasoning in Ebrahim is clearly informed by international law considerations. See M. G. Cowling, Unmasking 'Disguised' ExtraditionSome Glimmer of Hope, 109 S. Aia I.J. 241, 249-250 (1992) (acknowledging that it is
unfortunate that the court did not rely more squarely upon public international law and

international human rights law); see also Dugard, supra note 353.
362. Ebrahim v. Minister of Law and Order, [1993] 2 S.A. 559 (Transvaal Pray. Div.).
See Rika Pretorius, Delictual Compensationfor Abduction in Foreign Territory, 18 S. Am.
Y.B. INT'L L.142 (1992/93).
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Alvarez-Machain, a contention which is unconvincing. 3 63 Nevertheless,
Ebrahim is not above criticism. Like the U.S. courts, the Ebrahim court
failed to adequately distinguish between the possession of jurisdiction and
the discretion to exercise it. Yet by~recognizing that even where there is no
violation of customary international law there may be powerful reasons for
preventing the criminal trial of an abducted fugitive, Ebrahim provides a
potent precedent for courts in other jurisdictions.
Subsequent cases have placed some important interpretive glosses
upon Ebrahim.36 4 Regrettably, a more recent case appears to have circumvented Ebrahim'sreasoning. In S. v. Mahala,3 65 Ciskei police arrested and
then detained a fugitive in Ciskei until South African police could return
him to South Africa. South African police then arrested a second fugitive
in Ciskei with the cooperation of the Ciskei police. There was no Ciskei
protest in either case. The court held that it had the jurisdiction to try both
of the fugitives because the Ciskei police had consented to their removal,
despite the fact that the Ciskei police were without authority to give such
consent. 36 6 The court determined that there had been no forcible removal
of the fugitives, and thus distinguished Bennett II as a case concerning "forcible" and "unlawful" removal of a fugitive from a foreign state.
The court in Mahalaignored the important decision in S v. Wellem, 36 7
where three Ciskei citizens were arrested in Ciskei by Ciskei authorities on
charges including murder and robbery. One was told that he would be
held in Ciskei pending extradition to South Africa unless he voluntarily
accompanied the South African police to South Africa. He agreed to go to
South Africa, and upon his arrival was arrested. The following day he
363. Semmelman, Case Comment, supra note 360, at 137. Semmelman contends that
Ebrahim's Roman-Dutch law foundations render it unsuitable for transplant into other

jurisdictions. Yet the principles underlying Ebrahim can flourish in foreign soil, as Bennett II demonstrates. Semmelman's attempt to distinguish Ebrahim as a treason case is
similarly dubious because his implication that the fugitive in Ebrahimwould never have
been extradited to South Africa applies with equal force to Alvarez-Machain, where, it
will be recalled, the fugitive was a Mexican national.
364. These cases have concerned rendition between South Africa and the so-called
Bantustans or "TCVB states" (Transkei, Ciskei, Venda, and Bophutatswana), the formerly independent homelands which have since been reincorporated into South Africa.
Andries Cilliers, Reincorporation of Bophuthatswana and Certain Other States into the
Republic of South Africa, 19 S. Am. Y.B. lfrr'L L. 93 (1993/94). The world community
never recognized the Bantustans, and their independence from South Africa was always
more notional than real. DucmAa, supranote 353, at 77-81. Certainly, the South African
police did not accord them much respect, in the sense that the police crossed the border
with virtual impunity to arrest fugitives. Schoombie, supra note 148. Nevertheless, the
courts of both South Africa and the Bantustans have recently provided some measure of
procedural protection to fugitives returned to stand trial by carefully observing each

other's independence and territorial integrity. Thus, a recognition of the borders of the
Bantustans, while generally objectionable, may have had beneficial effects for the rule of

law in this particular context.
365. S. v. Mahala, [1994] 1 S.A.C.R. 510 (S. Afr. App. Div.).
366. See H. A. Stiydom, Abductions on ForeignSoil - Once Again, 9 S.AFR. J. Hum. RTS.
308 (1993) (discussing trial decision); Neville Botha, Aspects of Extraditionand Deportation, 19 S. AmP. Y.B. ITrr'L L. 163, 177-83 (1993/1994) (criticizing the appeal decision).

367. S. v. Wellem, [1993] 2 S.A.C.R. 19 (E. Cape Div.).
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returned to Ciskei with South African police and identified for the police
the other two accused. All were arrested, agreed to return to South Africa
immediately rather than await formal extradition in Ciskei, and signed
statements to this effect. They subsequently challenged the South African
court's jurisdiction over them.
The court held that the Extradition Convention between South Africa
and Ciskei (and the other TCVB states) 3 68 provided the exclusive means by

which the presence of fugitives could be obtained from those states party
to the Convention. The court further held (following Ebrahim, and the
minority in Alvarez-Machain) that the circumvention of the Convention
rules made the resulting arrests and renditions unlawful. The court placed
particular emphasis on the unlawful nature of the extraterritorial police
acts. Moreover, the court found that the consent of the fugitives to waive
the protection offered by formal extradition proceedings36 9 had not been
fully informed, and was thus invalid. The fugitives had been led to believe
that there was little difference between informed rendition and extradition.
Regardless, the court was of the view that overriding considerations of public policy would have displaced even valid consent: consent of the fugitives
could not cure the unlawful nature of the actions by the South African
police. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the fugitives, and
the fugitives were released.
The applicant in S v. Mabena370 argued that South African and
Bophuthatswanan police illegally arrested him in South Africa and then
brought him to Bophuthatswana. The court interpreted Ebrahim to require
three elements before a court's jurisdiction would be displaced: first, the
removal of an individual from one state by the agents of another; second,
the use of force or deception; and third, lack of knowledge on the part of
the injured state. It is doubtful that these requirements flow from Ebrahim
itself. Nevertheless, the court held that the applicant had not made out the
second and third grounds and dismissed the appeal.
In S v. Mofokeng, 3 71 one of five individuals accused of theft and
attempted robbery challenged the South African court's jurisdiction on the
basis that her presence in South Africa had been obtained through deception by the South African authorities. A South African police officer had
taken statements from the accused and others in Bophuthatswana. The
officer returned some days later asking the accused to accompany him to
South Africa to make a witness statement, to which she agreed. In South
Africa she gave a statement which implicated herself, and she was also
368. Convention on Extradition Between South Africa, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and
Ciskei, Nov. 11, 1986, Proc. 10 Gov. Gaz. 10586, Jan. 23, 1987. The convention was
dissolved upon the reincorporation of the TCVB states into South Africa. Dirk van Zyl
Smit, Reentering the InternationalCommunity: South Africa and Extradition, 6 CaIM. L.
FOR. 369, 371 (1995).
369. In particular, protection from the death penalty: the extraditing state could as a
condition seek assurances from the requesting state that the death penalty would not be
imposed upon an individual.
370. S v. Mabena, [1993] 2 S.A.C.R. 295 (Bophuthatswana Gen. Div.).
371. S v. Mofokeng, [1993] 2 S.A.C.R. 697 (N.C.).
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implicated by another witness. She voluntarily repeated her statement to a
magistrate and was arrested.
There was no evidence of force or deception on the part of the South
African police. The accused had voluntarily come to South Africa and had
not been lured into the country on false pretences. There was no protest
from Bophuthatswana. Crucially, the court found that the police had acted
lawfully and dismissed the accused's plea. Even if the police presence had
been technically illegal, the court was of the view that there was no causal
connection between the accused's removal from Bophuthatswana and her
subsequent arrest in South Africa. The accused had not been brought to
South Africa as a suspect, and the court would have distinguished Ebrahim
on this basis.
One of three fugitives charged with murder challenged the jurisdiction
of the court in S v. Buys.37 2 The three were arrested in Bophuthatswana by

Bophuthatswanan police and returned to South Africa by South African
police at the request of the Bophuthatswanan police. In South Africa, they
were arrested and charged with murder. The fugitives had agreed to the
transfer to South Africa, and there had been no bad faith on the part of the
South African police. The court distinguished Ebrahim on the grounds that
the South African police had acted lawfully and in good faith. Because
Bophuthatswana had voluntarily surrendered the fugitive to the South Africans, any violation of Bophuthatswanan law by the Bophuthatswanan
police was irrelevant. Nevertheless, the court agreed with Wellem that the
Extradition Convention and Extradition Act were the sole means by which
individuals could be returned to South Africa. Again, the court (as in Wellem) emphasized that the waiver of extradition treaty rights by the fugitive
had not been properly informed. Accordingly, as the South African authorities had complied with neither the Extradition Act nor the Extradition
Convention, the court did not have jurisdiction over the fugitive.
The South African courts have thus gone a considerable distance in
elaborating the framework first set out in Ebrahim. The subsequent decisions, however, have been surprisingly inconsistent, given Ebrahim's strict
rule against transnational forcible abduction. Part of the explanation for
the murky state of the South African law after Ebrahim may simply be the
reluctance of some judges to let go of the male captus bene detentus rule.
This reluctance may also be inspired by the strictness of the Ebrahim doctrine itself, which requires that courts divest themselves of jurisdiction.
Where the facts are not as stark as in Ebrahim,judges may seek to avoid
having to apply such a strict rule. The more flexible approach to abuse of
process advocated in this Article seeks to avoid such doctrinal rigidity.
4. Canada
Historically, the limited Canadian jurisprudence has followed the tradi372. S v. Buys, [1994] 1 S.A. 539 (O.F.S.).
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tional Anglo-American rule. 3 73 In Regina v. Walton,3 74 a U.S. police officer
arrested a Canadian in Buffalo, New York, on the basis of a telegram from
the Toronto police. The fugitive was detained in New York until a detective
from Toronto took custody of him and returned him to Toronto. The fugitive argued that his arrest and imprisonment were unlawful and a violation
of the Canada-U.S. Extradition Treaty. Osler, JA., following Ker and Scott,
held that the circumstances by which the fugitive had been brought to trial
did not concern the court and did not affect its exercise of jurisdiction over
him. The proper remedy was either for the United States to espouse his
claim in international law (which it had not done),3 75 or for the fugitive to
37 6
bring a civil suit against the detective for wrongful arrest and detention.
In Hartnett,3 77 Canadian authorities lured the applicants into Canada
under the guise of having them testify before the Ontario Securities Commission, and then arrested them and charged them with fraud. The applicants argued that the fraudulent misrepresentations made by the Canadian
authorities violated their right to natural justice and due process of law
under the Canadian Bill of Rights.3 7 8 They contended that to allow their
trial to proceed would constitute an abuse of process and a circumvention
of the extradition process. Hughes, J., held that "an illegal arrest does not
deprive a Judge of jurisdiction to entertain the prosecution of the victim," 3 79 and denied the applications. He reasoned that luring the applicants into Canada on false pretenses could not violate due process because
there is no right to an extradition proceeding within one's own
jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, should a transnational forcible abduction case come
before a Canadian court today, the court would possess the power to order
a stay of proceedings where warranted. 380 The revolution in Canadian
373. LAW REFORm COMMISSION OF CANADA, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION (WORKING
PAPER No. 37) 135 (1984); Brian H. Greenspan, Illegal Arrest, Irregular Rendition and
Extradition, CANADIAN COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENmH
ANNUAL CoNFRENcE 53, 55 (Ottawa, Oct. 29-31, 1981); see The Ship North v. The King,

37 S.C.R. 385, 396-97 (Can. 1906) (analogizing seizure of foreign fishing vessels to irregular rendition and indicating that the proper remedy was a protest by the injured state,

followed by resolution on the diplomatic plane); Rex v. Whitesides, 8 O.L.R. 622 (Ont.
(Can.) C.A. 1904) (allowing trial of accused arrested in one county and conveyed to

another without proper warrant).
374. The King v. Walton, 10 C.C.C. 269 (Ont. (Can.) C.A. 1905).
375. There was no evidence of a U.S. protest, and the involvement of the U.S. police

officer indicates that such a protest was unlikely.
376. As Ker was followed by Frisbie;,so Walton was followed by Rex v. Isbell, 63 O.L.R384 (Ont. (Can.) App. Div. 1928) (holding that jurisdiction unaffected where accused,
charged with conspiracy and fraud, alleged that he had been abducted from Montreal to
Toronto, but noting that the accused retained a wrongful arrest claim in Quebec).
377. In re Hartnett, I O.R. 2d 206 (Ont. (Can.) High Ct. J. 1973).
378. An Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms, 8-9 Eliz. 2, ch. 44, § 1 (1970) (Can.) (right not to be deprived of life, liberty
or security of the person except by due process of law).
379. 1 O.R. at 209.
380. See Regina v. Sunila and Solayman, 26 C.C.C. 3d 177, 185 (Nova Scotia (Can.) S.
Ct. App. Div. 1986) (noting traditional rule that illegal arrest does not displace court's
jurisdiction, but observing that the rule may be subject to Charter challenge). LA FOR-
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criminal law instigated by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
has extended both to the exclusion of evidence and to the ability of courts
to order a stay of proceedings in order to protect the integrity of the judicial process. Moreover, the negative Canadian reaction to the Jaffe case
may spark a re-examination of the traditional Canadian male captus bene
detentus rule. 38 1 Finally, the considerable attention given by the Supreme
Court of Canada to the procedural protections accorded fugitives facing
extraditionfrom Canada 38 2 suggests a similar concern as to the manner in
3
which fugitives are brought into Canada. 38
EST, supra note 16, at 47-48, is optimistic that in the event of a fugitive being forcibly

abducted from abroad and brought to trial in Canada, section 7 of the Charter would
prevent criminal proceedings. See also HUGH M. KINDRED Er AL., INTERNATiONAL LAW
CHmFLY As INTERTED AND APPLIED IN CANADA 472 (5th ed. 1993) (implying similar
view); Lewis, supranote 5, at 363-68. But the Charter protection afforded an accused in
such a situation is unclear because there has been no case on point. Moreover, there is
some lingering uncertainty as to the territorial scope of Charter protection. While the
federal government is competent to legislate with extraterritorial effect, the courts have
interpreted the Charter to have a strictly territorial application: Regina v. A, B. and C,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 995 (Can.); Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1
S.C.Rt 177 (Can.); Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1990] 2 F.C. 534
(Can. Fed. Ct.), aff'd on other grounds, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236 (Can.); Ruparel v. Minister of
Employment and Immigration, [1990] 3 F.C. 615, 36 F.T.R. 140 (Can. Fed. Ct.). But see
Donald Galloway, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the Charterto Visa Applicants, 23
O-rTAWA L. REV. 335 (1991). More recently, the Supreme Court has suggested that the
Charter may apply to the acts of Canadian agents abroad: Regina v. Terry, 135 D.L.R.
4th 214 (Can. 1996); Regina v. Harrer, 128 D.L.R. 4th 98 (Can. 1995). Furthermore, the
Charter's lack of extraterritorial effect does not mean that it would not protect individuals abducted from abroad and brought to face trial in Canada. Due process factors are
engaged by the presence of the accused individual before the court.
381. Jaffe v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304 (11th Cir. 1987). The irony is that the situation
which inspired the Canadian authorities to intervene as amicus curiae in AlvarezMachain could well have arisen in Canada. Few of the Canadians criticizing the Jaffe
incident noted that the comparable Canadian law is substantially similar. For an exception, see L.C. Green, InternationalLaw-Wrongful Removal-Extradition and the Jaffe Case,
61 CAN. BAR REv. 713 (1983). Given its long and relatively porous border with the
United States, Canada has a particular interest in ensuring both that extraterritorial
abduction is prohibited by international law, and that the domestic law of other states
(and the United States in particular) reflects this.
382. Reference re Ng Extradition, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858 (Can.); Kindler v. Canada,
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 (Can.); United States v. Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469 (Can.);
United States v. Allard and Charette, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564 (Can.); Argentina v. Mellino,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 536 (Can.); United States v. Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500 (Can.). See
Donald K Piragoff & M. V.J. Kran, The Impact of Human Rights Principleson Extradition
from Canada and the United States: The Role of National Courts, 3 CluM. L. FOR. 225
(1992).
383. However, discussion of this latter point as a matter of domestic law has been
limited. See WruiAms & CAsTt_, supra note 99, at 144-48; Williams, supra note 5. The
Charter rights of individuals who are to be extradited from Canada are closely connected to forcible abduction. If the minority position advocated in the extradition cases
noted above, supra note 382, were to become influential so that, for example, Canadian
courts refused to extradite individuals to states where they might face the death penalty
or other forms of punishment, a requesting state would have an incentive to go outside
the extradition system and abduct such individuals. See Sharon A. Williams, Extradition
to a State that Imposes the Death Penalty, 28 CAN. Y.B. TNT'. L. 117, 167 (1990). But see
Van den Wyngaert, supra note 279 (arguing that increased human rights guarantees are
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While Canadian courts are unable to prevent the prosecution of an
accused person, they do possess an inherent right to stay proceedings
where there has been an abuse of process. 3 84 The power to order a stay of
proceedings is distinct from the power to exclude illegally-obtained evidence.38 5 Yet in both instances the issues are broadly similar: the courts
must protect both the judicial process from the taint of unlawful police
conduct, and the public by ensuring that serious crime does not go unpunished. The courts may now stay proceedings when police misconduct
amounts to an "abuse of process." 38 6 In particular, pre-trial police activities (especially the investigative process) are now considered part of the
administration of justice. Where the conduct of the police is an affront to
the court's sense of fair policy and decency, even where the conduct is not
technically unlawful, it may outweigh the societal interest in the prosecution of crime.
In exercising their power to stay proceedings, courts are guided by
section 24(2) of the Charter. Thus, courts should consider whether the
impugned police conduct would bring disrepute to the administration of
unlikely to increase the temptation to abduct or deport due to high application
threshold).
384. This power antedates the Charter, Regina v. Osborn, 4 C.C.C. 185 (Ont. (Can.)
Ct. App. 1969), reversed, [1971] S.C.R. 184 (Can.), although the Charter expands it considerably. In Regina v. Jewitt, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 128, 136-37 (Can.), the Canadian
Supreme Court held that courts possess a residual common law power to stay proceedings where "compelling an accused to stand trial would violate those fundamental principles of justice which underlie the community's sense of fair play and decency"
(adopting Regina v. Young, 13 C.C.C. 3d 1, 31 (Ont. (Can.) Ct. App. 1984) (Dubin,
J.A.)). The court was of the view, however, that the discretion to order a stay should be
used only in the "clearest of cases." Id. The court has consistently reaffirmed this view.
Regina v. O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, 468 (Can.). See generally Derek R. S. Jonson,
Abuse of Process and the Charter,37 CRIM. L. Q. 309 (1995).
385. The Charter entrenches both substantive due process (section 7), as well as the
exclusion of illegally-obtained evidence (section 24(2)). KENT ROACH, CoNsTrruToNAL
REMEDIES IN CANADA ch. 10 (1994). The difficulty with the Charter section 24(2) exclusionary rule is that the exclusion of illegally-obtained evidence may provide an inadequate remedy (from the accused's point of view) for the breach of certain Charter rights,
especially sections 7, 9, and 11(b). Gary T. Trotter, Judicial Termination of Criminal
Proceedings Under the Charter,31 CpuM. L.Q. 409, 410 (1989); David Paciocco, The Stay
of Proceedings as a Remedy in Criminal Cases: Abusing the Abuse of Process Concept, 15
CiuM. L. J. 315 (1991). In effect, the fugitive in a forcible abduction case would seek to
have himself "excluded" on the basis that his very presence before the court was illegally
acquired. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the argument that an accused himself
can be excluded (or "suppressed") as being illegally-obtained evidence. I.N.S. v. LopezMendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039-40 (1984) ("The 'body' or identity of a defendant or
respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest."); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 575, 592 n.34 (1980); United States v. Crews,
445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980) ("Respondent is not himself a suppressible 'fruit'.. ."). A
Charter breach in a transnational forcible abduction case would likely be of section 7. A
fugitive whose section 7 rights have been violated through forcible abduction must look
to section 24(1), with its broad remedial provisions, for a satisfactory remedy.
386. Regina v. Mack, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903 (Can.). While there is disagreement over
the extent of the power to stay proceedings, its existence is not disputed. Regina v.
T.(V.), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 749 (Can.); Regina v. Conway, [19891 1 S.C.R. 1659 (Can.);
Regina v. Vermette, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 985 (Can.); Regina v. Keyowski, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 657
(Can.).
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justice rather than the need to discipline or deter the police or prosecution,

although this may be the ancillary result:38 7 the goal of the courts should

be to protect the integrity of the judicial process. 3 88 A central consideration for the courts is the nexus between the breach of the Charter rights
and the appropriateness of continuing the criminal proceedings. The doctrine of abuse of process unites the court's concern to protect the rights of
individuals, the need to guard the process of the court from abuse, and the
imperative to protect the integrity of the administration of criminal justice. 3 89 As such, it is closely linked to the concept of the rule of law set out
in Section I above. Though it should be noted that application of the doctrine of abuse of process has been relatively rare, 39 0 it would have at least
primafacie applicability in a transnational forcible abduction case.
C. The Demise of the English Rule: The Bennett Litigation
1. The TraditionalRule Is Challenged
Under the traditional English rule a court need not-indeed, may notdivest itself of criminal jurisdiction over an illegally arrested accused.
However, domestic and international influences-in particular, the Hartley
decision-weakened this rule. During this transitional period the law was
in a state of considerable uncertainty. In Mackeson,3 9 1 the English authorities sought the return of the fugitive from Zimbabwe/Rhodesia on fraud
charges. English authorities made no formal request for his extradition:
not only was Zimbabwe/Rhodesia in civil revolt, but the United Kingdom
did not even recognize the Rhodesian government. English police informed
local authorities that the fugitive was wanted in England. The local authorities arrested him and made out an order for his deportation. The
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia authorities sent the fugitive's passport to England,
where it was revalidated for a single month and for a one-way trip back to
the United Kingdom. All of this took place without the fugitive's knowledge. The fugitive challenged the deportation order in the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia courts on the basis that it amounted to an unlawful disguised
extradition.3 9 2 He succeeded on his initial application, 39 3 but this was
overturned on appeal.3 94 The fugitive was deported to England and
arrested there upon his arrival.
387. Regina v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, 281 (Can.).
388. Mack, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 940 (Lamer, J.).
389. Regina v. O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, 456-60 (Can.).
390. Regina v. Power, [19941 1 S.C.R. 601 (Can.); Regina v. Potvin, [1993] 2 S.C.R.
880 (Can.). See Jonson, supra note 384, at 340-41.
391. Regina v. Bow Street Magistrates' Court (Ex parte Mackeson), 75 Crim. App. 24
(Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1982) [hereinafter Mackeson].
392. Based upon Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison (Ex parte Soblen), [1963] 2

Q.B. 243 (Eng. C.A.) (holding that deportation is unacceptable as a means of circumventing extradition procedures).
393. Mackeson v. Minister of Information, Immigration and Tourism, [1980] 1 S.A.
747 (Zimbabwe/Rhodesia Div.) (detention unlawful because its purpose was to effect
illegal extradition to the United Kingdom).
394. Minister of Information, Immigration and Tourism v. Mackeson, [1980] 2 S.A.

747 (R.A.D.).
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In England, the fugitive sought certiorarito quash the charges against
him and an order of prohibition against further proceedings, alleging that
his presence in England had been secured through an unlawful deportation from Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. Lord Lane, CJ., followed Hartley in holding that the court had jurisdiction to try the fugitive as well as the
discretion to stay proceedings against him.3 9 5 Because the purpose of

Mackeson's rendition had been to circumvent regular extradition
processes, 39 6 the court issued a prohibition order to prevent further proceedings. Mackeson thus seemed to incorporate Hartley into English
law. 39 7 Yet Mackeson is not as clear as Hartley. In Hartley, the illegal
actions of the domestic authorities constituted the abuse of process. In
Mackeson, the abuse of process resulted from a mixture of the actions of
the domestic and foreign authorities: the court found that the Zimbabwe/
Rhodesia authorities did not act solely at the instigation of the English
police.
Driver,3 98 however, reiterated the male captus bene detentus rule. English police sought the return of an Australian charged with murder who
had fled to Turkey. There was no extradition treaty between England and
Turkey. At the instigation of the English police, the fugitive was arrested
and detained but subsequently released by Turkish authorities. Australian
embassy officials gave him a ticket to fly unaccompanied to Heathrow airport, where he was arrested upon arrival by English police officers. He
alleged that his presence in England had been acquired by illegal means,
viz., "disguised extradition," and that the court, while possessing jurisdiction over him, should exercise its inherent power to stay proceedings.
Stephen Brown, LJ., held that the fugitive had been lawfully arrested
in England upon his arrival from Turkey, and that the court did not possess the power to stay proceedings. 39 9 Moreover, even had the court possessed such a power, it would not have exercised it here. 40 0 The results in
Driver and Mackeson appear irreconcilable, and whether an English court
had the power to inquire into the circumstances by which an individual
395. Mackeson, 75 Crim. App. at 33.
396. Id. at 30 ("[l]t seems clear to me that the object of this exercise was simply to
achieve extradition by the back door. It seems equally plain to me that the English
police authorities were, to say the least, concurring in that exercise."). The actions of the
English authorities in relation to the invalidation of the fugitive's passport appear to have

been decisive considerations for the court.
397. Mackeson was distinguished in Regina v. Guildford Magis. Ct. (Ex parte Healy),
[1983] 1 W.L.R. 108 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1982) (finding that deportation decision made
by U.S. authorities alone).
398. Regina v. Plymouth Magis. Ct. (Ex parte Driver), [1986] Q.B. 95, 82 Crim. App.
85 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1985) [hereinafter Driver].
399. Driver, [1986] Q.B. at 114, following Regina v. O./C. Depot Battalion, R.A.S.C.
Colchester (Ex parte Elliott), [1949] 1 All E.R. 373 (KB.), and Sinclair v. H.M. Advocate,
17 R. (Ct. of Sess.) 38 (H.CJ. 1890) ("[The court has no power to inquire into the
circumstances in which a person is found in the jurisdiction for the purpose of refusing
to try him.").

400. Driver, [1986] Q.B. at 95, 96 (holding that irregularities outside the jurisdiction
of the court would not amount to an abuse of process in the absence of improper dealing
by British authorities).
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had been °1brought into its jurisdiction for trial remained an open
4
question.
2.

Bennett: Revitalizing the Rule of Law

In Bennett 11,402 the House of Lords settled the issue in favour of Mackeson
by holding that a transnational forcible abduction which circumvents
extradition proceedings is an abuse of process such that a court should
exercise its discretion to enter a stay of proceedings against the fugitive.
The Law Lords explicitly rejected the approach taken by the majority of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain. In Bennett, a New Zealander was
charged in England with criminal offenses arising from his purchase of a
helicopter, having allegedly raised financing under false pretences and
defaulting on repayment. The English police discovered that the fugitive
had moved to South Africa. There was no extradition treaty between the
United Kingdom and South Africa, and the police did not seek his extradition through the normal channels. 40 3 The fugitive alleged that the English
arrested
police had colluded with the South African authorities to have40him
4
trial.
stand
to
Kingdom
United
the
to
returned
forcibly
and
South African detectives arrested the fugitive and placed him in police
custody. After being told that he was to be deported to New Zealand, and
flown as far east as Taiwan, he was returned to South Africa and put on an
airplane to Heathrow airport, handcuffed to his seat. English police
arrested him upon his arrival at Heathrow. He alleged that his rendition
was in violation of an order of the Supreme Court of South Africa. The
English police denied any collusion with the South African police,
although they acknowledged that the South Africans had informed them
that the fugitive was being sent through Heathrow en route to New Zealand.
The trial court refused the fugitive an adjournment to prepare a challenge to the court's jurisdiction. On an application for judicial review, the
divisional court held that fugitive's allegations of police misconduct did
not provide an adequate basis to challenge the court's criminal jurisdiction. 40 5 The divisional court followed the traditional male captus bene
detentus rule, holding that the manner in which a fugitive is brought before
a court of competent jurisdiction does not affect its exercise of criminal
jurisdiction.
401. Regina v. Gilmore, [1992] CRm. L. REv. 67 (Eng. C.A. 1991); Regina v. Bateman
and Cooper, [1989] CRim. L. REv. 590 (Eng. C.A.).
402. Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. 42 (Eng. H.L. 1993).

403. At the time of the fugitive's rendition, there were no extradition proceedings in
force between South Africa and the United Kingdom. Any extradition would have had to

have been arranged through special extradition arrangements under section 15 of the
U.K. Extradition Act of 1989. But see Ossman, supra note 8 (arguing that no such extradition would have been possible under South African law).
404. Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 57.

405. Regina v. Horseferry Rd. Magis. Ct. (Ex parte Bennett), [1993] 2 All E.R. 474
(Eng. Q.B. Div'l CL) [hereinafter Bennett I].
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The majority in the House of Lords 40 6 held that it would constitute an
abuse of process to allow the criminal charges against the fugitive to proceed, given the manner in which he had been brought to trial. The case
was remitted to the divisional court for resolution.40 7 The Law Lords did
not dispute that the English courts properly had jurisdiction over the fugitive. But they held that this did not exhaust the matter. The Law Lords
held that the high court could invoke its supervisory jurisdiction to inquire
into how the fugitive had been brought before it. If the fugitive was brought
into the jurisdiction through the circumvention of extradition procedures,
40 8
the court could stay the proceedings and order his release.
In Lord Griffiths's view, the issue was what circumstances should
cause a court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction. The discretion to stay
proceedings in a criminal trial was found to be latent in the inherent jurisdiction of the court to prevent an abuse of process. Previous cases had
indicated that an abuse of process occurred where the prosecution had
manipulated or misused the process of the court at the defendant's
expense. 40 9 The principle underlying this rule is that the court should
ensure that its processes are used to ensure fair trials. Yet in Bennett, as in
many abduction cases, there was no indication that the fugitive would not
receive a fair trial once he had been forcibly returned to England. Lord
Griffiths argued that proceedings should be stayed not only where the trial
itself would be unfair, but also where it would be unfair to even put the
accused on trial.4 10 Given the public interest in ensuring that the process
of the court not be abused, Lord Griffiths proposed that the concept of
abuse of process be extended to encompass Bennett. While recognizing
that one effect of his decision might be to deter pre-trial police misconduct,
Lord Griffiths did not justify his judgment upon this rationale, one of the
major-if controversial-principles to have informed the extension of the
constitutional due process guarantees in the United States. 41 1 Instead, his
406. Lord Griffiths, Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Lowry, and Lord Slynn of Hadley.
Lord Oliver of Aylmerton dissented and would have dismissed the appeal. Lord Slynn

concurred with Lord Griffiths.
407. Note that the Law Lords were determining the jurisdictional question alone, and

thus assumed the veracity of the fugitive's allegations. The decision of the divisional
court is discussed infra text accompanying notes 432-33.
408. Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 64 (Lord Griffiths).
409. Regina v. Derby Crown Court (Ex parte Brooks), 80 Crim. App. 164, 168-69
(Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1984) (finding an abuse of process where defendant has been
prejudiced by unjustifiable delay on the part of the prosecution); Regina v. Croydon
Justices (Ex parte Dean), [1993] Q.B. 769 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l. Ct.) (finding it an abuse of
process to prosecute defendant in breach of the promise that he would not be prosecuted for certain offenses). See Connelly v. D.P.P., [1964] App. Cas. 1254 (Eng. H.L.);
ANDREw L.-T. CHoo, ABUSE OF PROCESS

AND JUDICIAL

STAYS OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

(1993).
410. Choo, International Kidnapping, supra note 8, at 630. See also the later case,
Att'y Gen. of Trinidad and Tobago v. Philip, [1995] 1 App. Cas. 396, 417-18 (P.C. 1994)

(holding it an abuse of process to try accused who had surrendered in reliance on promise of a pardon).

411. See Paul Denis Godin, A Comparative Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Standing Threshold in Canada,the United States, and New York State: The Relation of Purposeto
Practice, 53 U. ToR. FAc. L. REv. 49 (1995). Lord Lowry also rejected the "police deter-
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concern was to protect the integrity of the judicial process. 4 12 Lord Griffiths held that the Law Lords bore a responsibility "to oversee executive
action and to refuse to countenance behaviour that threatens either basic
human rights or the rule of law." 4 13 In the face of executive misconduct, it
was "unthinkable" that a court "should declare itself to be powerless and
stand idly by." 4 14 Lord Griffiths continued:
In my view your Lordships should now declare that where process of law is
available to return an accused to this country through extradition procedures our courts will refuse to try him if he has been forcibly brought within
our jurisdiction in disregard of those procedures by a process to which our
own police, prosecuting or other executive authorities have been a knowing
party. If extradition is not available
very different considerations will arise
4 15
on which I express no opinion.
Thus, in the extradition context, executive unlawfulness violates the
twin pillars of "basic human rights" and the rule of law.
Lord Bridge of Harwich concurred with Lord Griffiths, and put the
issue thus:
When a person is arrested and charged with a criminal offence, is it a valid
ground of objection to the exercise of the court's jurisdiction to try him that
the prosecuting authority secured the prisoner's presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the court by forcibly abducting him from within the jurisdiction of some other state, in violation of international law, in violation of
the laws of the state from which he was abducted, in violation of whatever
rights he enjoyed under the laws of that state, and in disregard of available
procedures to secure his
lawful extradition to this country from the state
4 16
where he was residing?
While most previous English and Scottish decisions answered this
question with a resounding "no," foreign decisions were more mixed, ranging from Ebrahim to the Ker-Frisbieline of cases, with its culmination in
Alvarez-Machain. Lord Bridge expressed sympathy for the reasoning in
Hartley. To give effect to the rule of law, he held that a court must not "turn
a blind eye to executive lawlessness beyond the frontiers of its own jurisdiction."4 17 It would be an abuse of process to allow a trial to proceed against
rence rationale." Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 74-75. A "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule has developed in the United States. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340
(1987); Mass. v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984).
412. The same distinction was made in Levinge v. Director of Custodial Services,
[1987] 9 N.S.W.L.R. 546, 557 (New S. Wales (Austl.) S. Ct. 1987) (Kirby, P.). See also
Regina v. Conway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659 (Can.); Regina v. Mack, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903
(Can.); Hunter v. Chief Constable of West Midlands, [1982] App. Cas. 529, 536 (Eng.
H.L.) (Lord Diplock).
413. Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 62 (Lord Griffiths).

414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 64 (Lord Bridge). It is unclear whether this means that all of the conditions described must be met in order for a stay to be ordered.
417. Id. at 67 (Lord Bridge). He stated:
There is, I think, no principle more basic to any proper system of law than the
maintenance of the rule of law itself. When it is shown that the law enforcement
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a fugitive seized and brought to England in violation of international law,
because there would have been no such trial but for the English authorities'
illegal action. 4 18 "To hold that in these circumstances the court may
decline to exercise its jurisdiction on the ground that its process has been
abused," said Lord Bridge, "[M]ay be an extension of the doctrine of abuse
4 19
of process but is, in my view, a wholly proper and necessary one."
Lord Lowry held that abuse of process was "a misuse or improper
manipulation of the process of the court."420 Yet he was concerned that
"abuse of process" should not be stretched so broadly as to become too
imprecise.4 2 1 Lord Lowry favored the requirement that "the process of the
court is itse/fbeing wrongly made use of."42 2 Lord Lowry rejected the KerFrisbie doctrine's contention that due process of law is satisfied if the
accused has received a fair trial, without regard for the circumstances by
which the accused was brought to trial. He held that in certain situations
an otherwise fair trial would be an abuse of process. 4 23 A case of forcible
abduction would be just such a situation. Lord Lowry distinguished the
U.S. cases culminating in Alvarez-Machain as they concerned jurisdiction,
whereas in Bennett II the issue was not whether the court had jurisdiction
(the majority in Bennett II held that the court clearly did have jurisdiction),
but whether the court should order a stay to prevent an abuse of process. 4 24 Lord Lowry recognized that Bennett II would have a "significant"
impact upon the executive's conduct of international relations 4 25 by deterring the police from circumventing extradition procedures when arranging
agency responsible for bringing a prosecution has only been enabled to do so by
participating in violations of international law and of the laws of another state
in order to secure the presence of the accused within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court, I think that respect for the rule of law demands that the court take
cognisance of that circumstance. To hold that the court may turn a blind eye to
executive lawlessness beyond the frontiers of its own jurisdiction is, to my mind,
an insular and unacceptable view.
418. Id. at 68 (Lord Bridge). See also Lord Lowry opinion. Id. at 76.
419. Id. at 68 (Lord Bridge).
420. Id. at 73, citing ARcHBOLD's PLEADING EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES
430, T1I 4-44 (43rd ed. 1993).
421. Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 73-74. Lord Lowry approved of Laskin, CJ.C.'s,
warning in Rourke v. R., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 1021, 1038, 1041 (Can.), that while "[the court]
is entitled to protect its process from abuse," there was "the danger of generalizing the
application of the doctrine of abuse of process." Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 73-74.
422. Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 74 (Lord Lowry), approving ofMoevao v. Department of Labour, [1980] 1 N.Z.LR. 464, 471 (C.A.) (Richmond, P.) (emphasis added).
423. Lord Lowry indicated that it would be abusive to try an accused while ignoring
proof of a previous conviction or acquittal. It would also be abusive to try an accused
who had already been bound over and the summons withdrawn (citing Regina v. Grays
Justices (Ex parte Low), [1990] 1 Q.B. 54 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct.)) or where the magistrates
had already found no case to answer (citing Regina v. Horsham Justices (Ex parte
Reeves), 75 Crim. App. 236 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1980)). Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at
74.
424. Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 77 (Lord Lowry) ("[l]t is not jurisdiction which
is in issue but the exercise of a discretion to stay proceedings.").
425. Id. at 76.
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the return of fugitives to England for trial. 4 2 6 Yet the Bennett II rule, it is
argued below, is not a strict exclusionary rule. Rather, it contemplates a
contextual "balancing" approach to the determination of whether a stay of
proceedings is appropriate.
Lord Oliver of Aylmerton, the lone dissenter, would have dismissed the
appeal. While he agreed that it was essential that an accused receive a fair
trial, he believed that the other Law Lords had given insufficient weight to
the public interest in the prosecution and punishment of crime. Lord Oliver felt that in the absence of an unfair trial a court should exercise its
discretion to stay criminal proceedings only upon narrow grounds, and
should not concern itself with pre-trial police impropriety which did not
affect the fairness of the trial itself. 4 27 In his view, while executive unlawfulness was to be regretted, the proper remedy was civil or criminal proceedings against the wrongdoers, rather than freeing the fugitive. 4 28 Lord
Oliver argued that executive misconduct should be punished directly, and
not indirectly by way of a stay of proceedings. 4 29 Beyond this, Lord Oliver's feared that a general supervisory power would tend to "hopeless
uncertainty." 430
Lord Oliver also rejected the contention that there is a special quality
to forcible abduction cases necessitating a duty to supervise the executive.43 1 He did not accept the argument that an English court should signal its disapproval of the invasion of the rights of a foreign state. As a
matter of institutional competence, he felt that such issues should be
resolved within the diplomatic sphere. Lord Oliver argued that domestic
courts should not concern themselves with investigating the legality of acts
committed abroad under foreign law. But this assertion is too broad to
withstand scrutiny. While domestic courts are not competent to investigate the lawfulness of the acts of foreign officials under foreign law, the
rule of law must surely demand that they consider the legality of the
domestic executive's actions abroad under foreign or domestic law. This is
the true meaning of the broader conception of the rule of law outlined by
the Bennett II majority.
426. Id. at 77. He was thus more comfortable with grounding his decision upon a

police deterrence rationale, unlike Lords Griffiths and Lowry.
427. Id. at 69.
428. Id. at 71. A similar argument is often made in the United States. E.g., United
States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 765 n.6 (9th Cir. 1995); Paul B. Stephan lII,
Constitutional Limits on International Rendition of Criminal Suspects, 20 VA. J. IN'L L.
777, 799-800 (1980) (arguing that allowing for civil liability "strikes a reasonable balance between society's interests in punishing wrongdoers and both the public and pri-

vate interests in penalizing government misconduct"). But the record of civil liability as
a vehicle for protecting the judicial process and deterring police illegality has been weak.

See Bush, supranote 6, at 974-75. There is no reason to believe that it will be an effective
remedy in cases of abuse of process.
429. But Lord Griffiths noted: "The courts, of course, have no power to apply direct
discipline to the police or the prosecuting authorities, but they can refuse to allow them

to take advantage of abuse of power by regarding their behaviour as an abuse of process
and thus preventing a prosecution." Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 62.
430. Id. at 71.
431. Id. at 72-73.
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469

Moreover, Lord Oliver rejected the assertion that irregular rendition
violated a right of the fugitive to be returned to the abducting state only
through the extradition process. He argued that the very fact that a fugitive
could be returned by a foreign state to the United Kingdom by processes
other than extradition (e.g., through deportation) and without the involvement of the English authorities showed that no such right exists, notwithstanding the U.K. Extradition Act of 1989. The alleged involvement of
English authorities in a disguised extradition would not alter this
conclusion.
Lord Oliver's dissent recalls Chief Justice Rehnquist's conclusion in
Alvarez-Machain that an extradition treaty cannot be said to "cover the
field" with respect to the transfer of individuals between states. However,
deportation and abduction are distinguishable: deportation takes place
upon the consent of the deporting state, whereas abduction often does not.
More importantly, international human rights law, as we have seen, has
much to say concerning the treatment of individuals and the wrongful exercise of jurisdiction over them.
3. The Aftermath of Bennett
In the Divisional Court, the fugitive's allegations were subsequently made
out, although the court's decision is rather unsatisfactory. 4 32 As well, the
length and complexity of the hearing provides some indication that the
development of the Bennett II doctrine comes at a price. Mann, LJ., noted
that the South African authorities had discovered the fugitive in South
Africa in 1991 and had regarded him as an illegal immigrant. After they
unsuccessfully attempted to deport the fugitive to Taiwan, the English
police became aware of his presence in South Africa. Mann, LJ., was of the
same view as the House of Lords: although there was no extradition treaty
in force between the United Kingdom and South Africa, the fugitive's
433
return could have been secured under special extradition arrangements.
As a result, Mann, LJ., regarded the deportation of the fugitive to New
Zealand via England as colorable, both because the route was "not an obvious one," and because no arrangements had been made by the South Africans to transfer the fugitive from Heathrow airport to Gatwick airport,
from which the flight to New Zealand was allegedly to depart. Mann, LJ.,
also regarded an internal Crown Prosecution Service memorandum as evi432. Regina v. Horseferry Rd. Magis. Ct. (Ex parte Bennett) (No. 3), [1995] 1 Crim.
App. 147, 1994 T.L.R. 187 (Eng. Q.B. Div'1 Ct. 1994) [hereinafter Bennett III]. See also
Regina v. Horseferry Rd. Magis. Ct. (Ex parte Bennett) (No. 3), 1994 T.L.R. 24 (Eng. Q.B.
Div'l CL) [hereinafter Bennett IV] (permitting the cross examination of witnesses in

South Africa by video link); Bennett v. Comm'r of Police of the Metropolis, [1995] 1
W.L.R. 488 (Ch. D.) [hereinafter Bennett V] (dismissing Bennett's action against D.P.P.,
Police Commissioner, and Home Secretary for public misfeasance because statement of
claim did not disclose the elements of misfeasance or negligence); Regina v. Horseferry
Rd. Magis. Ct. (Ex parte Bennett) (No. 2), [1994] 1 All E.R. 289 (Q.B. Div'l Ct) [hereinafter Bennett VI] (ordering disclosure of Crown Prosecution Service documents).

433. As discussed above, this view has been questioned. See Ossman, supra note 8.

The further discussion infra at text accompanying notes 452-53, however, suggests that

Mann, J., was correct on this point.
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dence of collusion between the English and South African authorities. The
court thus held that the fugitive had come to the United Kingdom in defiance of regular extradition proceedings due to collusion between English
and South African authorities. Despite this holding, there was actually very
little evidence of collusion, and the memorandum in question provides circumstantial evidence at best.
Aside from the English charges against him, Bennett also faced fraud
charges in Scotland. The progress of his case before the Scottish courts
provides an intriguing counterpoint to the English decisions. The question
arose as to whether the Scottish warrant for the arrest of Bennett on the
Scottish charges could be executed in England, given the disposition of the
case by the English courts. Bennett sought an injunction to prevent the
execution of the Scottish warrant in England. In Regina v. Commissionerof
Police of the Metropolis, ex p. Bennett,4 34 the English divisional court held
that it did not have jurisdiction to hear an application for judicial review of
the decision to execute a Scottish warrant against Bennett in England. The
court held that the arrest was not an abuse of the English court's trial process, and the English court would not concern itself with the issue of the
possible abuse of the process of the Scottish courts: that would be for the
Scottish courts to determine for themselves. The decision reinforces the
conclusion that the court's focus should be upon the possible abuse of its
own process.
The Scottish warrant against Bennett remained outstanding after it
was determined that the finding of the English divisional court on the merits of Bennett's allegations did not bind a Scottish court. 43 5 The Scottish
court, while acknowledging the weakness of the male captus bene detentus
rule after Bennett II, interpreted the facts of the case differently than the
English divisional court. The Scottish court found that South Africa's initial attempts to deport the fugitive to New Zealand via Taiwan had been
foiled because the fugitive had destroyed his passport on the flight to Taiwan. Because no airline would take him to New Zealand upon his arrival
in Taiwan, he had to be returned to South Africa. The court also held that
the difficulty of travel to and from South Africa in 1991 (when the country
was still subject to international sanctions) made the South African claim
that it was attempting to deport the fugitive to New Zealand via the United
Kingdom more plausible than it might have appeared at first blush.
Because there were no direct flights from South Africa to New Zealand at
the time, deportees from South Africa had to be routed through a third
state.
The Scottish court held that the memorandum sent to the English
police by the South African authorities merely reported to them the
independent South African decision to deport Bennett. The court also disputed the English divisional court's finding that the Crown Prosecution
434. [1995] Q.B. 313, [19951 3 All E.R. 248, 1994 T.L.R. 570 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1994)
[hereinafter Bennett VII].
435. Bennett v. H.M. Advocate, 1994 S.C.C.R. 902, 1994 T.L.R. 621, 1995 S.L.T. 510
(H.CJ.) [hereinafter Bennett VIII].
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Service memorandum demonstrated collusion between the English and
South African authorities. The South African authorities, mindful that the
assistance of the English authorities would be required to transfer the fugitive from Heathrow airport to Gatwick airport, informed their English
counterparts of their plan. The English authorities never made such transfer arrangements because they planned to arrest the fugitive upon his arrival at Heathrow. Moreover, even had the English authorities acted
improperly, there was no evidence that the Scottish authorities had also
acted improperly. The unlawfulness of the actions of the English police
under English law could not affect Scottish proceedings. Bennett's jurisdictional challenge was dismissed.
So the actual result of the Bennett litigation is very similar to that in
Levinge: the Scottish courts are not concerned with alleged misconduct by
foreign government officials where domestic authorities were not involved
in arranging the abduction. The Scottish court did indicate that had there
been evidence of collusion between the domestic authorities and foreign
authorities for the purpose of circumventing regular extradition procedures, a different result might have been reached. Scottish criminal
appeals do not go to the House of Lords, so there is no possibility that the
43 6
Law Lords will rehear the case on appeal from Scotland.
4. What Bennett Decided

A number of questions arise from the decision of the House of Lords in
Bennett II. First, the Law Lords were ambiguous as to whether there is a
duty to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over an individual who has been
brought unlawfully before a court, or merely a discretion to do so. The
majority of the Law Lords suggested that there is a discretion through such
language as: "[the court] may stay the prosecution;" 43 7 "the court may
decline to exercise its jurisdiction;" 438 "I would not expect a court to stay
the proceedings of every trial which has been preceded by a venial irregularity;"4 39 and finally:
[A] court has a discretion to stay any criminal proceedings on the ground
that to try those proceedings will amount to an abuse of its own process
either (1) because it will be impossible (usually by reason of delay) to give
the accused a fair trial or (2) because it offends the court's sense of justice
and propriety
to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of a partic40o
ular case.
436. DAVID M. WALKER, THE ScorrlsH LEGAL SYsTEM

308 (6th ed. rev. 1992).

437. Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 64 (Lord Griffiths) (emphasis added).
438. Id. at 68 (Lord Bridge) (emphasis added).
439. Id. at 77 (Lord Lowry).
440. Id. (Lord Lowry). These comments echo those of Kaufman, J., in United States
ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1975) ("We did not intend to suggest
[in Toscanino] that any irregularity in the circumstances of a defendant's arrival in the
jurisdiction would vitiate the proceedings of the criminal court.") See also Levinge v.
Director of Custodial Services, [1987] 9 N.S.W.L.R. 564, 565 (New S. Wales (Austl.) S.
Ct); Regina v. Hartley, [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 199 (CA).
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Lord Griffiths, however, also spoke of a duty: "[O]ur courts will refuse to
try him, and if it comes to the attention of the court that there has been a
serious abuse of power it should, in my view, express its disapproval by
refusing to act upon it."44 1 The majority is surely right in its view that the
courts possess discretion. In deciding whether to exercise its power to stay
proceedings, a court must weigh many factors. 4 42 The House of Lords was
not clear, however, about what factors a court should consider in exercising its discretion to order a stay. This is considered further in Section VI,
below.
A second issue concerns how the House of Lords viewed its role as a
domestic court in implementing international rule of law ideals. In part,
this issue is connected with the Law Lords' view that on the assumed facts
there had been a violation of international law. The assumed facts of the
case-no action by English agents on South African territory, and more
importantly, no South African protest at the fugitive's "abduction," no
request for his return and no New Zealand protest (Bennett was a citizen of
that state)-suggest that there was no violation of customary international
law. Moreover, it will be recalled that at the time of the abduction there
was no extradition treaty in operation between South Africa and the United
Kingdom, so the abduction could not be said to have violated a treaty.
Indeed, these considerations suggest that Bennett II presented an
unfavourable set of facts upon which to overturn the male captus bene
detentus rule, especially when compared with Alvarez-Machain,where there
was a protest by the injured state, an extraterritorial forcible abduction,
and, in the view of this author, the violation of an extradition treaty.
Despite these shortcomings, the Bennett II majority alluded several
times to a violation of international law. Lord Bridge's judgment suggests a
broader, international conception of the rule of law. Given that the case
involved no violations of either customary international law or of a treaty,
Lord Bridge's statement that there had been a violation of international law
suggests an international human rights dimension to the case.4 43 Lord
Lowry implicitly views domestic courts as agents of the international legal
system, even if the international legal system is understood in terms of the
legal order or rule of law more generally. 444 Lord Lowry also argued that
there was a violation of international law in Bennett II, but does not explain
his position. He seems to have asserted that the executive violated international law.44 5 As with Lord Griffiths, Lord Lowry's judgment is coherent
only if one accepts that there was a violation of international human rights
441. Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 62 (emphasis added).
442. Regina v. Latif and Shahzad, [1996] 1 W.L.R. 104, 112 (Eng. H.L. 1995) (Lord
Steyn) ("The court has a discretion: it has to perform a balancing exercise.").
443. Bennett If,
[1994] 1 App. Cas. at 67.
444. Id. at 77. Lord Lowry was careful to note that "[the abuse of process which
brings into play the discretion to stay proceedings arises from wrongful conduct by the
executive in an international context." Moreover, unlike Lord Oliver, Lord Lowry did not

accept that such issues were best resolved at the diplomatic level; South African complicity would preclude an acceptable resolution in Bennett's case.
445. Id. at 76:
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law in Bennett II, because the case did not disclose a violation of customary
law or treaty. Lord Griffiths placed particular emphasis upon the procedural protection which extradition treaties accord to fugitives. This argument finds support in the fact that two subsequent cases considering
Bennett II in the context of possible violations of international law have
declined to find an abuse of process for lack of a violation of international
law.446

Alternatively, it may be that the Law Lords believed that the English
police had violated the domestic law of South Africa. It seems likely that
the Law Lords took a dim view of what they saw as an attempt to circumvent an order of the South African Supreme Court forbidding the removal
of the fugitive from South Africa. 4 47 But again, there was no South African
protest, and thus no violation of customary international law. The inchoate international human rights violation thus remains the sole possible
ground upon which to base the Law Lords' contention that the fugitive's
rendition to England violated international law.
Importantly, Lord Griffiths rejected the "justiciability" argument
implicit in the majority judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in AlvarezMachain. The House of Lords indicated that it would not hesitate to act as
a check against executive acts which violate domestic or international law.
There was, however, no discussion of the duty of English courts to give
effect to international law rules on abduction, although it may be that these
considerations informed Lord Griffiths' understanding of "basic human
rights" and "the rule of law."44 8
The third issue is whether extradition was actually available in Bennett
11. This question is of cardinal importance because the majority assumed
that extradition was available and that the illegality resulted from the
efforts of the English authorities (in collusion with the South Africans) to
circumvent regular extradition proceedings. 4 49 This implies that the rule
If British officialdom at any level has participated in or encouraged the kidnap-

ping, it seems to represent a grave contravention of international law, the comity
of nations and the rule of law generally if our courts allow themselves to be used
by the executive to try an offence which the courts would not be dealing with if
the rule of law had prevailed.
446. See Regina v. Mills (unreported 1995, Croyden Crown CL, England) and Regina
v. Stipendiary Magistrate (Ex parte Newall) (unreported 1993, Gibraltar). Both cases
concern the arrest of individuals on ships in international waters, and both are discussed in William C. Gilmore, CurrentDevelopments: Public InternationalLaw: Hot Pursuit: The Case of Regina v. Mills and Others, 44 Ir'L & CoMp. L. Q. 949 (1995).
447. But note Mann, LJ.'s, finding that there was no evidence that the South African
authorities were "in any respect contumacious" in acting in disregard of the order. Bennett III, [1995] 1 Crim. App. at 149.
448. Lord Griffiths considered the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court to be
broader in cases with a transnational element than under purely domestic law cases: "it
is in fact a horse of a very different colour from the narrower issues that arise when
considering domestic criminal trial procedures." Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 64.
449. Id. at 62 (Lord Griffiths). Lord Griffiths assumed arguendo that the English
police "took a deliberate decision not to pursue extradition procedures but to persuade
the South African police to arrest and forcibly return the appellant to this country." Id.
at 52. Lord Bridge suggested that the illegality was the executive's resort to abduction
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in Bennett II applies only where extradition proceedings are available but
circumvented. 450 Bennett II thus seems to support the proposition that the
domestic executive must endeavor to make use of available extradition
arrangements in securing the return of fugitives from foreign states. When
it procures the return of a fugitive by means of informal processes and
extradition was available, a stay of proceedings may be ordered. Thus,
there is some uncertainty as to the application of Bennett II to situations
451
such as that in Driver, where extradition proceedings were unavailable.
Moreover, it has been argued that extradition procedures were actually
unavailable in Bennett II. Ossman contends that not only was there no
extradition treaty between South Africa and the United Kingdom, but also
that the "special proceedings" extradition mechanism of section 15 of the
U.K. Extradition Act of 1989 could not have been invoked because South
African law does not allow extradition without a conventional obligation to
do so. 45 2 The point is of particular importance because Lord Griffiths
indicated that his opinion would have been different had extradition been
unavailable. 4 53 In a way, then, the House of Lords did not entirely distance itself from the familiar U.S. "extradition treaty paradigm" at work in
Alvarez-Machain. At the very least, given that the application of the abuse of
process doctrine set out in Bennett II presupposes the circumvention of an

extradition treaty, care must be taken to determine whether such a treaty
(or a more murky "relationship") did in fact exist.
The fourth issue arising from Bennett II concerns its final result: what
exactly does the House of Lords' decision require? Clearly, a stay of proceedings should be ordered once the facts underlying the fugitive's allegations of unlawful executive conduct are made out. But what happens at
that point? Lord Lowry indicated that the fugitive should be released and
given the opportunity to "escape." 45 4 But this does not prevent the fugitive
instead of regular extradition proceedings, which assumes that extradition was available
but was deliberately circumvented by the executive. Id. at 68. Similarly, Lord Lowry's
reasoning implies the existence of an extradition treaty with South Africa. Id. at 74. See
also Schmidt II, [1995] 1 App. Cas. 339, 375 (Eng. H.L. 1994) ("special arrangements
could have been made").
450. Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 62 (Lord Griffiths).
451. Schmidt II, [1995] 1 App. Cas. 339. But see R. v. Latif and Shahzad, [1996] 1
W.L.R. at 112-13 (suggesting that the Bennett II abuse of process doctrine could be

invoked even in the absence of an extradition treaty).
452. Ossman, supra note 8, at 78-79. But see the South African Extradition Act of
1962, § 3(2), which empowers the president to surrender an individual accused or convicted of an offense in a foreign state which would be an offense if committed in South
Africa to a foreign state upon request, even where South Africa has no formal extradition
relationship with that state. See Hiranter v. Minister of Law and Order [1992] 1 S.A.C.R.

414 (W.).
453. Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 62.
454. Id. at 81. See Trimbole v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison, [1985] L.K 465, 493 (Ir.

H.C., S.C.) (where extradition of fugitive was denied because of abuse of process, fugitive
was given seven weeks from the date of his release during which he could not be rearrested in order to be extradited); Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 430 (fugitive could not be tried

again until given a reasonable time and opportunity to return to the foreign state from
which he had been forcibly removed); Sinclair v. H.M. Advocate, 17 1 38, 43 (Scot.
1890) (Lord Adam) (allowing sufficient time for individual to return); but see 17 K, at
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from being properly pursued in the future.45 5 As in the Derrick Hills incident, the fugitive should be returned to the state from which he had been
abducted, with the domestic authorities free to make a subsequent formal
45 6
extradition request for his return.

The release of the fugitive does not mean that he can never be properly
extradited. If the fugitive refused to return to South Africa, he could be
validly prosecuted in England after a reasonable period of time on the
grounds that he had submitted to English jurisdiction. 45 7 But this rule
would not resolve a case in which extradition proceedings were unavailable. While Bennett II would logically suggest that the fugitive should be
released and returned to the injured state from which he had been
abducted even where extradition is unavailable, it should be recalled that
Lord Griffiths suggested that other considerations might then apply.
D. Extradition and Abuse of Process: Schmidt
1. Schmidt
Bennett II does not address the issue as to whether executive or police conduct not amounting to force, but nevertheless leading to the presence of a
fugitive within England, could also be considered an abuse of process.
This is an important question in its own right. 45 8 In Schmidt 11, 459 the
42, 44 (Lord Justice-Clerk and Lord McLaren holding that individual could be immediately rearrested upon release).
455. In Bennett, had the fugitive returned to South Africa, the English authorities
could have made an extradition request for him under section 15, the "ad hoc" provision
of the U.K. Extradition Act of 1989.
456. Derrick Hills Case (1991), reprinted in 31 LL.M. 932 (1992) (Canada returned
fugitive who had been arrested on U.S. side of border to the United States, and later
made a formal extradition request for his return.); see also Higgs Case (1964), reprinted
in Bmr-ISH PAcTIcE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw-1964, at 185 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1966)
(South Africa subsequently requested extradition of Higgs from Northern Rhodesia,
although Higgs had by this time gone to the United Kingdom, with which South Africa
did not have an extradition treaty.).
457. Sinclair v. H.M. Advocate, 17 R. 38 at 43 (Lord Adam): "After a certain time, no
doubt, he would be held to be staying here of his own free will, and so liable to be
apprehended."
458. In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894); Liangsiriprasert v. United States, [1991]
1 App. Cas. 225 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Hong Kong C.A.); In re Extradition of David,
390 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Ill. 1975). Facing extradition from the United States to France,
the fugitive in David alleged that he had been kidnapped from Brazil by U.S. agents. The
court applied Ker-Frisbie,and distinguished Toscanino on the basis that the alleged government conduct was insufficiently "outrageous." In subsequent proceedings, 395 F.
Supp. 803 (E.D. IlL. 1975), the fugitive alleged that his case fit within the Toscanino rule
because he had been tortured. The court then distinguished extradition proceedings
from a criminal trial on the basis that the former did not involve a determination of
guilt. On this view, even outrageous government conduct sufficient to allow the fugitive
to invoke the Toscanino rule in a criminal trial would not apply to extradition proceedings. See also David v. Attorney General, 699 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 832 (1983) (court held Toscanino rule inapplicable to extradition proceedings
because France would be penalized for the allegedly unlawful conduct of U.S. agents if
the court were to divest itself ofjurisdiction). In re Matter of Extradition of Atta, 706 F.
Supp. 1032 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (Fugitive sought for terrorist attacks in Israel was deported
to United States from Venezuela and tried to resist extradition to Israel on the basis of
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House of Lords determined that an individual who has been lured into
England from abroad by the police under false pretenses may be lawfully
extradited to face criminal charges in a third state. Schmidt II is also significant because Lord Jauncey left little doubt that the position he adopted in
that case would also apply to the propriety of a criminal trial where an
individual has been lured into the jurisdiction by fraud. Schmidt II thus
goes some distance towards fleshing out the limits of the Bennett II
principle.
In Schmidt II, a German faced criminal charges in Germany for serious
drug offenses. He moved to Ireland, from which the German authorities
unsuccessfully sought his extradition. 460 The German authorities later
informed their English counterparts that the fugitive was making frequent
visits to the United Kingdom from Ireland under false passports and
requested that he be located and arrested. The English police decided to
investigate. An English detective contacted the fugitive and his solicitor in
Ireland under the false pretense that he was investigating a check fraud
scheme, and that he wished to exclude the fugitive from his inquiries. The
fugitive was lured to England on the false premise that the police wished to
interview him there. He was told that if he refused to come to England for
the interview he would be suspected of having committed the offense and
would be arrested upon his next visit to the United Kingdom. Faced with
these options, the fugitive came to England with his solicitor, and was
arrested and committed to custody pending extradition to Germany.
The fugitive brought proceedings in the High Court seeking a writ of
habeas corpus and judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision to
order the magistrate to extradite him to Germany. The House of Lords
refused the motion, holding that the general supervisory jurisdiction which
it had outlined in Bennett II in the context of a criminal trial did not apply
to extradition proceedings. Moreover, the Law Lords held that even if there
had been such a supervisory power, it would not have been invoked in
Schmidt's case.
The central question in Schmidt II was whether the supervisory jurisdiction over criminal trials set out in Bennett II should be extended to proceedings to extradite an individual from England. 4 6 1 The House of Lords
unlawful rendition to United States. The court rejected this claim, but intimated that the
Ker-Frisbiedoctrine might not apply to extradition because U.S. courts could not ensure
a fair trial abroad.). See also Re Parisot, 5 T.L.R. 344 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1890) ("The
jurisdiction under the Extradition Act attaches if the prisoner is in England, even though
illegally arrested."); Regina v. Robertson, 1912 S.A.L.R. 10 (Transvaal Prov. Div.). Compare O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure, supra note 5, at 309 (extradition of an illegallyabducted individual would likely violate international law).
459. Schmidt II, [1995] 1 App. Cas. 339 (Eng. H.L. 1994).
460. Schmidt had been arrested by the Irish police and pled guilty to drug possession.
A German extradition request was refused by the Irish authorities on the ground that the
extradition warrant was not in order.
461. See In Re Parekh, [1988] Cium. L. REv. 832 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct.) (application of
abuse of process doctrine to extradition proceedings).
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was of the view that it should not.4 62 The fugitive argued that the manner
in which he had been induced to enter England amounted to an abuse of
process and executive power, and that a stay of proceedings should be
ordered. 4 63 The government contended that the High Court had no such
inherent supervisory jurisdiction with respect to extradition proceedings,
and that its statutory jurisdiction under section 11(3) of the U.K. Extradition Act of 1989 was inapplicable here. The statutory extradition scheme
excluded any supervisory jurisdiction. The divisional court rejected the
application, 46 4 and on appeal, the House of Lords affirmed. Lord Jauncey
of Tullichettle wrote the unanimous decision, holding that Bennett II was
strictly limited to criminal trials and did not extend to extradition proceedings. 4 65 He held that the High Court did not possess the inherent supervisory power for which the fugitive had argued, 46 6 and that this case could
not be brought within the scope of the provisions of section 11(3) of the
the High Court supervisory
U.K. Extradition Act of 1989 which granted
46 7
jurisdiction in limited circumstances.
LordJauncey agreed that there was the potential for injustice if a fugitive were to be extradited to a state which would convict him through
improper means. But he argued that different considerations applied to a
pending criminal trial than to pending extradition proceedings. 468 In the
case of a pending trial in England, the supervisory jurisdiction of the High
Court (as set out and extended in Bennett II) would provide the sole protec46 9
tion for the accused from abuse of process and executive misconduct.
However, in the case of pending extradition proceedings, additional protections were afforded to a fugitive. The first of these was the Secretary of
State's discretion (under section 12 of the U.K. Extradition Act of 1989) to
refuse to surrender the fugitive for extradition. Second, Lord Jauncey
argued that the courts of many states possess the same sort of powers as
the House of Lords had outlined in Bennett II: to order a stay of proceed462.
(Austl.
463.
[1975]

The position of Australia is the same. Forrest v. Kelly, 105 A.L.R. 397, 419
Fed. Ct. 1991).
Schmidt II, [19951 1 App. Cas. 362-64, relying upon dicta in Australia v. Harrod,
2 All E.R. 1, 10-11 (Eng. H.L.) and Re Osman, [1992] CRiM. L. REv. 741 (Eng.

Q.B. Div'l Ct.

464. Schmidt 1, [1995] 1 App. Cas. 339, [1994] 2 All E.R. 784 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct).

465. Schmidt II, [1995] 1 App. Cas. at 377. Lord Jauncey was joined by Lords Ternpleman, Ackner, Slynn of Hadley, and Lloyd of Berwick.

466. Following Atkinson v. United States of America, [1971] App. Cas. 197 (Eng. H.L.

1969) and Regina v. Governor of Pentonville Prison (Ex parte Sinclair), [1991] 2 App.

Cas. 64 (Eng. H.L.) (court has no discretion to refuse to commit fugitive for extradition
where statutory requirements are met).

467. Schmidt II, [1995] 1 App. Cas. at 378-79. Section 11(3) provides that the High
Court shall order the discharge of the applicant (a) if the offense for which he is sought
is trivial; (b) by reason of passage of time; or (c) because the charges made against him

are not made in good faith. It was thus inapplicable in this case.
468. Id. at 379. This argument is presumably founded on the basis that extradition
proceedings do not involve a determination of the guilt or innocence of the fugitive. See
In re Extradition of David, 390 F. Supp. 521. See also Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R.

779, 844 (Can.) (McLachlin, J.).
469. Schmidt II, [1995] 1 App. Cas. at 377-78.
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ings in the face of irregularities in the manner inwhich a fugitive has been
brought to stand trial. Under this view, a fugitive extradited by a U.K.
court to such a state would have his abuse of process argument heard at
trial in the requesting state rather than at the extradition stage in the
United Kingdom.
In Schmidt II, Lord Jauncey emphasized the importance of the European Convention on Extradition, under which the fugitive was being extradited to Germany. 4 70 The purpose of the Convention was to facilitate and
expedite the extradition process between the contracting states, a process
which required that each state "rely upon the genuineness and bona fides
of a request made by another one." 47 1 This purpose would be defeated if
national courts were free to review the substantive circumstances of each
case.4 7 2 The Convention requires that national courts extradite fugitives
upon a simple request and trust that justice will ultimately be done in the
criminal courts of the requesting state.4 73 Indeed, unlike under most bilateral extradition treaties, there is no obligation under the Convention for the
requesting state to make out a prima facie case in order to secure the extradition of a fugitive. It may be, then, that Schmidt II is limited in its application to extradition proceedings under the European Convention on
Extradition. In a case where extradition is sought by a non-Convention
state there may be less room for the trust in the quality of foreign justice
expressed in Schmidt.4 74 As a corollary, there should be a greater willingness on the part of the extraditing4 75court to consider the circumstances by
which the fugitive came before it.
2. After Schmidt
It is to be regretted that the House of Lords in Schmidt II did not extend
Bennett II to include extradition proceedings, although it is conceded that
4 76
the Law Lords had little choice as a matter of statutory interpretation.
470. Id. at 378. See generally European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957,
E.T.S. No. 24, 359 U.N.T.S. 273; European Convention on Extradition Order 1990, SI
1990/1507 (U.K).
471. Schmidt II, [1995] 1 App. Cas. at 378. See also In re Evans, [1994] 1 W.L.R.
1006, 1008 (Eng. H.L.) ("Extradition treaties and legislation are designed to combine
speed and justice.").
472. Schmidt II, [1995] 1 App. Cas. at 378.

473. European Convention on Extradition, supra note 470, art. 1 (obligation to extradite); Dinstein, supra note 280, at 49 ("Reciprocal trust is the key to the huge success of
the European system."). In Schmidt II, note the echoes of the Commission dissent in
Bozano v. France, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 320, 324 (1987) (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.), especially

the need to trust other states under the European Convention.
474. Nevertheless, some level of trust in the quality of foreign justice is an essential
element of any extradition relationship. See Regina v. Governor of Pentonville Prison
(Ex parte Lee), [1993] 1 W.L.R. 1294, 1300 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct.).
475. Recall that a similar issue arose in Bennett VII, [1995] Q.B. 313, where the English divisional court held that it was unable to prevent the execution of a Scottish war-

rant in England, even though the fugitive had been brought into England unlawfully.

The approach advocated in this Article would suggest that the English court take a
broader view of its powers.

476. See Regina v. Governor of Pentonville Prison (Ex parte Alves), [1993] App. Cas.
284, 294 (Eng. H.L. 1992); Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. 42, 63 (1993). In Schmidt II,
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Schmidt II emphasizes the residual common law nature of the doctrine of
abuse of process by its holding that the doctrine may be displaced by statute. 47 7 Extradition can no longer be seen as a matter of purely executive

discretion, unguided by rule of law considerations and human rights
norms. 47 8 Rather, it raises two related questions. First, do courts possess
the discretion to determine how individuals come within their jurisdiction?
Second, should a court exercise its discretion to stay proceedings upon a
determination that the domestic executive has acted unlawfully? Those
issues are entirely distinct from the question of whether the individual will
4 79
get a fair trial in the requesting state, itself an important consideration.
It is clearly inappropriate for an extradition judge to exercise the full

jurisdiction of a trial court. 48 0 Yet an extradition judge should possess the

jurisdiction to determine whether the executive abused the process of the
court by securing the presence of a fugitive by unlawful means, and if so, to
48 1
order the return of the fugitive to the state from which he was taken.
Schmidt Ii's denial of any supervisory jurisdiction to the extradition judge
means that the English police could have forcibly abducted Schmidt from
Ireland without affecting his subsequent extradition to Germany because
the English courts would have been powerless to order a stay. That cannot
be right.
Furthermore, where the requesting state is not a signatory to the European Convention on Extradition, its courts may not possess the power 8to2
4
investigate the manner in which a fugitive is brought before them.

Lord Jauncey noted that Lord Griffiths in Bennett II had made reference to Sinclair,

[1991] 2 App. Cas. 64 (Eng. H.L.), without casting aspersions as to its continued vitality.
477. See Walton v. Gardiner, 177 C.L.R. 378, 395 (Austl. 1993). This would not be
the case in Canada, where the doctrine arguably has a constitutional foundation, and

accordingly cannot be excluded by statute.
478. Canada v. Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 518 (Can.) (La Forest, J.) (extradition

subject to Charter scrutiny); id. at 520-21 (Wilson, J.) (same). A recent English decision
indicates that the Home Secretary's discretion under section 12 of the U.K. Extradition
Act of 1989 is amenable to judicial review. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department (Ex Parte Launder), 1996 T.L.R. 603 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l CL).
479. See supra notes 473-74.
480. Argentina v. Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536, 553-54 (Can.).
481. Compare Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison (Ex parte Levin), [1996] 3 W.L.R.

657 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct.) (holding that extradition proceedings are criminal proceedings
for the purposes of the U.K. Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984), with Regina v.

Governor of Belmarsh Prison (Ex parte Francis), [1995] 1 W.L.R. 1121 (Eng. Q.B. Div'1
Ct.) (ruling that magistrates have no discretion to exclude evidence of accomplices on
the grounds of fairness in extradition committal proceedings because section 78 of the
U.K. Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 does not apply).
482. In Bennett II the Law Lords recognized that the courts of some states (notably
the United States, as evidenced by Alvarez-Machain) will not inquire into the manner in
which they obtain jurisdiction. Indeed, so long as there has been no unlawful action by
the domestic authorities, this is the view put forward in Levinge v. Director of Custodial

Services, [1987] 9 N.S.W.L.R. 546 (New S.Wales (Austl.) S. Ct) and Bennett VIII, 1994
S.C.C.R. 902 (H.Cj.). See also Geldof v. Meulemeester and Steffen, 33 I.L.R. 385 (Belg.
Ct. cass. 1961); Extradition (Jurisdiction) Case, 8 Ann. Dig. 348 (Ger. 1936); Extradition
(Germany and Italy) Case, [1929-1930] Ann. Dig. 270 (Ger. Reichsgericht in Crim. Matters) (court in requesting state incompetent to review decision of extraditing state).

Thus, the manner in which the fugitive came into the jurisdiction of the extraditing state
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Indeed, even the courts of some Convention states may not possess this
power. It is perhaps even more significant that many states whose courts
do possess such a power will not exercise it where the domestic executive
has not acted unlawfully. 483 Lord Jauncey's argument that a court of the
requesting state would take into account the manner in which the fugitive
came before it is thus open to some doubt. In Schmidt II, it would seem
unlikely that a German court would stay proceedings against the fugitive in
Germany unless he could show that the German authorities had been
responsible for his allegedly unlawful return to England. The extraditing
court cannot be expected to determine the position which the fugitive
would face before the courts of the requesting state. Given the approach
adopted in this Article, the question is ancillary. The extraditing court
must be concerned with the abuse of its own process, and should not turn
a blind eye when it is alleged that a fugitive is before it only through unlawful executive conduct.
3. Schmidt and Trimbole: A Broader Conception of Abuse of Process
A final consideration is illustrated by Schmidt's subsequent suit in the
Irish courts against the British Home Secretary, the Commissioner of the
Metropolitan Police, and the English detective in his own personal capacity. Schmidt alleged trespass to the person, false imprisonment, conspiracy, and breach of constitutional rights as a result of having been lured to
England from Ireland on false pretences. 4 84 The Irish High Court threw
the case out on the basis that the defendants enjoyed sovereign immunity,
as they were acting in their official capacities in exercising British policy.
Thus, it is evident that abductors who are also state agents are unlikely to
face justice in the injured state due to application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Law Lords' refusal in Schmidt II to admit that the
abuse of process by the domestic executive is relevant to the extradition
process is thus particularly troubling: foreign courts are likely to view acts
by the officials of other states as being beyond their concern. Fugitives will
be the victims of this game of mutual deference. It is accordingly up to the
domestic courts to prevent the domestic authorities from abusing the process of those courts.
The Law Lords' decision in Schmidt II contrasts unfavourably with the
Supreme Court of Ireland's approach in The State (Trimbole) v. The Govermay be beyond the scope of review of the requesting state's court, and is in any event not
attributable to the authorities of the requesting state. See The King v. Hall, 42 D.L.R.
330 (N.S. (Can.) S. Ct. 1918) (court will not review the legality of the U.S. Secretary of
State's decision to surrender the fugitive to Canadian custody).
483. Levinge, [1987] 9 N.S.W.L.R. 546; App. No. 10893/84 v. Germany, 9 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 124, 125 (1985) (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.). Of course, this seems to be the position
of the English courts themselves. Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 62. It is certainly the
Scottish rule. See Bennett VIII, 1994 S.C.C.R. at 902. Bennett VII, [1995] Q.B. 313, was
merely a logical application of Schmidt II.
484. Schmidt v. Home Secretary, [1995] 1 I.L.R.M. 301 (Ir. H. Ct.) [hereinafter
Schmidt III].
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nor of Mountjoy Prison.4 85 In that case, the Australian government sought a
fugitive Australian citizen for offenses committed in Australia. Irish police
arrested him in Ireland under color of legislation intended to protect the
state from overthrow by its enemies. At the time of his arrest, the Irish
government had not yet made an order under the relevant provisions of the
Irish extradition legislation applying that legislation to Australia. The Irish
government made an order applying its extradition legislation to Australia
one day after the fugitive was detained. As such, the Irish authorities had
48 6
arrested him before they had established a legal basis to extradite him.
The fugitive challenged his detention and the attempt to extradite him
to Australia on two bases. First, that his arrest was illegal. Second, that the
Irish authorities had arrested him in a colorable effort to detain him so that
he could be held pending the coming into force of the relevant extradition
order. Both the High Court and the Supreme Court agreed that the illegal
nature of the fugitive's arrest tainted his subsequent detention. They held
that the arrest of the fugitive had been a conscious and deliberate violation
of his constitutional rights, carried out as a precaution to ensure that he
did not leave Ireland before the order applying Irish extradition legislation
to Australia could be put in place. The courts ordered that the fugitive be
released immediately. The Supreme Court concluded that it had a duty to
protect individuals against the invasion of their constitutional rights; to
ensure that individuals whose rights had been violated were restored so far
as possible to the status quo ante; and to ensure that the executive could not
enjoy the fruits of unlawful invasions of the rights of individuals. The
Court followed Mackeson and Hartley in asserting the existence of an inherent supervisory jurisdiction to protect against an abuse of process.
The approach of the Irish courts in Trimbole is more consonant with
the logic of Bennett II than Schmidt II. Trimbole demonstrates a level of
awareness of the need to vindicate domestic constitutional rights and to
ensure that the fruits of domestic executive illegality do not accrue to the
state when it attempts to invoke the process of the courts, whether for a
trial or extradition. It reinforces the conclusion that courts should possess
the power to discharge individuals brought before them by unlawful
means.
VI.

Regulating Transnational Forcible Abduction: What Is the Scope
of the Bennett Principle?

A. Introduction
This section aims to identify principles for the development of the law governing the exercise of the abuse of process jurisdiction in transnational
forcible abduction cases in the post-Bennett II and Schmidt II era. Three
main principles should guide domestic courts in deciding whether to order
a stay of proceedings. First, they should consider whether there has been a
485. 1985 L. 550 (Ir. H. Ct., Ir. S.C.).
486. A similar problem arose in Quinn v. France, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 529 (1995) (Eur.
Ct. H.T).
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violation of customary international law or of an extradition treaty, and
apply the appropriate remedy. Second, human rights considerations
should influence domestic courts. A transnational forcible abduction may
violate international human rights obligations. Moreover, domestic courts
should allow the domestic legal concept of abuse of process to be informed
and influenced by international human rights norms. Finally, domestic
courts must be prepared to supervise extraterritorial executive conduct. In
this way the rule of law is extended to the international plane, executive
unlawfulness is discouraged both at home and abroad, and the proceedings of domestic courts are protected from abuse.
As indicated in the previous section, the Law Lords in Schmidt II put
an interpretive gloss upon their earlier Bennett II decision. Having dismissed Schmidt's appeal on the ground that the High Court did not possess the supervisory jurisdiction to order a stay of the extradition
proceedings for abuse of process, Lord Jauncey, in obiter, considered
whether the facts of Schmidt II would have provided appropriate circumstances for the exercise of such a power had it existed. Clearly, Lord
Jauncey's thoughts on the subject are of direct application to a Bennett scenario, in which the High Court possesses supervisory jurisdiction where a
fugitive has been brought before it to face a criminal trial.
At the divisional court in Schmidt I, Roch, L.,had found the police
conduct at issue to be unobjectionable, or at least not warranting court
intervention. However, Roch, LJ., was of the view that the court would
intervene where there was a "serious abuse of power."4 8 7 By contrast,
Sedley, J., saw coercion which would have brought the case within the Bennett II principle had Schmidt concerned a criminal trial rather than extradition proceedings. Sedley, J., read Bennett II broadly as stating that the
exercise of the inherent supervisory power of the courts was not limited to
cases involving the use of physical coercion by or at the behest of the
domestic authorities. Executive lawlessness, not physical force, was the
critical factor. 4 88 Bennett II outlined a power "to inquire into the circum489
stances by which a person has been brought within the jurisdiction.
Sedley J. continued:
In my judgment what the doctrine of Bennett's case strikes at is an act on the
part of the executive government of the United Kingdom: (a) which violates
the laws of the foreign state, international law or the legal rights of the individual within that state, and thus offends against the principle of comity; (b)
which circumvents extradition arrangements made with that state; (c) which
instead brings the suspect by coercion into the jurisdiction of the United
Kingdom's courts; and (d) but for which the domestic proceedings could not
have been initiated ....
487. Schmidt 1, [1995] 1 App. Cas. 339, 353 (Eng. Q.B. Div'I Ct. 1994).
488. Id. at 356. "The principle will not be confined to cases where there has been an
application of physical force to the person of the detainee in the foreign country, but will
embrace cases where there have been threats or inducements of a serious and grave
nature." Id. at 353 (Roch, J.).
489. Id. at 356.
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In total, the decision of the House of Lords enlarges the concept of
abuse of process to embrace serious abuses of power where it is only by the
abuse of power that legal process has become possible. It articulates the
supervisory obligation of the High Court to maintain the rule of law as
something different from and greater than the maintenance of individual
rules of law. In constitutional terms the decision, it seems to me, is of the
highest importance, establishing 4a90 principle which will take time to be
worked out in our jurisprudence.

The principles set out by Sedley, J., in the divisional court in Schmidt I
provide a useful framework by which domestic courts may determine
whether a transnational forcible abduction warrants the exercise of the
power of the court to order a stay of proceedings to prevent an abuse of
process. I propose to examine each element of this framework in turn. As
a preliminary consideration, it should be recognized that the fugitive bears
the onus of demonstrating on a balance of probabilities that his presence
before the court was acquired unlawfully, such that it would be an abuse of
491
process to allow the trial to proceed.
B.

The Need for Domestic Executive Action

Domestic authorities must act before a judicially cognizable abuse of pro-

cess exists. Domestic executive lawlessness is the essential factor. 49 2 In the
absence of action by the domestic executive there is no unlawfulness sufficient to give rise to a stay of proceedings. 49 3 The abduction must have
been carried out by state agents, either state employees or private individuals working under state direction. 4 94 The distinction between abduction
by state agents and private citizens is important because international
wrongfulness and state responsibility depend upon an agency relationship. 4 95 This distinction may also affect the civil liability of the abductors
490. Id. at 357.
491. Levinge v. Director of Custodial Services, [1987] 9 N.S.W.L.R. 546, 566 (New S.
Wales (Austl.) S. Ct.).

492. Schmidt , [1995] 1 App. Cas. at 356 (Sedley J.), noting that Lord Griffiths in
Bennett If made "not physical force but executive lawlessness the critical factor." This
provides protection against the fraudulent luring of fugitives. See Regina v. Hartley,

[1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 199 (N.Z. C.A.); Levinge, [1987] 9 N.S.W.L.R. at 565 ("before a stay
can be granted the prosecution must have been either a party to the unlawful conduct or
connived at it").
493. Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 77 (Lord Lowry) ("The court here is not concerned with irregularities abroad in which our executive (at any level) was not
involved."). See also Bennett VIII, 1994 S.C.C.R. at 917; Sinclair v. H.M. Advocate, 17 P.
(CL of Sess.) at 41; StockE v. Germany, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 853.
494. In Alvarez-Machain the abductors were Mexican citizens employed by the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Agency. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 605 (C.D.
Cal. 1990), affd sub noma. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir.
1991), reversed,United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). In addition to
state responsibility, constitutional protection in domestic law may depend upon
whether the abductors were state agents. Regina v. Harrer, 128 D.L.R. 4th 98 (Can.
1995).
495. An abduction carried out by state agents is attributable to the state. Velasquez
Rodriguez Case (Merits), 95 I.L.P. 259, 296, 1 170 (Inter-Amer. Ct. Hum. Rts. 1988);
Theodor Meron, InternationalResponsibility of Statesfor UnauthorizedActs of Their Offi-
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under the domestic law of the abducting state. 49 6 The legal position is less
clear where private persons 4 97 are involved or
where the abducting state
4 98
enlists officials of the injured state as agents.
Where a fugitive is abducted from one state and brought to another by
private individuals acting without the knowledge of the latter state, there is
no violation of customary international law. However, there may be a violation of the domestic law of the injured 4 99 or abducting states,50 0 and, of
cials, 33 BRIr. Y.B. INT'L L. 85 (1957); Draft Articles on State Responsibility, [1979] 2 (pt.
1) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 91, arts. 5-8, 11; IAN BROWNUE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS:
STATE REsPONSIBILrY - PART ONE 134.37 (1983). That the state officials may have been
acting ultra vires or without the knowledge of superior officers is unimportant for state
responsibility purposes. See S. v. Ebrahim, [1991] 2 S.A.L.R. 553 (S. Afr. App. Div.)
translated in 95 I.L.R. 417, summarized and translated in 31 l.L.M. 888 (1992); S. v.
Wellem, [1993] 2 S.A.C.R. 19 (E. Cape Div.) (holding state liable for unauthorized police
acts); Draft Articles on State Responsibility, [1980] 2 (pt. 1) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 31, art.
10; Coussirat-Cousttre & Eisemann, supra note 5, at 364-72. Conversely, an abduction
carried out by private actors without state consent or direction is not attributable to the
state. Constance Madeline His Case (1891-1897), in 2 JOHN BASSErr MOORE, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

384-89 (1906). But see Veldsquez Rodriguez (Merits), 95 I.L.R. at

296, 1 172:
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly
imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or
because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the
lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by
the Convention.
A state may also incur responsibility if it fails to exercise due diligence to prevent its
territory from being used to faciliate abductions by private individuals. See BROWNLIE,
supra, at 165-66; Jiminez de Ar~chaga, supra note 193, at 558-61.
496. Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1975) (domestic state agents immune
from civil suit for acts carried out in furtherance of official duties).
497. Jaffe v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304, 307 (11th Cir. 1987) (conduct of bail bondsmen
not attributable to state); SHEARER, supranote 20, at 72 (question "unresolved"); Perry J.
Seaman, InternationalBountyhunting: A Question of State Responsibility, 15 CAL. W. INT'L
LJ. 397 (1985) (arguing that acts of bounty-hunters are attributable to the state which
sets the bounty).
498. Where state A bribes officials of state B to transfer an individual to A, state A
likely incurs state responsibility. O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure, supra note 5, at 303.
499. The abductors may face criminal charges in the injured state. See Regina v. Kear,
51 C.C.C. 3d 574 (Ont. (Can.) C.A. 1989). In addition, the abducted individual would
retain the right to a civil action (for false imprisonment, deceit, assault, etc.) in the
injured state, although this is of questionable benefit given his likely imprisonment in
the prosecuting state. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886); Ebrahim v. Minister
of Law and Order, [19931 2 S.A. 559; Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. 42, 67-68 (1993)
(Lord Bridge); id. at 68 (Lord Oliver, dissenting) (recognizing civil remedy as not
"ideal"); Regina v. O./C. Depot Battalion, R.AS.C. Colchester (Ex parte Elliott), [1949] 1
All E.R. 373, 376 (K.B.); Re Parisot, 5 T.L.R. 344 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1890); Ex parte
Scott, 9 R. & C. 446, 109 Eng. Rep. 166, 176 (K.B. 1829). As well, such suits will likely
be blocked by the doctrine of sovereign immunity when the abductors are agents of a
foreign state. Walker v. Bank of New York, 16 O.R_3d 504 (Ont. (Can.) C.A. 1994), leave
to appeal refused, 19 O.Rt3d xvi (Can. 1994); Schmidt I1, [1995] 1 I.L.R.M. 301 (Ir. H.
Ct).
500. The abducted individual may pursue a civil suit in the abducting state. Jaffe v.
Boyles, 616 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D.N.Y. 1985). The abducted individual may be able to sue
the abducting state for false imprisonment and kidnapping. Drug Agency Is Sued Over
the Kidnapping of a Mexican Doctor,N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1993, at 26 (discussing Alvarez-
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course, a possible violation of international human rights law as well.
Moreover, the action of private abductors, while not initially engaging its
responsibility, may become attributable to a state if subsequently ratified
by it. 50 1 Finally, only state agents are entitled to foreign sovereign immu50 2
nity from prosecution in the injured state.
C. The Action Must Be Illegal
1. Domestic Law
Not specifically mentioned by the Law Lords in Schmidt II (although suggested in Bennett II), a serious violation of domestic law by the executive in
abducting an individual from abroad would weigh strongly in favor of a
stay.50 3 The domestic authorities may well have no statutory authorization
to abduct fugitives from abroad.50 4 Conversely, a technical or relatively
minor violation of domestic law may be insufficient, barring additional
5
considerations, to justify invocation of abuse of process jurisdiction.50
2. The Laws of a Foreign State
The abduction of an individual from a foreign state will almost invariably
violate the criminal law of that state (though not, it seems, in Schmidt II
itself). 50 6 While courts are often reluctant to judge the legality of acts
under foreign law, this concern should not be exaggerated in the forcible
abduction context. First, kidnapping statutes are remarkably similar in
Machain). But see Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203 (domestic state agents immune to
suit alleging transnational forcible abduction from Canada to U.S.).
501. Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.CJ.3, 35 (Iran liable for occupation of U.S. Embassy and consulates due to
its adoption of private acts). See Commentary on I.L.C. Draft Articles, [1974] 2 (pt. 1)
Y.B. Irr'L L. COMM'N 284 (Eichmann, Argoud, Jacob-Salomon cited as examples of the
imputability of the acts of private individuals to a state); DraftArticles on State Responsibility, supra note 9, art. 11 (conduct of persons not acting on behalf of the state); Maurice Bourquin, Crimes et ddlits contre la sfirett des 9tats trangers, 16 RcUnML DES CoUrs
162 (1927-1) (state incurs international responsibility by taking custody of abducted
individual from volunteers); Mann, Reflections, supra: note 5, at 407-08 (same).
502. Walker v. Bank of New York, 16 O.tK 3d 504 (Ont. (Can.) C.A. 1994), leave to
appealrefused, 19 O.tk 3d xvi (Can. 1994) (State Immunity Act immunizes foreign government agents from tort actions arising out of alleged fraudulent inducements to individual to enter U.S. in order to secure his arrest); Jaffe v. Miller, 13 O.tK 3d 745 (Ont.
(Can.) C.A. 1993), leave to appealrefused, 107 D.L.R. 4th vii (Can. 1994) (foreign government agents immune from suit for alleged involvement in and orchestration of kidnapping); Schmidt III, [1995] 1 I.L.R.M. 301 (Ir. H. Ct.) (foreign agents immune from tort
suit arising out of fraudulent luring from country). But see Regina v. Mafart and Prieur,
74 I.L.R. 241 (N.Z. H.C. 1985) (French Rainbow Warriorbombers not entitled to foreign
sovereign immunity).
503. Note that the domestic executive might act in a foreign state in compliance with
the law of that state, yet still violate its own domestic law. FRaN'cis PIGGOTT, EX-RADITioN: A TRtaArISE ON THE LAw RELATNG To FUGrIvE O-raNERas 35 (1910) (although conceding that the male captus bene detenus rule applies to individuals arrested abroad).
504. Greenspan, supra note 373, at 54. It may also be possible to imagine a "good
faith" exception to this element of the test.
505. Regina v. Latif and Shahzad, [1996] 1 W.L.R. 104, 111-13.
506. The Irish High Court, in Schmidt 111, [1995] 1 I.L.R.M. at 301, did not determine
this issue.
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most states. Therefore, the fear of being unable to accurately evaluate and
apply foreign law should not deter a domestic court from determining
whether there has been a prima facie violation of foreign law. Moreover,
liability under foreign or domestic law would not necessarily arise from
such a determination. Rather, the domestic court would only use the violation of foreign law as a threshold for the invocation of the abuse of process
doctrine. Where domestic authorities have violated foreign law in securing
the return of a fugitive from abroad, the domestic court should strongly
consider finding an abuse of process.5 0 7 Note that it must be the acts of
the domestic authorities, and not those of foreign authorities or private
citizens, which violate foreign law.
How then to determine whether there has been a violation of foreign
law? Ideally, a fugitive would be able to advance evidence that the domestic authorities were convicted in the foreign (injured) state of violating its
criminal law. In the majority of cases, however, this will not be possible,
because the domestic authorities will be either immune to suit or not amenable to trial in the foreign state. Courts will thus be forced to rely upon
expert evidence to determine whether the domestic authorities violated foreign law. This should not present undue difficulties: courts in conflict of
laws cases must often interpret and consider foreign law. It must be
emphasized that the domestic court would not be applying foreign law for
the purpose of determining the liability or responsibility of the parties; it
would only be for the purpose of determining whether an abuse of process
has taken place.
The real importance of this factor is that it establishes that the domestic authorities acted extraterritorially. Determining whether the abducting
state acted extraterritorially may be troublesome in some cases, particularly where the agency relationship between the prosecuting state and the
abductors is unclear, where foreign police were involved, or where the individual was lured into the prosecuting state.5 0 8 It is particularly difficult in
cases like Schmidt II, where the domestic authorities do not at first blush
appear to have acted extraterritorially at all.5 0 9 Yet elementary conflict of

laws principles which locate a tort can be of assistance in establishing the

507. Although it should weigh heavily, a violation of foreign law is not necessarily

determinative of the abuse of process question. Regina v. Latif and Shahzad, [1995] 1
Crim. App. 270, 278 (Eng. C.A. 1994) (possible violation of foreign law as part of
scheme to lure drug traffickers to England not an abuse of process of English court).
The House of Lords did not address the issue on appeal. Regina v. Latif and Shahzad,
[1996] 1 W.L.R. 104.
508. Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. 42 (Eng. H.L. 1993) (English police arranged with
South African officials to have individual forcibly deported to England); Schmidt II,
[1995] 1 App. Cas. 339 (Eng. H.L. 1994) (accused lured into England by a ruse communicated to him over the telephone); S. v. Beahan, [1990] 2 S.A.C.R. 59 (Z.), [1992] 1

S.A.C.R. 307 (Z.S.) (fugitive returned to Zimbabwe by Botswanan police).
509. But note that the Irish High Court, in Schmidt III, [1995] 1 I.L.R.M. at 304-05,
had no doubt that the tort in that case (the fraudulent luring of Schmidt from Ireland)
had been committed in Ireland.
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existence of an extraterritorial act on the part of the domestic executive.5 10
Accordingly, one can be said to act in state X even if one remains physically
present in state Y. In the clearest cases, such as Alvarez-Machain, the
abducting state arrests an individual outside its own territorial jurisdiction
and brings him before its domestic courts to face criminal charges. In
most cases, abductions will be from another state's territory, although they
may also take place in international waters 5 11 or airspace.5 12 The key
aspect is that the abducting state must have acted outside its own territory
in some fashion.
In Schmidt II, the English police do not seem to have violated Irish
criminal law.5 13 Moreover, there was no forcible abduction or other physi-

cal act in Ireland by either English or Irish officials.5 14 But it does seem
clear that extradition proceedings were circumvented: because the English
police did not seek to press charages against Schmidt, U.K.-Ireland extradition proceedings could not have been invoked to secure his presence in
England.
At the House of Lords, Lord Jauncey distinguished Schmidt II from
Bennett II on the grounds that there had been no abduction in Schmidt II,
and that the fugitive in Schmidt II had not been forced to come to England.
In his view, the fugitive could simply have chosen to remain in Ireland,
suggesting that Schmidt's decision to come to the United Kingdom was
voluntary. Thus, Lord Jauncey would not have stayed proceedings even if
the court had possessed the supervisory jurisdiction to do so. By implication, Lord Jauncey would not have stayed proceedings against the fugitive
under the Bennett II principle had the fugitive been lured into England in
510. Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd., 43 D.L.R. 3d 239 (Can. 1973); Canadian
Commercial Bank v. Carpenter, 62 D.L.R. 4th 734 (B.C. (Can.) C.A. 1989), leave to

appeal refused, 109 N.R. 21 (Can. 1990) (negligent misrepresentation); Metall und Rohstoff A.G. v. Donaldson Lufldn & Jenrette Inc., [1990] 1 Q.B. 391 (Eng. C.A.) (tort is
located where "in substance" the tort arose); Diamond v. Bank of London and Montreal
Ltd., [1979] Q.B. 333 ( Eng. C.A.) (tort of fraudulent misrepresentation occurs where
representation is received and relied upon). But see Walker v. Bank of New York, 16
O.R.3d at 510 (holding that the plaintiff's injuries did not take place in Canada, which
suggests that the alleged tort did not occur in Canada either).

511. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd, 924 F.2d 1086
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (no protest from Lebanon or Cyprus where Lebanese lured onto a yacht
in international waters and abducted by U.S. agents to face trial for hijacking and
destroying Jordanian airplane in Beirut). See also United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979) (seizure outside 12 mile territorial
sea); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975) (seizure 35 miles from Florida, nearest land was a Bahamian island 11.9 miles
away); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978) (seizure of vessel 200
miles from U.S. coast); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978) (Coast
Guard has authority to search beyond 12-mile limit).
512. For example, the apprehension of the Achille Lauro hijackers in 1985. There the
United States intercepted Palestinians in international airspace and forced them to land
at a NATO base in Italy. Four of the five highjackers were tried and convicted in Italy.
See G.V. Gooding, Fighting Terrorism in the 1980's: The Interception of the Achille Laura
Hijackers, 12 YALEJ. IN 'L L. 158 (1987).
513. Schmidt II, [1995] 1 App. Cas. at 354; the issue was not resolved in Schmidt III,
[1995] 1 I.L.R.M 301.
514. But see Schmidt III, [1995] 1 LL.RM. at 304-05 (torts committed in Ireland).
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order to face a criminal trial there because the police conduct in question
would not have been sufficiently "grave or serious as to warrant intervention."5 15 This was so despite the fact that in Schmidt II there was uncontroverted expert testimony that the acts of the English police amounted to the
tort of deceit under Irish law. 5 16
3. InternationalLaw
Under the rules of international law, domestic courts have clear authority
to find an abuse of process, especially given the existence of a clear customary rule against transnational forcible abduction. There are alternative
bases for this authority: the territorial sovereignty of the foreign state;
treaty obligations, particularly under extradition treaties, owed to the foreign state; human rights duties owed to foreign states; and international
human rights obligations owed directly to individuals. A fugitive should be
permitted to advance evidence that his entrance to a court's jurisdiction
took place in violation of international law. If the fugitive can discharge
this burden, this factor should weigh in favor of a stay of proceedings.
Because the court is examining the legality of the acts of the domestic executive under international law, justiciability concerns will not arise.
4. The Legal Rights of the Individual in the Foreign State
The legal rights of the individual in a foreign state are a function of the civil
law of the foreign state.5 17 The decision as to whether to order a stay
should be influenced by a finding that the domestic authorities violated the
rights of the fugitive under foreign civil law. Conflict of laws cases routinely deal with this sort of question, so it should not create problems for
domestic courts in the present context. In Schmidt II,
for example, the fugitive asserted that his right to liberty and right to access to the courts under
Irish constitutional law had been violated. In large measure, then, domestic courts should be concerned with violations of the fugitive's rights and
reasonable expectations under foreign civil law. Individual rights under
foreign civil law could also have constitutional or international human
rights dimensions.
D. State Action Must Circumvent Extradition Relations With the
Foreign State
In many forcible abduction cases the executive illegality at issue is the circumvention of extradition relations with the foreign state from which the
fugitive was abducted. As noted above, there can be little doubt that this
question formed a central element of the grounds for decision in Bennett II
and was also an important consideration in Levinge and Fan. Bennett II
supports the proposition that where an extradition treaty or relationship
515. Schmidt II, [1995] 1 App. Cas. at 379.

516. Id. at 358; see also Schmidt III, [1995] 1 I.L.I.M. 301 (torts of trespass to the
person, false imprisonment, breach of constitutional rights, conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of free movement).
517. Schmidt III, [1995] 1 I.L.R.M. 301.
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exists, requests by the domestic authorities for the return of a fugitive from
a foreign state must be made pursuant to the treaty or existing processes.
But what of forcible abduction where no extradition proceedings have been
circumvented? Cases in which there is no operative extradition treaty
(Driver, Liangsiriprasert,Latif and Shahzad, perhaps Bennett II itself),
where there is no functioning extradition relationship (Mackeson), or
where extradition is unavailable because the individual has committed no
extradition offense (Schmidt II), present a particular problem, because the
Law Lords in Bennett II placed a premium upon the determination that
extradition proceedings had been circumvented. 5 18 Does the Bennett II
rule apply where no extradition treaty was circumvented? The Law Lords
expressly declined to decide this point in Bennett II itself. Roch, L.J.'s, balancing in Schmidt I was made "against the background that no legal process existed whereby the presence of the applicant could have been secured
from Eire within this jurisdiction."5 19 Extradition was simply unavailable.
A domestic court must take into consideration any violation of customary international law in determining whether a stay of proceedings is
appropriate. It is self-evident that an individual could not have a treaty
right not to be expelled from a state not a party to a valid extradition treaty
with the state seeking the individual's return or capture. 520 Moreover,
where there is no extradition treaty to circumvent, there can be no unlawfulness per se in having the domestic authorities request that the fugitive be
deported to them by the asylum state.5 2 1 Indeed, the unlawfulness identified in Bennett II seems to rest upon the circumvention of regular extradition arrangements.
But courts should not rely too heavily upon extradition treaties.
Under closer scrutiny, Bennett II suggests that in the absence of an extradition treaty abduction should not remain beyond the scope of the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts. Instead, customary international law and
international human rights law must both play roles. Circumvention of
extradition arrangements should be viewed as a sufficient but not necessary instance of executive unlawfulness. It is merely a common and obvious example of unlawful activity on the part of the domestic executive.
Provided that the other elements of the test are also made out, a stay
should be ordered when extradition arrangements have been circumvented.
However, even in the absence of treaty circumvention, a stay of proceedings should be ordered where other factors establish sufficient unlawful
522
activity on the part of the domestic executive.
518. Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 62 (Lord Griffiths); Schmidt 1, [1995] 1 App.
Cas. at 362 ("[Tlhe use of subterfuge must not be such as to violate the rule of law by
substituting coercion for established extradition procedures.") (Sedley, J.). See Regina v.
Hartley, [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 199 (N.Z. C.A.).
519. Schmidt UI,
[1995] 1 App. Cas. at 354.
520. United States v. Bowe, [1990] 1 App. Cas. 500, 525-27 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Bahamas C.A.).
521. Barton v. Commonwealth, 131 C.L.R. 477 (Ausdl. 1974).

522. In Regina v. Latif and Shahzad, [1996] 1 W.L.R. 104 (Eng. H.L. 1995), the Law
Lords did not suggest that the abuse of process doctrine was inapplicable because there
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Abduction has been presented as a legitimate option of "last
resort."5 23 If extradition proceedings are unavailable, or the foreign state
refuses to extradite despite treaty obligations, it is suggested that abduction
is justified as a residual self-help measure. Indeed, it has been argued that
Alvarez-Machain itself was such a case.5 2 4 States are understandably frus-

trated by their inability to obtain the custody of fugitives through lawful
channels. Though the impulse to adopt self-help remedies can be overwhelming, it must be resisted. Transnational forcible abduction is unlawful as a self-help measure. The requesting state may always make a claim
against the requested state for a breach of an extradition treaty. Indeed,
though its success is unlikely, the requesting state could seek a Security
Council resolution requiring the return of the fugitive.5 25 Otherwise, a
transnational forcible abduction cannot be justified where there are
grounds under an extradition treaty for a refusal to extradite. The test for
ordering a stay of proceedings should have the effect of requiring the
domestic authorities of the requesting state to exhaust all local remedies in
the requested state before abducting a fugitive.
Moreover, a state's refusal to extradite is often more complicated than
it may first appear. As discussed above, many foreign states do not extradite their own nationals.5 26 But such states may prosecute domestically,
and extradition treaties with such states commonly provide that the price
of a state's decision not to extradite a national is to prosecute that national
domestically.5 27 Extradition treaties often provide for grounds upon
which a requested state can decline to comply with an extradition request.
When a treaty grants the requested state the right to refuse to extradite, the
requesting state can hardly complain if the requested state chooses to exercise that right.
E. Bringing the Individual Within the Jurisdiction of the Domestic
Courts by Coercion
The focus here is upon what constitutes "coercion" for the purpose of
invoking the abuse of process doctrine in the transnational forcible abduction context. Schmidt I suggests that there are cases which do not involve
the use of force, but which may still amount to an overbearing of the will of
the fugitive. To this end it may prove difficult to distinguish the forcible
abduction of a fugitive from the coerced or fraudulent luring of a fugitive
was no extradition treaty between Pakistan and the United Kingdom. Rather, the Law
Lords held that the doctrine did not apply on the facts because the executive conduct at
issue was unobjectionable.
523. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 6, at 977-79; Fletcher, supra note 5, at 236; Gurulk,
supra note 7, at 490-91.
524. Gurulk, supra note 7, at 460.
525. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of
America), 1992 LCJ. 114 (Apr. 14).
526. Supra note 20.
527. E.g., U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, art. 9.
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into a jurisdiction.5 2 8 Force and fraud should be viewed as being on a
continuum of coercion.5 29 While abduction by force will almost certainly
create a strong presumption in favour of issuing a stay, the status of an
abduction by fraud is less dear. As the Privy Council recognized in Liangsiriprasert,530 the police must be accorded a certain leeway to combat
sophisticated international criminal activity through the use of ruses and
tricks. 53 1 The real question is how far the police may go before their con-

duct becomes objectionable.
At one extreme is the situation where the domestic police exercise
extreme duress upon a fugitive, such as threatening to harm the fugitive or
the fugitive's family, so that he enters the country where he would not
otherwise have done so. Such conduct is dearly objectionable under the
Bennett II rule as interpreted in Schmidt 1.532 At the other extreme are
cases where the fugitive is lured into the jurisdiction by the promise of
gain, as in Liangsiriprasert,where the fugitives entered Hong Kong to pick
up payment for drug shipments of their own free will "not because of any
unlawful conduct of the authorities but because of their own criminality
and greed." 53 3 In such cases, it cannot be said that the police exercised
528. See Re Hudson and the Queen, 1 O.k 2d 206 (Ont. (Can.) H.CJ. 1974); Colunje
(Pan. v. U.S.), [1933] 6 RI.A.A. 342 (U.S.-Pan. Gen. Claims Comm'n); Schmidt II, [1995]
1 App. Cas. at 362; Liangsiriprasert v. United States, [1991] 1 App. Cas. 225, 231 (P.C.
1990) (appeal taken from Hong Kong C.A.); Stock6 v. Germany, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 834
(1991) (Eur. Ct. H.R-). Bourquin, supra note 501, at 121, 156-58.
529. Schmidt 1, [1995] 1 App. Cas. at 359 (Sedley, J.) ("What is objectionable about
fraud, actual or constructive, is that it robs the victim of the power of autonomous decision and action as surely as does physical coercion."); Walker v. Bank of New York, 15
O.R. 3d at 602-03; S v. Wellem, [1993] 2 S.A.C.R. 19, 31 (E. Cape Div.). But see Bush,
supra note 6, at 979 (arguing that fraud is acceptable, but force may not be). See also
civil cases discussed supra note 23.
530. Liangsiriprasert v. United States, [1991] 1 App. Cas. 225 (Thai defendants
agreed to sell heroin in Thailand to U.S. D.E.A. agent for export to United States. American agents lured defendants to Hong Kong, ostensibly to collect payment, where they
were arrested upon arrival. United States sought their extradition. Defendants could
not have been extradited from Thailand to the United States because relevant extradition
treaty made no provision for drug offences. The Judicial Committee held that it was not
an abuse of process to allow the defendants to be extradited after having been lured into
Hong Kong.).
531. Id. at 243.
If the courts were to regard the penetration of a drug dealing organisation by the
agents of a law enforcement agency and a plan to tempt the criminals into a
jurisdiction from which they could be extradited as an abuse of process it would
indeed be a red-letter day for the drug barons.
Id. Compare Lord Jauncey in Schmidt II, [1995] 1 App. Cas. at 380 (Noting that
Schmidt faced multiple drug trafficking charges in Germany: "To bring such a person to
justice the police and other drug enforcement agencies may from time to time have to
tempt him to enter their fief.") (emphasis added). Accord, Regina v. Latif and Shahzad,
[1996] 1 W.L.R. 104, 111-13 (Eng. H.L. 1995).
532. Schmidt 1, [1995] 1 App. Cas. at 353. See S. v. Wellem, [1993] 2 S.A.C.R- at 31
(accused lured into South Africa by "craft and cunning").
533. Liangsiriprasert,[1991] 1 App. Cas. at 243; United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp.
896 (D.D.C. 1988), affd, 924 F.2d 1086 (fugitive lured into international waters by
promise of lucrative drug deal). In the domestic context, see Regina v. Christou, [1992]
Q.B. 979 (Eng. C.A.) (evidence gathered from shop set up by police to trap those selling
stolen merchandise not excluded). In the international context, see Regina v. Latif and
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duress upon the fugitives.
Schmidt II presents a case between these poles. There was evidence
that the fugitive did come to England on a semi-regular basis for business
purposes, and this likely influenced Lord Jauncey's view that the fugitive
had not been coerced into coming to England. The fugitive argued, and
Sedley, J., in the divisional court agreed, that "but for" the ruse he would
not have entered the country, and thus the jurisdiction of the English court
was based on fraud. What made the ruse objectionable, in Sedley, J.'s,
view, was that the fugitive had been threatened with serious adverse consequences-i.e., arrest upon his next visit to the United Kingdom-if he did
not come to the United Kingdom to meet with English authorities. In such
circumstances the English police knew "that this was an offer that the
applicant could not refuse."5 3 4 Sedley, J.'s, primary objection was not to a
ruse per se, but to the degree of duress which this particular ruse
involved. 535 He also objected to that fact that the fraud violated Irish law.
Sedley, J., would allow the police to tempt or lure a fugitive into the jurisdiction by appealing to his greed, but not to coerce or threaten the fugitive
with adverse consequences.
LordJauncey took a different view. He saw the police ruse in Schmidt
II as more akin to that at issue in Liangsiriprasertthan that in Bennett II:
"At the very worst, he was tricked into coming to England but not
coerced." 5 36 This Article is inclined to side with Lord Jauncey on this
point. Police conduct like that in Schmidt II should probably be found
acceptable and should not give rise to the operation of the abuse of process
doctrine, but the police should not be allowed to go much further. It is
important to note that fraudulent luring is not a customary international
law violation,5 3 7 although it may be a violation of international human
rights obligations. 53 8 Clearly, much depends upon the nature of the fraud.
The force-fraud distinction has been supported on the basis of policy
arguments, namely, that fraud does not violate the territorial sovereignty of
foreign states, and does not present the risk of violence to the fugitive or
third parties.5 39 While the latter point may be accurate, it is not determiShahzad, [1996] 1 W.L.R. 104 (no abuse of process to lure defendant into England by
deceit as part of a drug trafficking scheme).
534. Schmidt 1, [1995] 1 App. Cas. at 358.
535. Id. Sedley, J., also suggested that the deception in Schmidt likely violated Irish
civil law. Id. at 357-59. The Irish High Court in Schmidt III, [1995] 1 I.L.R.M. 301, 30405 (Ir. H. CL), held that the conduct of the English officials was tortious, but that they
were protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
536. Schmidt II, [1995] 1 App. Cas. at 379.
537. Coussirat-Coustre & Eisemann, supra note 5, at 353. But see Mann, Reflections,
supra note 5, at 408-09 (arguing that fraudulent luring by a state or its agent(s) is an

international law violation). See Ex parte Brown, 28 F. 653 (N.D.N.Y. 1886) (holding
that court's jurisdiction unaffected where fugitive lured into U.S. from Canada by false
statements); Ex partePonzi, 290 S.W. 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 1926) (defendant lured from

Italian vessel in New Orleans and arrested, but luring and arrest not attributable to
government); In re Hartnett, 1 O.t 2d 206 (Ont. (Can.) H.CJ. 1973); Colunj6 (Pan. v.
U.S.), [1933] 6 R.I.A.A. 342 (U.S.-Pan. Gen. Claims Coun'n).
538. Stocke v. Germany, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 834 (1991) (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
539. Bush, supra note 6, at 979.
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native of the issue. Further, the former point is simply untrue. According
to conflict of laws rules, a fraud perpetrated upon a person located in a
foreign state occurs in that state. 540 Although fraud is not strictly
equivalent to sending police agents into the territory of a foreign state, it
still amounts to a wrong committed by domestic authorities in that foreign
state.
United States v. Wilson presents an extreme example of fraudulent
inducement. 54 ' In Wilson, the fugitive was lured by U.S. agents into the
Dominican Republic through false representations. Upon his arrival, local
authorities placed him on a commercial flight to the United States, where
he was arrested upon arrival. In the view of the court, because "Wilson was
the victim of a non-violent trick," the case did not provide grounds for
deviation from the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine.5 42 But the presence or absence of
viblence should not be the litmus test of the legality of a fraudulent inducement. It certainly is not for Canadian domestic kidnapping jurisprudence.5 43 The key question is the degree of duress imposed by the police
upon the fugitive: the greater the duress, the more likely it is that a stay
will be appropriate.
F.

Forcible Abduction as the Source of Domestic Jurisdiction

A final element of the proposed test is one of causation. In order to secure
a stay, the fugitive must demonstrate that she would not have been amenable to the jurisdiction of the domestic courts but for unlawful executive
acts. 544 The test is simply one of "but for" causation. It seems clear (as
counsel for the accused in Driver conceded) 545 that there is no abuse of
process, and no rationale for a stay of proceedings, where a fugitive enters
a jurisdiction voluntarily. This is explored in the next section.
540. Schmidt III, [1995] 1 I.L.RtM. at 304-05. See discussion of this point at text

accompanying notes 508-10.
541. 732 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1984).
542. Id. at 411. See also Charron v. United States, 412 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1969)
(Court's jurisdiction unaffected where the defendant was lured into jurisdiction by

fraud. Defendant flew from Toronto to Mexico City via Detroit. The defendant alleged
that upon his arrival, Mexican officials (at the instigation of the United States) refused
him permission to remain and sent him back to Toronto, again via Detroit. He was

induced to leave the plane in Detroit and was arrested there.).
543. See, e.g., Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-46, sec. 279 (Can.); Regina v. Johnson, 65 N.S.R. 2d 54 (Nova Scottia (Can.) C.A. 1984), leave to appeal refused, 67 N.S.R.

2d 180 (Can. 1985); Regina v. Metcalfe, 10 C.C.C. 3d 114 (B.C. (Can.) C.A. 1983), leave
to appealrefused, 54 N.R.320 (Can. 1984); Regina v. Brown, 8 C.C.C. 2d 13 (Ont. (Can.)

C.A. 1972). In England, see Regina v. D., [1984] App. Cas. 778, 800 (Eng. H.L.) (either
force or fraud provides an essential element to kidnapping).
544. This element stems directly from Bennett If.
According to SedleyJ.: "The last of
these requirements, a 'but for' test of causation, emerges dearly from the language used
by Lord Bridge, at p. 68 and Lord Lowry, at p. 76, and is implicit in the reasoning of
Lord Griffiths." Schmidt 1, [1995] 1 App. Cas. at 334. Also, Lord Lowry in Bennett II,
[1994], 1 App. Cas. at 76, argued that the very reason that unlawful acts by the executive
constituted an abuse of process was that "they are the indispensible foundation for the
holding of the trial."
545. Regina v. Plymouth Magis. Ct (Ex parte Driver), [1986] Q.B. 95, 82 Crim. App.
85, 94 (Q.B. Div'I Ct. 1985).
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1. The Individual Voluntarily EntersJurisdiction
Where a fugitive consents to return to the jurisdiction seeking to prosecute
him, the causation element of the proposed test is not satisfied, and a stay
of proceedings should generally not be ordered.5 4 6 This would also
include cases in which the fugitive has waived the benefit of formal extradition proceedings.5 47 But a stringent approach to consent should be
adopted. The South African cases on informed consent suggest an analogy
with waiver of rights in domestic constitutional law, and emphasize that
such waiver is valid only when the fugitive is informed of the consequences
of waiver.5 48 Waiver must thus be clear and informed. In cases of ambiguity, recognition of a waiver should be denied.
The legal standards which determine whether a stay of proceedings
will be granted in cases of transnational forcible abduction should discourage informal rendition even in circumstances where it is not in itself unlawful. The rights of a fugitive are more likely to be violated when he is
returned for trial by informal means, outside the scope of the procedural
protections offered by formal extradition arrangements.
While lack of consent to forego formal extradition processes should be
a factor in the stay equation, the fact that the fugitive did consent cannot
cure what would otherwise be unlawful extraterritorial activity by domestic
police.5 4 9 The police possess a certain jurisdictional competence under
domestic law which cannot be expanded or rendered immune from judicial supervision by the consent of third parties. Thus, the fact that foreign
authorities may have consented to or even aided in the forcible abduction
of a fugitive by domestic authorities will not render lawful that activity
where it is prohibited by domestic law.
2.

Where the Individual Returns to the Jurisdiction Through Unplanned or
Unintended Events

The causation element of the proposed test is not satisfied where the fugitive's presence in the jurisdiction is fortuitous. For example, suppose that
Bennett had decided to take a trip to New York from South Africa, unaware
of the fact that his flight would travel via Heathrow, and he was arrested by
546. Accord Regina v. Fan, 98 F.L.R. 119 (N.S.W. (Austl.) 1989); Judgment of July 1,
1966 (Kote, Mazeli et Noujaim), Cour d'Appel de Paris, 56 REv. Carr. DE DR. INT'L PRivE

163 (1967) (fugitive returned voluntarily from Switzerland to France).
547. A fugitive who agrees to return to the requesting state voluntarily and waive an

applicable extradition treaty does not benefit from the procedural protections of the
treaty, such as the specialty principle. Regina v. Gagnon, 117 C.C.C. 61 (Que. (Can.) S.
Ct. 1957); Regina v. Liberty, [1930] 1 D.L.R. 892 (Alta. (Can.) S. Ct. App. Div. 1929);
Regina v. Flannery, [1923] 3 D.L.R. 689 (Alta. (Can.) S. Ct. App. Div.) (although refusing
to remit the case for a new trial on a nonextraditable offense). See also United States v.
DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 211-12 (2d Cir. 1987).
548. S. v. Buys, [1994] 1 S.A. 539 (O.F.S.); S. v. Wellem, [1993] 2 S.A.C.R. 19 (E. Cape
Div.). See Regina v. Borden, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145, 162 (Can.); LAFAVE, supra note 29, at
148.
549. Wellem, [1993] 2 S.A.C.R. at 30.
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English police at Heathrow. 550 Similarly, suppose that he intended to fly
to Ireland, but that due to bad weather his airplane was forced to land in
England. In both cases he could be validly arrested and tried in England
for offenses committed there. 5 5 1 However, the picture is very different
where the fugitive has been deliberately misled.55 2 Where the presence of
fugitive has been accomplished only because of the domestic authorities'
deception, that presence may not be considered fortuitous. An inquiry into
how the fugitive was tricked into coming into the jurisdiction must be
made. If the fugitive was threatened with adverse consequences, her presence is unlikely to be considered voluntary. Conversely, if she was lured
into the jurisdiction by the prospect of gain, her consent cannot (without
more) be challenged.
3. JurisdictionThrough DeportationWithout IrregularAction by the Police
of the Receiving State
The causation test is satisfied by the fugitive only when the domestic
authorities have acted unlawfully. The mere fact that a fugitive has been
returned to the jurisdiction through a deportation which is unlawful under
foreign law cannot in itself amount to an abuse of process, even when
extradition might have been available. 55 3 Rather, there must be evidence
of action taken by domestic authorities to circumvent formal extradition
procedures,5 5 4 and the fugitive cannot rely upon a violation of foreign law
by foreign authorities alone.5 5 5 There must be evidence of unlawfulness
550. Cf. Walker v. Bank of New York, 15 O.R. 3d 596 (Ont. (Can.) Gen. Div. 1993),
rev'd on other grounds, 16 O.R. 3d 504 (Ont. (Can.) C.A. 1994). The plaintiff was
arrested in New York as part of a U.S. Treasury Department "sting" operation. He

alleged that he had been given an airplane ticket to fly from Canada to the Bahamas, but
did not realize until he was on the airplane that there would be a stopover in New York.
For an alternative explanation of the case, see Janet Walker, Immunity for Extraterritorial
Enforcement Measures in Canada: The Supreme Court Declines to Decide, 1 CAN. INT'L
LAwYam 17 (1994).
551. Cf. Nkondo v. Minister of Police, [1980] 2 S.A.L.R. 894 (O.P.D.).
552. Walker, 15 O.R. 3d 596; Stocke v. Germany, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 839.
553. Stevenson v. United States, 381 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1967) (finding no violation of
U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty where defendant deported from Mexico to United States
because deportation not initiated by United States); Bennett VIII, 1994 S.C.C.R. at 921;

Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. 42 (Eng. H.L. 1993) (Lord Lowry) ('The court here is not
concerned with irregularities abroad in which our executive (at any level) was not

involved. . ."); Sinclair v. H.M. Advocate, 17 R. (CL of Sess.) 38 (CJ. 1890).
554. Judgment of Dec. 22, 1988 (Amedien), Cass. Crim., 93 REv. GEN. DE DR. Ir'L
PUB. 696 (Fr. 1987) (not allowing a challenge to the court's jurisdiction where defendant
was returned to France via informal rendition, but noting that disguised extradition with
the participation of the domestic police would ground a jurisdictional challenge, partic-

ularly if an extradition treaty was breached in the process); Bi is.sz-, supra note 28, at
279.
555. Otherwise, foreign officials would be subjected to domestic legal and constitutional standards for acts carried out within their own territory. See United States v.
Pelaez, 930 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1991) (defendant sent to U.S. from Columbia, but with-

out involvement of U.S. officials); United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1975)
(defendant expelled from Mexico to United States where U.S. officials were waiting for

him at border); United States v. Hamilton, 460 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1972) (fugitive
returned to United States by Canadian border officials; alleged illegality of return under
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on the part of the domestic executive, usually evidence that the violation of
foreign law came at the instigation of the domestic authorities.5 56 Proof of
actual intention on the part of the domestic authorities to circumvent extradition porceedings may not be required, however.55 7 It may be sufficient
to demonstrate that the domestic authorities were ambivalent or unconcerned as to whether extradition proceedings have been circumvented, i.e.,
acting with willful blindness. Thus, rendition without extradition by forbut the same at the
eign authorities to the requesting state is acceptable,
558
instigation of the domestic authorities is not.

However, it is important to specify exactly what is meant by "at the
instigation of the domestic authorities." The mere fact that the domestic
authorities have made inquiries about a fugitive in a foreign state should
not be considered "instigation."5 59 Neither should the fact that the foreign
authorities have advised domestic officials that they intend to deport 5an
60
individual to the latter state be taken as proof of a disguised extradition.
Canadian law did not affect U.S. court's jurisdiction); Wentz v. United States, 244 F.2d
172 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 806 (1958) (fugitive deported from Mexico to
United States; no violation of Mexican or U.S. law by U.S. officials); S. v. Beahan, [1990]
2 S.A.C.R. 59 (Z.), [1992] 1 S.A.C.R. 307 (Z.S.) (no violation of international law to
receive deported individual and prosecute him). See also Altmann (Barbie) v. France,
App. No. 10689/83, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 225, 233 (1984).
556. See Levinge v. Director of Custodial Services, [1987] 9 N.S.W.L.R. 546 (New S.
Wales (Austl.) S. Ct.); Regina v. Hartley, [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 199 (C.A.); Mackeson v. Minister of Information, Immigration and Tourism, [1980] 1 S.A. 747 (Z.R.). See BLAKESLEY,
supra note 28, at 279.
557. Regina v. Keyowski, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 657 (Can.) (no willful misconduct required
to invoke abuse of process doctrine).
558. There is no violation of international law if a state voluntarily yields an individual for rendition to another state, even if the rendition violates the domestic law of the
yielding state. See Savarkar Case (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 275 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1911). Similarly, domestic courts will not divest themselves of jurisdiction in such
circumstances. Katz v. Officer Commanding the Polish Military Prison, Jerusalem, 12
Ann. Dig. 165 (1944) (Deserter apprehended by Palestine civil police and handed over to
Polish military authorities rather than brought before civil court; court's jurisdiction
unaffected by manner in which applicant came before it.). See also The King v. Hall, 42
D.L.R. 330 (N.S. (Can.) 1918); Regina v. Murrell, 40 C.C.C. 298 (Ont. (Can.) Sup. Ct.
1924); Bennett VIII, 1994 S.C.C.R. 902 (H.CJ. 1994); S v. Rosslee, [1994] 2 S.A.C.R. 441
(C.) (fugitive deported to South Africa from Namibia at request of South African authorities). The situation may be different if the would-be extraditing state is party to an international human rights treaty. See Giry v. Dominican Republic, 95 I.L.R. 321 (U.N.
H.R.C. 1990); Soering v. U.K., 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 439 (1989) (extradition of
individual to state where he faces the death penalty is prohibited by European
Convention).
559. It has been claimed that the distinction between initiation and co-operation is
too murky to provide a useful standard. See Colin Warbrick, IrregularExtradition, PUB.
L. 269, 273 (1983). Also unhelpful as a standard for "instigation" is whether domestic
authorities merely requested the fugitive's return, see App. No. 10893/84 v. Germany, 9
Eur. H.R. Rep. 124, 125 (1987) (Commission report), unless the request is ultra vires or
specifically prohibited under domestic law, as in S. v. Wellem, [1993] 2 S.A.C.R. 19
(E.C.D.). See also Lira, 515 F.2d at 71; Bennett VIII, 1994 S.C.C.R. at 921.
560. United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Lira, 515
F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Degollado, 696 F. Supp. 1136 (S.D. Tex. 1988);
Bennett VIII, 1994 S.C.C.R. 902; Regina v. Guildford Magis. Ct. (Ex parte Healy), [1983]
1 W.L.R. 108 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1982).
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Admittedly, the distinction between deportation and disguised extradition
may at times prove to be very fine. There are terrible difficulties in determining whether domestic officials have "instigated" action by foreign
authorities or merely "co-operated" with them.5 6 1 Nonetheless, there is a
clear conceptual distinction between co-operation and agency, even though
it is not always obvious in practice. In most cases it will be difficult for a
fugitive to prove such "instigation," as the sort of documentary evidence
relied upon in the subsequent proceedings in Bennett III (internal memoranda, etc.) are likely to be both rare and difficult to gain access to. Moreover, as the Bennett litigation demonstrates, such evidence is often
amenable to multiple interpretations. However, a bare assertion of "disguised extradition" is easily made by a fugitive, and courts should in general insist that fugitives advance clear evidence of connivance or instigation
by the domestic executive in order to stay proceedings. But courts should
not hesitate to draw inferences from executive behaviour in appropriate
circumstances.5 6 2 Indeed, in some circumstances, willful blindness on the
part of domestic authorities as to the legality of the rendition of a fugitive
may be sufficient.5 63 In the end, much will depend upon the willingness of
domestic courts to make such determinations.
G. Other Factors
Commentators5 64 suggest three additional factors which should influence
a court's decision regarding a stay order:5 65 the use of violence in the rendition, whether the police acted in "circumstances of emergency," and the
seriousness of the offense.
1.

Whether Violence Was Used in the Rendition

It is suggested that if the fugitive was brought into the jurisdiction by
561. Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); BarbieJudgment of Oct. 6, 1983, Cass.
crim., 78 I.L.R. 125 (Fr.) (court's jurisdiction not affected by tacit agreement of French
officials to "receive" Barbie upon his deportation from Bolivia to French Guyana and
then fly him to France to face charges of crimes against humanity. Fugitive could not
advance allegations of disguised extradition, which involved violation of an extradition
treaty, because there was no extradition treaty between France and Bolivia.). Barbie, 706
F. Supp. at 128. The fugitive's subsequent application to the European Commission for
Human Rights was declared inadmissible. Altmann (Barbie) v. France, App. No. 10689/
83, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 225 (1984).

562. S. v. Ebrahim, 95 LL.R. 417, 424 (1992) (drawing the inference that the abductors were agents of the South African government). See also Bennett II, [1994] 1 App.

Cas. at 77 (Lord Lowry) (noting that "[i]n practice, the transporting of a wanted man to
the United Kingdom from elsewhere (by whatever method) will nearly always take place
in consequence of a request by the executive here"). But see Healy, [1983] 1 W.L.R. at
113 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct.).
563. Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 62.

564. Bush, supra note 6, at 980-81; Choo, International Kidnapping, supra note 8, at
631.
565. See the rules governing the exclusion of evidence in Canada (Regina v. Collins,

[1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (Can.)) and Australia (Bunning v. Cross, 141 C.L.R. 54 (Aust.
1978)). See also Regina v. Smurthwaite and Gill, [1994] 1 All E.R. 898 (Eng. C.A.) (outlining "balancing" approach to the exclusion of evidence in England under section 78 of
the U.K. Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984).
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means of violence, "this would weigh heavily in favour of a stay."56 6 Violence in a rendition on the part of the domestic authorities should be considered a primafacie ground for ordering a stay of prosecution. But this
rule will resolve only a few relatively easy cases; violence is merely an indicator of extreme lawlessness.
A major concern (as the Law Lords recognized in Bennett II) about
reliance upon violence as a factor in the abuse of process equation is that it
will make the use of physical force a prerequisite for the finding that an
abduction was illegal. This might lead courts to take the route established
by the U.S. federal courts after Toscanino, declining to order stays unless
the evidence established extreme violence on the part of the police. This
Article contends that the issue of violence is often a red herring. Many
transnational forcible abductions do not involve much violence. For example, limited violence was used in Alvarez-Machain, while hardly any violence at all was used in Bennett, Hartley, and Schmidt. But it cannot be

suggested that the degree of violence itself should have dictated the results
of those cases. Violence should be viewed as a sufficient but not necessary
factor in establishing the illegality of an abduction. Where an abduction
involves violence, the court should order a stay of proceedings, so long as
the other elements of the Bennett II equation are made out. But a court
should be able to order a stay on the basis of other factors, even where no
violence was present.
2.

Whether the Police Acted in "Circumstances of Emergency"

It is contended that circumstances of necessity should be considered a mitigating factor in determining whether the abuse of process doctrine should
be invoked. But it is unclear what is meant by an "emergency" in the context of a forcible abduction: the term seems to imply "force majeure" or
another "circumstance precluding wrongfulness." 5 67 While states should
be able to invoke necessity in extreme circumstances, the scope of such a
doctrine should be confined to the definition of a "circumstance precluding wrongfulness" under international law. The invention of an "emergency" should not involve a subjective determination on the part of the
domestic executive itself, but should instead be amenable to judicial examination. Otherwise, the emergency factor seems amenable to infinitely elastic and expedient definition. Transnational forcible abduction is not likely
to be a common method of returning fugitives from abroad, and the danger
is that its relative rarity could be used to justify any situation in which it is
employed as being an "emergency." The circumstances in which an emergency or necessity doctrine may be properly invoked must be very narrowly circumscribed.

566. Choo, International Kidnapping, supra note 8, at 631.

567. The concept of a "circumstance precluding wrongfulness" in the law of state
responsibility is discussed supra note 149.
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The Seriousness of the Offense

It is also argued that the more serious the alleged offense, the less appropriate it is that a stay should be ordered. Conduct on the part of the
domestic authorities amounting to an abuse of process in the case of a
lesser offense might not amount to such an abuse where the alleged offense
was more serious. There was no explicit mention of this factor in Bennett II
itself, although it might be implied from Lord Lowry's suggestion that not
every "venial irregularity" should result in a stay.5 68 Roch, LJ., in Schmidt I
did consider it a factor, however.5 6 9 It emerges more dearly from cases
such as Eichmann. In part, this factor will be tied into the "emergency"
there has been an
factor, because an emergency will only arise where
5 70
offense of the highest gravity, or the threat thereof.
The most difficult cases will involve threats to national security,
offenses against universally accepted principles, and war crimes. The possible existence of an "Eichmann" exception, canvassed above, may play a
role, although the requirement that the abducting state have exhausted all
possible routes to secure the fugitive's return by normal processes should
be stringently upheld by the courts of the abducting state. It should also
be noted that states are generally under treaty obligations to prosecute or
extradite for many offenses against universally accepted principles. The
more serious the offense and the potential consequences of a conviction for
that offense, the more strictly courts should demand that the government
adhere to procedural protections in apprehending the defendant. Because
transnational forcible abduction (which is both expensive and likely to
have adverse political consequences abroad) 5 71 is unlikely to be used other
than in cases involving serious offenses, the usefulness of the "seriousness"
factor is limited: it will be present in the majority of transnational forcible
5 72
abduction cases. Nonetheless, it may still be employed as a factor.
Conclusion
Domestic courts must accept their role as agents of the international legal
system. This role requires them to determine whether a particular transnational forcible abduction has violated international law. If it has, a domestic court is under an international and domestic legal duty to order a stay
of proceedings against the fugitive and to order his return to the state from
which he was abducted. Moreover, the domestic court must determine
568. Bennett II, [1994] 1 App. Cas. at 77. See also Regina v. Latif and Shahzad, [1996]
1 W.L.R. at 113 ("Realistically, any criminal behavior of the customs officer was venial
compared to that of Shahzad.").
569. Schmidt II, [1995] 1 App. Cas. at 354 (discussing a "balancing between the gravity of the alleged offences" and the improper conduct of the police).
570. Levinge v. Director of Custodial Services, [1987] 9 N.S.W.L.R. 546, 565 (New S.
Wales (Austl.) S. Ct).
571. Bush, supra note 6; Gurulk, supra note 7, at 490-91.
572. Regina v. Latif and Shahzad, [1996] 1 W.L.R. at 113; Regina v. Colarusso,
[1994] 1 S.C.R. 20, 78 (Can.) (seriousness of offense a factor to be considered in determining whether evidence should be excluded).
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whether the abduction violated treaty obligations owed to a foreign state,
customary international law, or international human rights obligations
owed to either a foreign state or the fugitive. Such a violation should
strongly encourage the ordering of a stay.
The distinction between lacking the jurisdiction to try an abducted
individual, and possessing such jurisdiction but being under a duty not to
exercise it is chimerical and should be ignored. The better approach is to
admit that jurisdiction to try abducted fugitives exist, but to allow the international legal status of transnational forcible abduction (both in customary
law and the nascent international human rights law) to structure and guide
the exercise of discretion by courts to order a stay when faced with fugitives who have been brought before them in an irregular manner.
As we have seen, however, in many cases of transnational forcible
abduction there are other reasons why a domestic court may wish to order
a stay of proceedings against a fugitive. To this end, it is my argument that
domestic courts possess a discretion to stay proceedings against a fugitive
brought before it in violation of the law of a foreign state; or in circumvention of regular extradition proceedings; or in order to prevent unlawfulness
on the part of the domestic executive. In exercising its discretion to order a
stay the court must weigh and evaluate the circumstances through which
the fugitive came before it. The finding that there was no violation of customary international law (e.g., because the injured state consented to the
abduction) should not prevent a domestic court from refusing to have its
processes tainted by the executive's illegal conduct. The rule of law rationales opposing the male captus bene detentus principle-that it brings the
administration of justice into disrepute, encourages lawlessness, violates
state sovereignty, disregards international human rights law, and undermines the international extradition network-are overwhelming.

